site also constitutes the essence of all forms of movement of matter, a general law of its existence." [Boris Gessen and Ivan Podvolotskii, quoted in Weston (2008), p.435. These two characters were Deborinites writing in the 1920s.]
"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable ofinfinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinitedifferentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because thisunlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]
"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]
"This first conception [i.e., the first conception Lenin had mentioned -- RL] remains on the surface of phenomena. It can describe merely the outer appearance of movement but cannot divulge its essence; it is able merely to describe the growth or diminution of different elements or factors in a process, but cannot explain the internal cause of its evolutionary movement, cannot show how and why a given process develops. The supporters of this conception, when they would attempt such an explanation, are compelled to seek for some external factor to account for the qualitatively new, since this could never be given by merely quantitative changes. It is hardly surprising that they are frequently driven to the theory of divine intervention. The supporters of this view cannot explain how a thing comes to be turned into its own opposite, cannot explain 'leaps,' the disappearance of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new.' Thus from this standpoint it is impossible to show why capitalism must inevitably grow into socialism, or why classes in the U.S.S.R. disappear as the result of sharp class struggle. The exponents of this point of view are supporters of the mechanistic conception of development.
"The exponents of the second conception proceed from the standpoint that everything develops by means of a struggle of opposites, by a division, a dichotomy, of every unity into mutually exclusive opposites. Thus capitalism develops in virtue of the contradiction between the social character of production and the private means of appropriation; transitional economy develops on the basis of the struggle between developing and growing socialism and developed, but not yet annihilated, capitalism, and also on the basis of the sharpened conflict of classes in this period in the course of which classes ultimately disappear.
"The second conception, not remaining on the surface of phenomena, expresses the essence of movement as the unity of opposites.... This conception seeks the causes of development not outside the process but in its very midst; it seeks mainly to disclose the source of 'self-movement' of the process. To understand a process means to disclose its contradictory aspects, to establish their mutual relationship, to follow up the movement of its contradictions through all its stages. This view gives the key to the 'leaps' which characterises the evolutionary series; it explains the changing of a process into its opposite, the annihilation of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new'...." [Shirokov (1937), pp.134-36.]
"This conception of all existence as movement, process, is the fundamental condition for the understanding of the dialectic. Only from this standpoint do the contradictions and opposites, their struggle, their transformation and conversion into one another, their inter-penetration, their dialectical interaction become comprehensible. Those who see rigid entities before them and have rigid concepts of them in their heads will find it impossible to understand how the same thing can possess contradictory determinations or change into its opposite. But to those who regard both things and their reflection in our minds as processes, it will not seem strange that a process should have contradictory tendencies, sides, elements which conflict with one another, penetrate one another and change into the other....
"So the 'other' which arise from the dialectical process of becoming is not an other, i.e.., not only 'otherness,' but its other, as Hegel emphasised:
'This harmony', he says, 'is just absolute becoming, change -- not becoming something other, now this and now an other. The essential point is that each different, particular thing is different from an other, not abstractly different from any other, but different from its other.' [Rudas is here quoting Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular passage coming from p.285 --RL.]
"Upon which Lenin comments:
'Very true and important: the "other" as its other, development into its opposite.' [Rudas is here quoting Lenin (1961), p.260. This is a key idea in Hegel's response to David Hume; on this, see here -- RL.]
"Are life and death, matter and thought, bourgeois and proletarian, capitalism...and communism only 'otherness,' and not also opposites which arise from a contradictory process of development and represent its opposite poles or the transformation of one into another?" [Rudas (1933), pp.19-21. This can now be read here, although in the on-line version the above passage comes from the reader's pp.10-12.]
"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -–at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….
"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]
"The negative electrical pole…can't exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]
"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), pp.94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used at this site.]
"Formal logic, which is based on abstract, or simple, identity (A equals A), is too one-sided to explain this negation of one state of matter and its transformation into its opposite, in this case the lifeless into the living, because it excludes from its premises real difference and contradiction, which is the extreme development of difference. But the unity of opposites (A equals non-A), which makes contradiction explicit and intelligible, can explain this transition, which actually occurred on earth. The emergence of life from the nonliving in turn substantiates the objective basis in nature of this law of concrete contradiction, a cornerstone of dialectical logic." [Novack (1978), p.239.]
"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….
"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....
"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature….Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]
"Dialectics teaches one to look beyond the immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of stability and calm, and to see the seething contradictions and ceaseless movement that lies beneath the surface. We are imbued with the idea of constant change, and that sooner or later everything changes into its opposite. The capitalist system, together with its values, morality, politics and what sometimes passes for philosophy, is not something eternal, which has no beginning and no end. In fact, it is a very recent phenomenon with a turbulent past, a shaky present, and no future at all. This, of course, is something the system's defenders find impossible to contemplate. So much the worse for them!" [Authors' Preface to the second Spanish Edition of Reason in Revolt (i.e., Woods and Grant (1995); quoted from here.]
"Ted Grant was an incorrigible optimist all his life. Marxists are optimistic by their very nature because of two things: the philosophy of dialectical materialism, and our faith in the working class and the socialist future of humanity. Most people look only at the surface of the events that shape their lives and determine their destiny. Dialectics teaches one to look beyond the immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of stability and calm, and to see the seething contradictions and ceaseless movement that lies beneath the surface. The idea of constant change, in which sooner or later everything changes into its opposite enables a Marxist to rise above the immediate situation and to see the broader picture." [Authors' Preface to the second English Edition of Reason in Revolt; quoted from here.]
"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….
"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….
"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….
"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414.]
"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.
"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one can't find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....
"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]
"The statement that the struggle of opposites is decisive in development in no way belittles the importance of their unity. The unity of opposites is a requisite of struggle, because there is struggle only where opposite sides exist in one object or phenomenon....
"And so, objects and phenomena have opposite aspects -- they represent the unity of opposites. Opposites not merely exist side by side, but are in a state of constant contradiction, a struggle is going on between them. The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the source of development of reality." [Afanasyev (1968), pp.95-97.]
"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'
"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.
"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.
"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)
"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.
"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]
"But, change itself also constitutes a unity of opposites. In the most general way, a system undergoing change is becoming something that it was not and is cessing to be what it was. In one form or another a change represents the transformation of an object into its dialectical opposite, a process referred to as dialectical negation...." [Marquit (1982), pp.69-70.]
"Qualitative change is one of the basic concepts of dialectics. And so-called qualitative change refers precisely to the transformation of the character of a thing into the opposite and its change into another thing. To deny this is to deny the whole of dialectics." [Wang Jo-Shui, p.3, quoted from here. (This links to a PDF.)]
"Apart from the more or less broad division of contradictions into antagonistic and non-antagonistic, it is possible to emphasize specifically contradictions which are the basic source of development of an object (this is contradiction in its essence), contradictions connected with the transition of an object from a given state into its opposite state...." [I. Narski, Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia (1963), p.1; quoted fromhere. (This links to a PDF.)]
Even Left Communists, it seems, have been seduced by this Hermetic Creed:
"It is assumed that the dialectical character of historical materialism is best described when it is referred to as the theory of development. However, the process of evolution was also known to the natural science of the 19th century. Scientists were well acquainted with the growth of the cell into a complex organism, the evolution of animal species as expressed in the origin of species, and the theory of the evolution of the physical world known as the law of entropy. But their method of reasoning was undialectical. They believed their concepts were concrete objects and considered their identities and opposites as absolutes. Consequently, the evolution of the universe as well as the continued progress of knowledge brought out contradictions in the theory of knowledge of which many examples have been quoted by Engels in his 'Anti-Dühring.' Understanding in general and science in particular segregate and systematise into definite concepts and laws what in the real world of phenomena occurs in continuous flux and transition. By means of names, through which language separates and defines the sequel of events, all occurrences falling into a particular group are considered similar and unchangeable. As abstract concepts they differ sharply, but in reality they converge and fuse. The colours blue and green are distinct from each other but in the intermediary nuances no one can say definitely where one colour ends and the other begins. It cannot be stated at which point during its life cycle a flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That in practical life good and evil are not absolute opposites and that the greatest justice may become the greatest injustice is acknowledged everyday, just as juridical freedom may be transformed into its opposite. Dialectical thinking corresponds to reality inasmuch as it takes into consideration that the finite cannot explain the infinite, nor the static the dynamic world; that every concept has to develop into new concepts, or even into its opposite. Metaphysical thinking, on the other hand, leads to dogmatic assertions and contradictions because it views conceptions as fixed entities. Metaphysical, that is undialectical, thinking considers concepts formulated by thought as independent concepts that make up the reality of the world. Natural science proper does not suffer much from this shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice insofar as the very process of development compels it to continually revise its formulations and concepts, to amplify them by breaking them up in greater detail, to further modify its formulations to account for the new changes and to find new formulas for additions and corrections, thereby bringing the picture ever closer to the original model, the phenomenal world. The lack in dialectic reasoning becomes disturbing only when the naturalist passes from his special field of knowledge towards general philosophy and theory, as is the case with bourgeois materialism." [Anton Pannekoek,Materialism And Historical Materialism, 1942. Quoted from here. Spelling altered to conform to UK English.]
And, this idea crops up all over the place on the Internet:
"Logic since Aristotle (384-322 BCE) had been based on the so-called formal logic of A = A, a thing is always equal to itself. With the advances in science just after the French Revolution Hegel was able to propound a new logic, which based itself on movement. This can be summed up with the idea that A = -A, everything will eventually change into its opposite. Light and dark, life and death, up and down, all phenomena are in movement and eventually change into their opposite. Even the most durable elements break down into nothing over time." [Quoted fromhere.]
"The two mutually contradictory aspects of an objective thing are not dead and rigid, but living, conditional and mobile and they transform themselves into each other." [Yen Feng, quoted from here.]
"It is hardly surprising that they are frequently driven to the theory of divine intervention. The supporters of this view cannot explain how a thing comes to be turned into its own opposite, cannot explain 'leaps,' the disappearance of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new.' Thus from this standpoint it is impossible to show why capitalism must inevitably grow into socialism, or why classes in the U.S.S.R. disappear as the result of sharp class struggle. The exponents of this point of view are supporters of the mechanistic conception of development....
"The mutual penetration of opposites, the transition of one opposite into another, belongs to all processes....
"Such indeed must be the method of studying any process, i.e. our task must be to find its simplest, basic relations, to disclose in it the basic contradictions, to investigate their development and their conflict; to investigate how the development of a contradiction prepares its resolution and determines the form of its resolution; to investigate the qualitative changes in the successive phases of development of a process, the relative independence of movement of contradictory aspects, their mutual connection, their transitions one into the other; to disclose in the development of the conflict of opposites in any process the necessity and also all the conditions and possibilities of its conversion into its own opposite. Such must be the course of study of any process in its emergence, development and decay." [Quoted from here.]
"This does not end with merely acknowledging that their contradictory aspects are necessary for each other's existence. What we also need to include is their transformation into each other. In given conditions each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite.
"This transforming into its opposite is what revolution is about....
"This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. All contradictory things are interconnected. They coexist in a single entity in given conditions,under other conditions they transform themselves into each other. This is what Lenin meant when he said, 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another." [Quoted from here.]
"The universe has not been created, but has always existed, in a process of continuous flux and change, whereby things change into their opposites, cause becomes effect, and effect cause. Thus contradiction lies at the root of everything. In order to get at the truth, it is necessary to go beyond the appearances, and lay bear the inner conflicting tendencies of a given phenomenon, in order to understand its inner motive forces." [Allan Woods, quoted from here.]
"Everything, which exists, does so out of necessity. But everything perishes, only to be transformed into something else. Thus what is ‘necessary’ in one time and place becomes 'unnecessary' in another. Everything creates its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it." [Quoted from here.]
Of course, this is archaic doctrine even appears in Chinese Philosophy:
"The Yin Yang principle is 'the' preeminent ancient Chinese secret offering explanation to everything that exists, changes or moves. Its origin comes from observing the very essence of the Universe -- from darkness there is light. Yin Yang embodies duality or an opposite nature with Yin tending toward passive, dark, feminine, downward seeking and Yang tending toward active, light, masculine, upward seeking.
"Because we can see dark and we can see light they appear separate yet they are connected. Everything in life has this same connective quality. However, notice your tendency to identify Yin and Yang as separate and to judge which one you relate to or prefer over the other. This same human tendency prevents us from accessing the power of the principle. So to access the power of Yin Yang we must embrace both Yin and Yang and observe without judgment.
"There is also a cyclical nature to Yin Yang. Everything changes into its opposite in an ongoing cycle of reversal. Health changes to sickness and sickness changes into health. The more you embrace Yin Yang and see your life as one continuous flow; your experiences in life will naturally reverse or begin to flow more easily." [China Daily, 25/02/2011.]
"Because we can see dark and we can see light they appear separate yet they are connected. Everything in life has this same connective quality. However, notice your tendency to identify Yin and Yang as separate and to judge which one you relate to or prefer over the other. This same human tendency prevents us from accessing the power of the principle. So to access the power of Yin Yang we must embrace both Yin and Yang and observe without judgment.
"There is also a cyclical nature to Yin Yang. Everything changes into its opposite in an ongoing cycle of reversal. Health changes to sickness and sickness changes into health. The more you embrace Yin Yang and see your life as one continuous flow; your experiences in life will naturally reverse or begin to flow more easily." [China Daily, 25/02/2011.]
Other, perhaps more open and honest mystics, hold the same belief:
"The messages that we receive every day from Babuji Maharaj emphasise that we have no choice. We have to go through it, suffering whatever happens to us, even to the extent of understanding that happiness is a suffering. Because today's happiness brings us sorrow tomorrow. Today's sorrow brings us happiness tomorrow. Everything changes into its [opposite] as we move through this incarnation. Nothing is fixed. What is fixed is the real experience of life that we treasure in our heart -- love." [Quoted from here.]
"'This is why no one could ever defeat me. There was no way to defeat me because I was never victorious. There was not a single person on this earth who could defeat me. Nobody could defeat me because I had already accepted the defeat on my own. I never tried to win. But you are saying that you want to win, and you don't want to be defeated by anyone. Then you are bound to be defeated because victory and defeat are two sides of the same coin.'
"What Krishna is saying is that one who sees this…. And remember one thing about this seeing: it is an existential experience. It is our everyday experience, but it is a wonder how we go on missing it, how we protect ourselves from seeing it. It seems we are playing a big trick on ourselves, otherwise it would be astonishing for such a living truth of life to escape our notice.
"We experience it every day. Everything changes into its opposite. If you go more deeply into a friendship, it starts turning into enmity. But what is the trick, that we go on avoiding seeing it? The trick is that when the friendship starts turning into enmity, we don't see it like that. We say that the friend is turning into an enemy." [Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, quoted from here. Link added. Many more examples of this ancient doctrine, which seem to have been accepted by every mystic that has ever walked the earth, have been posted here.]
It wouldn't be difficult to double or treble the number of quotations (taken both from Dialectical Marxists and from the above more open and honest mystics, like the good Bhagwan) that say more-or-less the same thing, as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have -- or, who knows how to use Google -- can easily confirm.
From the above, it is quite clear that the vast majority of classical (and even more recent) dialecticians do indeed believe that objects and processes not only change (1) Because of a struggle between their 'internal opposites', but also that (2) They change into these opposites (indeed, according to Lenin, they change into all of them!) as a result of that "struggle", and that they (3) Produce these opposites while they change --, or, they do so as a result of that change.
As we will also see, some might be tempted to drop one or other of the above three conditions to save the theory, but there were very good philosophical reasons why the DM-classicists argued the way they did. which most DM-apologists seem oblivious of. I will return to this theme in a later section; so anyone tempted to abandon one of more of (1)-(3) above would be well advised to postpone these moves until they have considered these reasons.
The Absurd Consequences Of This 'Theory'
In what follows, I will be ignoring the equivocation (outlined here and here), where dialecticians sometimes appear to mean by "internal opposite", "spatially-internal opposite", and sometimes they seem to mean "conceptually-", or "logically-internal opposite" -- the latter of which was certainly what Hegel appeared to mean by his use of such odd language.
As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change because they "struggle" with one another, and then change into one another -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics, and in the writings of countless other DM-theorists.
In order to see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of, or possesses, two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and thus changes as a result.
[Henceforth, in order to save on complexity, I will omit the phrase "or possesses".]
Unfortunately, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with which it could "struggle" in order to bring that about!
[Several obvious objections to the above argument will be neutralised below. Incidentally, the same problems arise if these 'contradictions' and 'opposites' are viewed as 'external'. (However, as we will see in Essay Eight Part One, 'external contradictions/opposites' attract serious difficulties all of their own.) Here, I have also avoided using "A" and "non-A"/"not-A" as 'opposites' in order to prevent certain options from being closed off too soon. Not much hangs on this, anyway, which readers can confirm for themselves if they replace O* andO** with "A" and/or "non-A"/"not-A" respectively throughout. (This will be done anyway, below, too.) Concentrating on A alone won't help, anyway. If A changes into non-A/not-A, A will have to exist at the same time as non-A/not-A, or A and non-A/not-A couldn't 'struggle' with one another in order for A to change into one or other of non-A/not-A. Once more: if non-A/not-A already exist, A can't change into either of them, since, plainly, it/they already exist!]
As we have just seen, 'dialectical opposites' have to co-exist of they are to engage in 'struggle' -- indeed, as Gollobin confirms:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414. Bold emphases added.]
Mao made the same point:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below').... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'howopposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Mao (1961a), pp.338-39. Bold emphases alone added.]
As, indeed, did Engels:
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold emphasis added.]
The online version renders this passage slightly differently:
"And one cannot have one side of this contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his hand after eating half." [Quoted from here.]
In that case, as noted above, these 'opposites' must co-exist.
Anyway, it is hard to see how O* could "struggle" with O** if O** didn't exist at the same time as O*!
Moreover, it is no use propelling O** into the future so that it is what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** isalready there, in the present, to make that happen!
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (if we now interpret O** as not-O*, which is how the DM-classicists tend to view these opposites), O* can't change into not-O* since not-O* already exists.
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (if we now interpret O** as not-O*, which is how the DM-classicists tend to view these opposites), O* can't change into not-O* since not-O* already exists.
[Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this dialectical ditch. I have considered all of them below, and in Note 1.]
Of course, the same problems will re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into (always assuming it isn't a changeless object/process). But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. Recall not-O* can only change into not-not-O* if it struggles with not-not-O*, which doesn't yet exist! In which case, the 'dialectical process' will simply grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence (out of thin air, it seems) to start things up again, or to keep things going. But, what could possibly engineer, or have engineered, that?
Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising the serious problems it creates for his theory.]
Returning to the last point: the puzzle where not-O* itself came from. It seems it will have to have come from O* since O* can only change because of its struggle with not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will only reduplicate the above problems -- as we will see in Note 1, but in relation to C, S, and F -- Capitalism, Socialism and Feudalism.1
[However, on the NON, see below.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]
Maybe this is all too quick? Perhaps we are missing something obvious? So, in order to ascertain if the above is indeed too hasty, it might be wise to push this process into the past to see if we can circumvent these 'difficulties'. To that end, let us suppose that O* itself came from object/process X, and that not-O* came from object/process Y.
However, according to the DM-classics, X itself can only change because it "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-X". As a result of that "struggle", X will change into not-X. But, and once again, not-X already exists, so X can't change into it! If not-X didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which X could "struggle", and hence change.
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Of course, this leaves the origin of not-X itself unexplained! And yet, it can only have come into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y! However, as we have seen, Y can't change into not-X, since not-X already exists! If it didn't, X couldn't in fact change since there would be nothing there with which it could "struggle". In which case, both X and not-X must have popped into existence from nowhere.
The same problems afflict Y. Once more, according to the DM-classics, Y itself can only change because of a "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-Y". As a result, it changes into that opposite, not-Y. But, and once again, not-Y already exists, so Y can't change into it! If not-Y didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which Y could "struggle", and hence change.
Once again, this leaves the origin of not-Y unexplained. Not-Y can only have come into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y! But, Y can't change into not-Y, since not-Y already exists! If it didn't, Y couldn't change. In which case, both Y and not-Ymust have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
It could be objected that the above seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the argument advanced in this Essay is completely misguided.
Fortunately, repairs are relatively easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O** -- the latter once again interpreted as not-O* --, and thus develops as a result.
The rest follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O*, and O* develops into not-O* as a result, then. plainly, this can't happen. As we have already seen, it isn't possible for O* to change into not-O* if not-O* already exists, and this will be the case whether or not, O* and not-O* are changeless or constantly changing objects and/or processes.
Of course, it could be objected that not-O* develops into O* while not-O* develops into O*. They develop into each other.
[This objection might even incorporate that obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]
If that were so, while this was happening, O* and not-O* would no longer be opposites of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more. It would also threaten to undermine this 'Law' in other ways, since, as we will see, each object/process has to have a unique "opposite" (something Hegel and Lenin called its "other").
Ignoring this 'minor' difficulty for now -- and even if we suppose it were the case that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' intoO*, and that and such change was governed by the obscure term "sublation" -- this theory still wouldn't work (as we are about to find out).
In order to see this, it might be a good idea to motivate the above objection to the argument presented here a little further. Indeed, it could be argued that Engels had anticipated the above 'difficulties' in the following comments:
"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976), pp.172-73. Bold emphases added.]
"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....
"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81. Bold emphases and link added.]
Engels's argument appears to be that "dialectical negation" isn't the same as ordinary (or even logical) negation in that it isn't simpledestruction, nor is it a mere cancellation. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect in itself, just as we will also see, this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as, indeed, did Engels and subsequent DM-fans).
Despite all this, it is worth asking: Does the above passage neutralise the argument presented earlier? Is the argument here guilty of the following?
"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought."? [Ibid.]
To answer this question, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites"/"tendencies"O* and not-O*, and it thus develops as a result. Given this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary --, but not intonot-O* --, incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. If we are to believe what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.
Putting this minor quibble to one side, too: Given this 'revised' view, we may now suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "Oi*" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').
If so, Oi* must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-Oi* in existence to make it develop any further!
[Recall that according to this 'theory', everything in existence (and that must include Oi*) changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]
So, there must be a not-Oi* already in existence to make Oi* change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt Oi* from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that Oi* changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events expressed in the DM-classics, which tell us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the "struggle" of opposites (and Oi* is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.
[That would also mean that the Second 'Law' isn't a law, either -- which is what we found was the case with the First 'Law', too.]
This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to Oi*) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.
Ignoring this 'difficulty', too: Even if Oi* were to change into not-Oi* (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down in the DM-classics), then all the problems we met earlier simply reappear, for Oi* would only be able to change if not-Oi* already exists to make that happen! But, not-Oi* can't already exist, for Oi* hasn't changed into it yet!
On the other hand, even if we were to suppose not-Oi* already exists, Oi* couldn't change into it since, as we have just seen, not-Oi*already exists!
Again, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O*, which produces not-O*, isn't ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.
In that case, let us now suppose that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite, not-Os*. But, if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Classics, not-Os* must already exist if O* is to struggle with it and then change into it! Once again, if that is so, O* can't turn into not-Os*, for it already exists! Alternatively, if not-Os* didn't already exist, O* couldn't change since O* can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-Os*!
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, once more.
It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For instance, to use Mao's example, peace changes into war; love can change into hate, and so on.
No one doubts this, but DM can't explain why this happens. Indeed, if DM were true, they couldn't happen!
So, for peace to change into war, it would have to struggle with it. Has anyone witnessed this odd event? Can abstractions like these actually struggle with one another? And yet, both Mao and Lenin told us the following:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphases added.]
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)'. Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another.
"That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion....
"War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.
"There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b), pp.316, 337-38, 339-40, 342-43. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
If the above DM-classicists are right, how can peace change into war unless it "struggled" with it?
It could be argued that the contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) of a given society, or societies -- which might give the appearance of peace -- are what turn peace in to war; it is the mutual struggle of these contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) that change the one into the other.
In that case, let us call these underlying contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) UA and UA*, respectively. If the above is correct, it is the struggle between UA and UA* that changes Peace (P) into War (W). And yet, if this is so, the DM-classics were wrong;P and its opposite, W, do not actually struggle with one another, even though they are opposites, and even though they should do this (if the DM-classics are to be believed). What changes P into W is a struggle between their non-opposites, UA and UA*. Furthermore, if eitherUA or UA* changes P into W, then one or both of them must be the opposite(s) of P, and if they are the opposite(s) of P they should change into P! Either that, or the DM-classics are wrong.
On the other hand, if UA and UA* are indeed opposites of one another, they should change into each other. But, they can't do that since they both already exist!
Once again, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Concrete Examples
It could be argued that if we consider concrete examples, we might be able to understand what the DM-classics meant when they claimed that things struggle, with and then change, into their opposites.
In what follows, I propose to examine several 'concrete' examples, some of which have been put to me by those who doubt that the general criticisms advanced above apply in such cases. Apologies are owed in advance for the somewhat repetitive nature of this material, but those who appealed to these examples thought they could thereby neutralise the above criticisms. In every case, they were only able to imagine they could do this by ignoring one or more of the core DM-theses advanced in the classics -- namely: (1) Everything changes because of a 'struggle' between 'dialectical opposites', (2) Everything changes into that 'opposite', and (3) Change produces that opposite.
Hence, the next four sub-sections are aimed at showing that if we accept what the DM-classics have to say, the aforementioned general criticisms do indeed apply in each case. Hence the unfortunate need for repetition.
'Dialectical John' Can't In Fact Age
Consider "John" again: it has been pointed out to me that while it might be the case that John is a boy, in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man (all things being equal). Now, the fact that other individuals are already men doesn't stop John changing into a man (his opposite). So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists. In that case, the above objections fail.
Or, so it could be maintained.
And yet, as we have seen, this theory tells us that all things/processes change because they "struggle" with their 'opposites', and that they "struggle" with what they become (i.e., that 'opposite'). The above response ignores these salient details. If we don't ignore them, what effect will that have on this example?
Are we to assume with the DM-classics that John has to struggle with his opposite? But, according to this response, his opposite is all men (or perhaps manhood). If so, John must struggle with all the individuals that are already men (i.e., all men) if he is to become a man himself. But, do we find boys, and particularly John, struggling with every grown man on the planet? I must admit, if this does happen, I have missed it; I suspect I'm not the only one.
Perhaps, John struggles with manhood? I'll return to this possibility presently.
On the other hand, are we to suppose that John must struggle with what he himself is to become, his individual opposite -- i.e., himself as a man --, even before it/he exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point; John can only change if he struggles with his opposite, but that opposite doesn't yet exist. Plainly, if his opposite doesn't yet exist, he can't struggle with it, and hence can't change.
We hit the same problem.
Moreover, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite (and his opposite is all men), does this mean he has to turn into these other men, too? Or, does he turn into just one of them? But, it seems he must do one or the other if the Dialectical Classics are to be believed.
Anyway, according to the DM-worthies, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. If so, are we really supposed to believe that "John-as-a-man" is struggling with "John-as-a-boy" in the here-and-now? Or, that the abstraction, manhood, is struggling with that other abstraction, boyhood?
Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, if that were the case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the here-and-now. Of course, adolescence can't struggle with anything, since it, too, is an abstraction. And, a struggle in John's 'mind' over what he is to become can't make him develop into a man, either! Maybe for Idealists what happens in 'the mind' can effect a change in John, but one assumes materialists will want to reject such an option; it should hardly need pointing out that a struggle in the mind can't change a boy into a man. This isn't to deny that such struggles take place, it is merely to point out that mere thinking doesn't make something so, or happen -- if it did, beggars would ride.
Nevertheless, John-as-a-man doesn't yet exist, so John-as-a-man can't struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-mandoes exist alongside John-as-boy, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy can't change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!
To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that 'opposite' cannot now exist otherwise John wouldn't need to become him! But, and once again, if this opposite doesn't exist, John can't change, for there would be nothing with which he could struggle.
Looking at this a little more concretely: In ten or fifteen years time, John won't become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "ManJ". But, and once again, ManJ must exist now or John couldn't change into him (if the DM-classics quoted earlier are to be believed) -- for John can only become a man if he is now locked in struggle with what he is to become, his own opposite, ManJ.
Once more: if this is so, John cannot become ManJ since ManJ already exists!
It could be objected that the DM-classics argue that an object in change takes on an opposite property or quality, expressed by the negation of the predicate term that once applied to it. So, in abstract terms, if A is F (where "A" is perhaps the name of a person, such as John, or that of some object or process, and "F" is some property or quality he/it possesses at some point) -- then the A that is F becomes the A that is not-F. Or, perhaps better: it used to be the case that A is F, now it is the case that A is not-F. This is surely possible -- indeed, actual. Moreover, A being F doesn't prevent A becoming not-F simply because F already exists, or even because not-F already exists (since, plainly, not-F doesn't yet exist in A). So, dialectical change is not only possible, it is actual.
However, this is just a generalisation of the point made above about John becoming a man, and is susceptible to the same sort of rebuttal: if not-F doesn't yet exist, then A can't struggle with it, and hence can't change. In which case, this latest response ignores what the DM-classics tell us: change is produced by a struggle of co-existent opposites.
It could be argued, that not-F does exist, so this struggle can take place. Hence, A can both struggle with not-F and become not-F. More concretely, tendencies in John that maintain him as a boy (F) are locked in a struggle with those that are changing him into a man/not-a-boy (not-F).
Again, this is just a particular example of a point that has already been considered. But, are we really supposed to believe that John changes into a tendency -- for that is what not-F is, according to this objection?
[Anyway, I examine the 'opposite tendencies defence' in more detail, below.]
Independently of that, it is difficult to believe that anyone who has read the DM-classics could imagine that this new interpretation finds any support in what they have to say. For example, if it is indeed the case that the A that is F turns into the A is not-F -- or if A's being Fdevelops into A's being not-F -- then, according to those classics, they must struggle with one another. But, how can this happen if it isadmitted that the A is not-F doesn't yet exist?
It could be countered that what is important here is that F applied to A turns into its opposite, not-F. Now, many not-Fs will typically alreadyexist. For example, John might be alive one day (i.e., A is F), but the next he could be dead/not alive (i.e., A is not-F). But, many other individuals were dead or weren't alive the day before, when John was alive. But, that doesn't stop him from becoming not alive (not-F), contrary to the repeated assertions above. The fact that some things are not-F doesn't prevent other things from becoming not-F, too.
Again, this is just a re-packaged version of the point made above about John becoming a man. In this case, when he dies, John doesn't just become any old corpse, he becomes John's corpse. If that is so, and the DM-classics are to be believed (that objects and processes struggle with what they become), then that can only happen if John struggles with his opposite, i.e., with his own corpse! Do we all really have to fight our own future cadavers in order to die?
It could be objected that this could happen if F struggles with not-F. Life and death/not-life are dialectically opposed to one another, as Engels pointed out. So, the forces that keep John, for example, alive are opposed to those that are killing him, and which will kill him one day.
But, if that is so, and the DM-classics are correct, then these dialectical opposites must turn into one another. Is it really the case then that the forces that keep John alive will turn into those that are killing him, and vice versa? Will anabolic processes become catabolicprocesses, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact, these processes don't even struggle with one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we were to believe everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[Since I have devoted several sections of Essay Seven Part One to this very point, the reader is re-directed there for more details.]
Furthermore, and returning to whatever it is that A refers to, mentioned above: A doesn't just change into any old not-F, it changes into aparticular not-F. Let us call the particular not-F that A changes into "FA". Once more, according to the dialectical classics, every object/process changes because (1) It struggles with its opposite and (2) It changes into that opposite. If so, A can only change by struggling with FA; but FA already exists, so A can't change into it. If FA didn't already exist, A couldn't struggle with it in order to change.
No matter how many bends we try to negotiate with this rusty old banger of a theory, it still ends up wrapped around the same non-dialectical tree trunk.
Turning The Tables On DM
Consider another concrete example with which I have been confronted: wood being fashioned into a table. Once more, according to the dialectical classics all objects and processes change because of a 'struggle' of opposites, and they also change into those opposites.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to 'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it. [Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?]
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood couldn't 'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it couldn't 'struggle' with the table it has yet to become!
Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to 'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it. [Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?]
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood couldn't 'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it couldn't 'struggle' with the table it has yet to become!
Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
And, it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a carpenter is required to turn wood into a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with that wood to make it into that table -- since we are told that every object and process in nature and society is governed by this 'Law'. But, once again, according to the Dialectical Classics, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical 'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, the wood in question must turn into the carpenter, not the table! And the carpenter must change into wood!
With a crazy 'theory' like this at its core, is it any wonder Dialectical Marxism is a by-word for failure?
Are 'Dialectical Cats' Immortal?
If we examine another example I have come across on several Internet Discussion Boards we will soon see that this 'law' has several other rather absurd consequences: The DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a 'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites' (since we are told everything in the entire universe changes this way).
Consider a live cat, C, and its 'dialectical opposite', C*. According to the DM-classicists, C must at some point 'struggle' with and then change into C*. But, at some point, C also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead cat must be the 'opposite' of that live cat; that is, C* must be that dead cat. In that case, if the dialectical classics are to be believed, a dialectical cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become. In which case, C can only die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
On the other hand, live cat C can't change into dead cat C* since dead cat C* already exists! If C* didn't already exist, C couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', C can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
Alternatively, this 'theory' also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
On the other hand, live cat C can't change into dead cat C* since dead cat C* already exists! If C* didn't already exist, C couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', C can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
Alternatively, this 'theory' also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in the life and death of cat C, whether or not these are 'sublated' intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that cat C goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.
However, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a 'struggle of opposites', and C(1) must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, C(1) must inevitably change into C(2).
So, C(1) must 'struggle' with and change into, C(2).
If so, the same problems arise, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since C(2) already exists. If C(2) didn't already exist, C(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it!
Let us assume, therefore, that cat C goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.
However, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a 'struggle of opposites', and C(1) must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, C(1) must inevitably change into C(2).
So, C(1) must 'struggle' with and change into, C(2).
If so, the same problems arise, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since C(2) already exists. If C(2) didn't already exist, C(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it!
Furthermore, if C(2) is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with and change into,C(3). But, C(2) can't change into C(3) since C(3) already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make C(2) change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat could change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat could change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
It is a mystery, therefore, how there is any room left in the dialectical universe for anything to move, let alone change!
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism?
Stop Press: Dialectical Kettles Use Zero Energy!
Consider another hackneyed DM-example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe what the DM-classics tell us, that the 'opposite' that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? But, this must be the case if the DM-classics are correct.
Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!
In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!
It might be useful to make this example a little more concrete: To that end, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it when the liquid (of which it is a part) is heated. In order to identify this molecule let us call it, "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into, "S1". But, if the DM-classics above are correct W1 can only turn into S1 by 'struggling' with it. In that case, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1couldn't struggle with it and thus change! But, how can W1 turn into S1 if S1 already exists?
[The same result emerges if we consider a set of water molecules, W, and the set of steam molecules, S, that they turn into. I have left the details for the reader to complete.]
In fact, according to the DM-classics, opposites turn into each other; if so, S1 must change into W1 at the same time that W1 is turning intoS1! So, while you are boiling a kettle -- according to this Super-scientific 'theory' -- steam must be condensing back into the water you are boiling, and it must be doing so at the same rate the water is turning into steam!
One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.
Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and, as we have seen, to any and all alleged examples of 'dialectical'-change).
It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas (i.e., into steam/water vapour); so the dialectical classicists are correct.
However, if we take the DM-classics at their word, this gas (steam) must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if that water is to change into it. But, plainly, this gas doesn't yet exist, or the water would already have changed into it! In which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true, since the gas it is supposed to change into isn't there yet for it to struggle with.
It could be argued that what happens is that the heat energy put into the system makes water boil. Indeed, but then, if heat makes water boil, that water must struggle with this heat, and then change into it (if we are to believe the |DM-classicists), just as heat must change into water! If not, the DM-classics are wrong, and dialecticians are left with no theory of change.
[Follow the above link for an explanation why Hegel and Lenin adopted this rather odd 'theory of change'.]
Critics Answered
General Response
The above argument completely destroys the undeserved reputation DM has enjoyed for over a century (at least in the minds of its supporters) that it is the theory of change. In which case, one would have expected some sort of coherent defence from DM-fans. But, what do we find?
When confronted with these startling revelations -- and to most DM-fans these passages are indeed revelations, since few of them seem to have read the DM-classics with due care, or given them much thought --, dialecticians with whom I have 'debated' this topic have tended to respond in one or more of the following ways:
(1) They deny the DM classicists meant what they said -- or they assert that the DM-classicists did not in fact say what these passages clearly say they said! [Yes, they are that desperate!]
(2) They argue that these quotations aren't representative, or they have been "taken out of context".
(3) They claim that the author in question mis-spoke, or made an error.
(4) They argue that my demolition of this core DM-principle is merely "semantic", or that it is a classic example of "pedantry". That response is neutralised here. But, independently of that, it is worth pointing out that the argument that Hegel used to motivate and establish this 'theory' of change was itself based on 'semantic' principles -- on that, see here and here. So, if this doctrine was originally based on 'semantics', DM-fans can hardly complain if 'semantics' is used in its demolition.
(5) They suggest we should use our "commonsense" when applying this 'Law', and we should therefore reject the absurd conclusions I have highlighted.
(6) They point out that it is inappropriate to use FL-symbols when attempting to understand/interpret this theory, since FL puts objects and processes in 'fixed categories'. [An example of this sort of response can be found here, on page 2.]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
(7) They endeavour to repair this theory on-the-hoof, as it were, substituting their own preferred, but hastily concocted, 'substitute theory' -- all of which 'repairs' suffer from other fatal defects which they have also failed to spot, problems that Hegel and the DM-classicists were well aware of. Indeed, Hegel's theory was specifically designed to avoid these 'problems'.
(8) They argue that (a) This 'Law' deals solely with, or pertains exclusively to, opposing "tendencies", or that (b) It only applies inspecific circumstances.
(9) But, mostly, they simply ignore this 'problem', or they deflect it onto me, and ask: "Who does Ms Lichtenstein think she is questioning this great Philosopher (Hegel), or these great revolutionaries?" [An excellent example of the latter approach can be found here -- check out the emotive responses of 'Loz'. But there are many more like this.]
I will now deal with each of these in turn -- beginning, however, with (2):
Unrepresentative And/Or 'Taken Out Of Context'
I have already listed dozens of quotations taken from the dialectical classics and 'lesser' DM-clones which show that these passages are indeed representative, and that DM-theorists (i.e., those who accept the classics) do in fact, or should in fact, believe that (a) Everything changes into its 'opposite', that (b) Everything does this by 'struggling' with its 'opposite', and that (c) This 'struggle' results in the production of that 'opposite'.
based on these passages, it is quite clear that the vast majority of classical (and even more recent) dialecticians do indeed accept (a), (b), and (c).
Now, when asked in what way these passages have been "taken out of context", the 'reply' I invariably receive from my 'dialectical critics' is..., er..., total silence. To that end, if any of my current readers think I have taken any of these passages "out of context", they should e-mail me, and if it turns out that i have sinned in this regard, I will apologise profusely and withdraw my criticism.
[This material has now been on the Internet, in one form or another, for nigh on eight years; in that time not one single DM-fan has e-mailed me to point out where or how I have taken this material "out of context".]
The DM-Classicists Didn't Mean What They Said
As far as (1) above is concerned, if the DM-worthies didn't mean what they said then latter-day DM-fans (who advance this excuse) will, it seems, have to ignore their own classics!
Less irrational readers will note that many of the above dialecticians quote one another word-for-word, so they at least thought their sources meant what they said.
The DM-Classicists Misspoke, Or Committed A Series Of Errors
More-or-less the same can be said about excuse (3); if the above worthies miss-spoke, or were wrong, then contemporary DM-fans would be well advised to ignore these error-strewn classics, since they all say the same thing!
Of course, anyone foolish enough to adopt this (otherwise!) sound piece of advice will have to endure the same amount and volume of abuse that has been aimed in my direction by those misguided enough to ignore it.
If We Use Our Commonsense, We Will Soon See These 'Absurd Consequences' For What They Are
Excuse (5) is a little different. Clearly we should use our common sense when interpreting anything, but this line-of-defence is a little rich coming from those who tell us, or who endorse, the following comment about 'commonsense':
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Engels (1892), p.406. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Especially those who now turn round and expect 'commonsense' to bale them out. In fact, Engels tells us that 'commonsense' is all but useless in such contexts (i.e., in relation to change, etc.). How 'commonsense' can help the beleaguered dialectician here is therefore something of a mystery.
Indeed, and on the contrary, the application of ordinary common sense shows this 'Law' would make change impossible.
[I explain the difference between "common sense" and "commonsense", here.]
Even so, Lenin and Mao were quite clear, this 'Law' is both universal and absolute:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. .]
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid.,p.318. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Not much wiggle room here, one feels!
It Is Inappropriate To Use FL, Or FL-Symbols, In Such Contexts
In fact, I have used very little, if any, FL in this Essay. And, as far as symbols are concerned, we need look no further than Mao's own use of them:
"But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed -- a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing." [Mao (1961b), p.333. Bold emphases added.]
Any who still complain about the use of symbols should turn an equally critical eye toward their use by DM-theorists themselves -- and, indeed, by Hegel, himself.
So, the use of abbreviative letters in this Essay (and they are no more than this -- they are certainly not variables drawn from FL!) is decidedly uncontroversial and plainly doesn't imply the use of 'fixed categories', as Mao himself notes.
In order to see this, it might be helpful to re-write an earlier argument (but now edited accordingly) that uses these abbreviative symbols to see what happens when they are dropped:
The DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a 'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites' (since we are told everything in the entire universe changes this way).
Consider a live cat and its 'dialectical opposite'. According to the DM-classicists that live cat must at some point 'struggle' with and then change into that 'opposite'. Again, at some point, that live cat also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead cat must be the 'opposite' of the live cat. In that case, if the dialectical classics are to be believed, a dialectical cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become; hence,it can only die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
Alternatively, that live cat can't change into the aforementioned dead cat since that dead cat already exists! If it didn't already exist, the live cat couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', the above live cat can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, it also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Alternatively, that live cat can't change into the aforementioned dead cat since that dead cat already exists! If it didn't already exist, the live cat couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', the above live cat can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, it also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in the life and death of a cat, whether or not these are 'sublated' intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that this live cat goes through an indefinite number of successive stages: cat stage one, cat stage two, cat stage three..., cat stage any large number you care to name, cat stage one bigger than that, until at cat stage one bigger still it finally pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, cat stage one can only change into cat stage two because of a 'struggle of opposites', and cat stage one must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, cat stage one must inevitably change into cat stage two.
So, cat stage one must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage two.
If so, the same problems arise, for cat stage one can't change into cat stage two since cat stage two already exists. If it didn't, cat stage one couldn't 'struggle' with it! Moreover, if cat stage two is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage three. But, cat stage two can't change into cat stage three since cat stage three already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make cat stage two change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By an indefinite number of applications of the above argument -- and according to this 'theory' -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
Let us assume, therefore, that this live cat goes through an indefinite number of successive stages: cat stage one, cat stage two, cat stage three..., cat stage any large number you care to name, cat stage one bigger than that, until at cat stage one bigger still it finally pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, cat stage one can only change into cat stage two because of a 'struggle of opposites', and cat stage one must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, cat stage one must inevitably change into cat stage two.
So, cat stage one must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage two.
If so, the same problems arise, for cat stage one can't change into cat stage two since cat stage two already exists. If it didn't, cat stage one couldn't 'struggle' with it! Moreover, if cat stage two is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage three. But, cat stage two can't change into cat stage three since cat stage three already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make cat stage two change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By an indefinite number of applications of the above argument -- and according to this 'theory' -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
It is a mystery, therefore, how there is any room left in the dialectical universe for anything to move, let alone change!
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism?
The reader will no doubt appreciate that very little has changed (no pun intended), except perhaps the argument isn't quite as clear or as concise as it used to be. Hence, very little hangs on the use of abbreviative symbols.
Impromptu Repairs Attempted 'On-The-Hoof'
It seems that very few DM-fans have given much thought to their own 'theory' of change, so when its absurd consequences are pointed out to them they first of all react with horror, and then some of them attempt to apply their own hastily constructed and impromptu repairs. [An excellent example of this tactic can be found here, on page 2.] But, these repairs, carried out 'on-the-hoof', fail to address the core problems that Hegel's theory was itself supposed to have addressed and then solved -- which is why DM-theorists like Lenin were keen to import it into Marxism. Before I examine how Lenin thought Hegel had done this, it might be a good idea to fill in some of the background details.
Hegel's Response To Hume
In reply to (7) above, it is worth recalling that Hegel invented this way of characterising change by appropriating and then adapting Kant's response to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation. Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume and the Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution pushed necessitating causation off into the Noumenon, about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect; he found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that every determination is also a negation (which, by the way, neither Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to justify -- more about that in Essay Twelve), and in (2) His argument that the LOI "stated negatively" implies the LOC (which, unfortunately, it doesn't).1a
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A, "determinate negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A. [I am, of course, simplifying greatly here! I have reproduced Hegel's argument below for those who think I might have misrepresented him.]
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".
From this, the "unity of opposites" was born. So, the link between cause and effect was now given by this 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction between these logically-linked "opposites".
Plainly, this paired, unique opposite, not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide his readers with no explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed to just any old not-A -- say, B, or, indeed, something else, C, for example -- all of which would also be not-A, too.
So, since B and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he would have had no effective answer to Hume.
[Hume, of course, wouldn't have denied that A changes into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have pointed out that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A to change into what we have always, or what we have in general, experienced before. There is no logical link, however, between A and what it develops into since there is no contradiction in supposing Ato change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply is successful!)]
Hence, Hegel introduced this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique "other" that was 'internally' connected to A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate negation' from A. [How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and criticism of it -- can be found in Essay Eight Part Three.]
This special not-A was now the unique "other" of A. Without it Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.
Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the above 'rationale'; as far as I can see, of the DM-classicists, only Lenin seems to be aware of it!), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And, that is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet") is integral to classical DM; it supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.
[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms, and those of more recent Humeans, and which do not thereby make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the reader is directed to Hacker (2007), and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
Lenin Endorses Hegel's Theory
Here is Lenin's acknowledgement and endorsement of this principle:
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Lenin (1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation is found on p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentiallycontained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961), p.225, quoting Hegel (1999),pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in the original.]
Lenin wrote in the margin:
"This is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.225.]
To which he added:
"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel." [Ibid., p.179.]
This shows that Lenin understood this to be a reply to Hume, and that it was central to comprehending dialectics.
It is worth quoting the entire passage from Hegel's Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied into the above Notebooks -- pp.225-28):
"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself.Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of theimmediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.
"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simpledetermination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negativejudgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.
"The second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation." [Hegel (1999), pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting several minor typos.]
The most relevant and important part of which is this:
"It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequentlyas contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid. Bold emphases alone added.]
This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not the logical reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel notes. Hence, Lenin was absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding" DM -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and unworkable as a result!
Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the 'Shorter Logic':
"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]
[The problems these rather odd ideas in fact create for Hegel are outlined here.]
Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or even (3) Reject the idea that these 'opposites' are internally-related as one "other" to another specific "other", will leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.
[For Hegel's other comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b), pp.369-75.]
In which case, Hegel's theory (coupled with the part-whole dialectic) was at least a theory of causation, change and of the supposed logical development of history; so the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental -- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has a logic to it. Hence, Hegel's 'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent incarnations of them (which, combined with contemporary versions of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith was of course a friend collaborator of Hume's) in essence feature in much of modern economic theory and philosophy, and thus in contemporary criticisms of Marx's economics and politics) -- are a direct threat to this idea. If these bourgeois critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner logic' to capitalism.
[This dependency on Hegel's theory of causation and change also supplies us with an explanation for the implicit teleology anddeterminism in DM, providing its acolytes with hope in a hopeless world. More on this in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two. The mystical and rationalist foundations of this approach to change are outlined here, here, here and here.]
As far as I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even noticed!) this aspect of their own theory. The only authors that I am aware of who take this aspect of DM into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which are the most sophisticated I have so far seen (on this topic), in other Essays published at this site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight Part Three. [However, since writing this I have also come across some of Charles Bettelheim's comments that suggest he, too, understood this point.]
Incidentally, this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any of these, they couldn't be 'logically' connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been logico-conceptual or necessary development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless enough to introduce 'external contradictions' into their system would in effect be 're-Hume-ing' Hegel, not putting him 'back on his feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that 'external contradictions' were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]
[I have analysed several other fatal defects implicit in the idea that there can be 'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature or society) in Essay Eleven Part Two, here and here.]
The problem is that even though Hegel's theory sort of works -- if one is both an Idealist and p*ss-poor logician (more on this in Essay Twelve Part Five) --, it can't work in HM, for the reasons outlined in this Essay -- since, if this theory were true, change would be impossible!
So, if, for instance, the relations of production and the forces of production, the proletariat and the capitalist class, are linked as 'contradictory opposites' in the way that Hegel supposed (upside down or 'the right way up') -- which they will have to be, or Hume's criticisms (or more modern versions of them) will have their place --, then the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class -- and vice versa!
So, if, for instance, the relations of production and the forces of production, the proletariat and the capitalist class, are linked as 'contradictory opposites' in the way that Hegel supposed (upside down or 'the right way up') -- which they will have to be, or Hume's criticisms (or more modern versions of them) will have their place --, then the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class -- and vice versa!
It could be argued that the proletariat will in fact change into the ruling-class, its opposite. So, this theory is at least correct here.
But, the opposite of the proletariat isn't just any old ruling-class, it is the capitalist class. This class is the unique "other" of the proletariat with whom they are 'internally' linked. Hence, the former must change into the latter, and vice versa, if this theory were correct. Workers struggle with capitalists, and so, according to this theory, they must change into them, thus making socialism impossible.
Anyway, did the peasant class in the Middle Ages change in to the ruling-class of their day? Or, vice versa? Did the slaves in Ancient Rome change into the Aristocracy? Or, vice versa? But, they should have done this if DM were correct.
[On this, also see Note 1.]
These Criticisms Are Completely Misguided Since They Ignore 'Opposite Tendencies'
Considering now the first half of (8) above, it could be pointed out that Lenin actually argued as follows:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
As one critic of my argument put things (this is in fact one of the few detailed and carefully argued responses to my objections I have encountered in the last eight years on the Internet):
"This is a complete misreading of the law of unity and interpenetration of opposites. To borrow Rosa's symobology (sic), a contradiction means in essence that an entity A contains internally contradictory tendencies O* and O** which cause A to turn into not-A. The struggle within A is between O* and O**, the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*) and the internal forces acting on it to change (O**). The whole essence of dialectics is that O* and O** can not exist within a stable equilibrium. Rosa quotes Lenin saying quite clearly that we are not dealing with O*turning into O**, but with the working-out of 'internally contradictory tendencies' within A.
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity; it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**).
"Now, Rosa's going to object that dialectics pictures entities that 'struggle with' what they are going to become, which presupposes that these entities already exist. But this is because she fails to distinguish between the realized entities A and not-A, and the internal tendencies O* andO**. When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism....
"Again, Lenin talks about these tendencies in phenomena and processes that elude your grasp. The above is precisely what I have been illustrating with the difference between A (the entity) and O*/O** (its contradictory tendencies) that you have not understood.
"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*." [Bold added.]
"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*." [Bold added.]
Readers will look long and hard and to no avail to find where I say that things "change into their contradictions", but into theircontradictories, in this case into not-A (which is what the DM-classics tell us). Just as they will look long and hard for a single quotation from the DM-classics (certainly this critic offered none) that supports this revisionist reading of the theory. The above critic will also need to tell us why not-A isn't the 'contradictory' of A.
It could be objected that the above critic did refer us to this quotation from Lenin:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)." [Lenin (1961), p.357. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
However, when asked (several times), the above critic refused to comment on this quotation from Lenin:
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin (1961), p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
According to the above, the opposite tendencies within A -- that is, "the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*)" and "the internal forces acting on it to change (O**)" must change into one another. But, how can they do that if each of them already exists? No wonder this critic ignored Lenin's words. [However, see below.]
But, what about this part of the argument?
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity; it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**)."
Unfortunately, this ignores the philosophical background to Hegel's theory (which Lenin accepted, even if he had to put it "back on its feet"). That background was outlined above.
It could be argued that this critic has answered the point made by Lenin (that opposites are transformed into one another):
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**."
And yet this fails to explain why O* and O** do not change into one another. Despite being pressed on this many times, this critic refused to respond. Moreover, this isn't to look "at the outside". [Whatever that means! More on this below.] The DM-classics are quite clear, this applies to "everything existing", and it is an "absolute":
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Ibid., p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]
"Of course, the fundamental proposition of Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted from here.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. In all of the above, bold emphases alone added; quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
[And these are only from the classics; we have seen that 'lesser' DM-works also say the same thing. However, this critic was a fellow Trotskyist, and so might not be prepared to accept what Mao had to say. But, as we can see, Mao was merely echoing Lenin.]
It could be argued that some of the above passages merely say that everything changes into its opposite; they don't say that they change into one another. But, if everything changes into its opposite, and that opposite is also part of everything, then it too must change into its opposite; that is, O* must change into O**, and O** must change into O*.
But, what of the argument itself? Are "tendencies" causal agents? Aren't they (i.e., both the tendencies and the changes) rather the result of other causes? For example, do we say that the "tendency" for glass to break is what makes it break, or do we appeal to inter-molecular forces within glass, and an external shock? But, can't we call these inner forces "tendencies", too? Are there such inner "tendencies" in glass? If there are, what are their causes? Or, are they uncaused? In fact, if we just appeal to "tendencies" to explain things, noting is explained. "Why did that glass break?" "It just has a tendency to do so." "Why is it raining?" "It simply has a tendency to do so in this area." "Why did those cops attack the strikers?" "They have a tendency to defend the bosses." So, an appeal to a "tendency" is no explanation at all.
Or, rather, if we insist on regarding and appeal to "tendencies" as an explanation, that must be because we also view the word as a shorthand for other causes (known or unknown) at work in the system. Consider the "tendency" of the rate of profit to fall. Is thatuncaused? But, no Marxist will argue it is. Indeed, Marxists point to several contributory causal factors that combine to make the rate of profit tend to fall over time. Would any of us have been satisfied if Marx had simply said there a "tendency" for the rate of profit to fall, and made no attempt to explain its cause/causes?
Hence, "tendencies" aren't causes; they are the result of one or more causes themselves. So, this critic is mistaken, an internal "tendency" can't "preserve A", nor can the opposite "tendency", O**, cause a "transformation into not-A", since these "tendencies" are derivative not causative. Indeed, as the DM-classics inform us, the cause of these "tendencies" is the "unity and interpenetration of opposites", the "contradiction" and the "struggle" that results from this.
As Gollobin points out (quoting Engels):
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414. Bold emphases added.]
So, as Lenin also noted, these 'internal opposites' not only struggle, they turn into one another:
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin (1961), p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
But, this can't happen, and for reasons explored above.
Well, perhaps it is the struggle between these "opposite tendencies" that causes A to change? Here is my critic again:
"When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism...."
But, the DM-classics are quite clear: when these opposites struggle, they change into one another, as noted above several times. [And it is no use this critic blithely asserting that this is to be found only in "some presentations" of the theory. It is found throughout the DM-classics and other DM-texts, as we have seen.] So, O* must change into O**, and vice versa. Otherwise, O* and O** will be changeless beings. If they themselves have causal powers, or are causal powers, then they, too, must also be objects (structures?), relations, or processes of some sort. In which case, they, too, must change. On the other hand, if they don't have causal powers, or they aren't causal powers, then, of course, they can't cause change themselves. And, we can see this critic also assumes this to be so, since he has stopped calling O* andO** "tendencies"; they have become the "capitalist class" and the "working class", respectively. And, these surely change one another, and thereby change themselves. They are the most important cause, or one of the most important causes, of change in Capitalism.
Indeed, this critic admits they do change:
"That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*."
And yet, if we ignore the impromptu 'theory' this critic has pulled out of thin air and accept the account given in the DM-classics, this can only happen if O* struggles with not-O*, and then turns into it, which puts us exactly where we were several paragraphs back. Of course, even though he adopted my "symbology", this critic failed to note that I had defined O**, for example, as not-O*. In which case, he has no explanation why O* changes into not-O*. Are there further tendencies within what are already tendencies? That must be so if this critic's theory is to work. There must be a tendency in O* that preserves it as O* -- let us call it, "T*" -- just as there must be a tendency to turn it into not-O* -- let us call this, "T**".
Does this go on forever, with a series of tendencies within tendencies within tendencies? It seems it must if all change (including each change of a tendency into whatever it changes into) is a result of these internal tendencies -- otherwise these tendencies must be changeless.
This seems to imply that every change involves a potentially infinite number of tendencies within tendencies within tendencies. Let us suppose it does imply this, and that each interaction between these inner tendencies takes, say, 10-10 seconds (i.e., each takes one ten-billionth of a second). Let us further suppose that there is a series of, say, 10100 of these tendencies within tendencies within tendencies. Now, even though this number is huge (i.e., it is one followed by a hundred zeros, and is called a Googol), it is way short of infinity. But, let us suppose there is this number of such inner, inner tendencies involved in each 'dialectical' change of an object/process into its opposite. If these changes (to those inner, inner tendencies) each take 10-10 seconds to complete, then any single change of an object/process into its opposite (i.e., A into not-A) will take 10-10 x 10100 = 1090 seconds to complete. If a year is 60 x 60 x 24 x 365 = 31,536,000 seconds, then each such change will take 1090/31,536,000 = 3.171 x 1083 years to complete -- that is, approximately 3 followed by 83 zeros years! If we take the latest estimate of the age of the universe as approximately 14 billion years (that is, 14 followed by nine zeros), then each 'dialectical change' -- even assuming there isn't an infinite series of these inner, inner tendencies -- would take approximately 2 x 1073 (i.e., 2 followed by 73 zeros) times longer to happen than the entire time that has elapsed since the 'Big Bang'!
On the other hand, an infinite series of these inner, inner tendencies will take an infinite number of years to complete. The universe would grind to a halt just as soon as it 'began'.
Of course, if there isn't an infinite number of these inner, inner tendencies, then at some point there will be a T* that changes into a T** (or even into a not-T*) that won't have been caused/initiated by an inner struggle of further tendencies. At this point, the theory will collapse, since it will then be clear that any change (all of which must begin with this very last uncaused tendency change) will be uncaused, and will just happen. So, since all change must begin with this first uncaused change, then 'dialectical change' will not ultimately be the result of a struggle between opposites, but will just happen and have no 'dialectical cause', and the DM-classics will stand refuted.
So, if this objector's theory were correct, then either (1) Change wouldn't have happened (but would have ground to a halt a billionth of a second or so after the Big Bang, or (2) Change isn't ultimately dialectical.
Anyway, this revisionist theory ignores the fact that the DM-classics tell us that such changes can only happen if O* and its opposite, not-O*, struggle with one another, and then change into one another. But, this cannot happen since they both already exist.
Once more, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall!
In which case, my refutation still stands.
[Readers are encouraged to read my lengthier reply to this critic, here. Several more objections are fielded here, and here.]
I return again below to the tendencies within capitalism that this objector thinks either tend to cause it to change or tend to make it remain the same (or which tend to make it resist change).
The idea behind the second half of objection (8) above seems to be the following point, made by Mao:
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another." [Mao (1961b), p.340. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Lenin seems to have agreed:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
[There are passages in Engels's work which appear to say the same sort of thing.]
Hence, it could be argued that the criticisms aired here seem to trade on the idea that dialectical contradictions are abstractions of some sort, or that they operate unconditionally, everywhere and at all times. As the above quotations show, the unity and identity of opposites applies to real, material processes, which have to be identified first (they can't just be invented, like the examples on show in this Essay), and they have to be studied dialectically so that the real contradictions they contain can be understood in all their complexity and as part of their inter-relationships with other objects and processes. Moreover, these contradictions operate conditionally and relatively. In which case, the criticisms in this Essay are completely misguided.
However, Lenin and Mao went on to point out the following:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
"Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever....
"Why is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible.
"Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?
"Lenin said:
'The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.'
"What does this passage mean?
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.341-42. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks also added to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, the struggle and the transformation into opposites is absolute, but the identity of opposites is conditional and relative. According to Mao it seems that the identity of opposites supplies some sort of constancy, while the struggle of opposites initiates change. [But, Mao isn't at all clear, so this might be to misrepresent him.]
However, my interpretation is partially supported by the very next thing Mao said:
"There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b), pp.342-43. Bold emphases added.]
Much of the difficulty interpreting Mao (and other dialecticians) lies in the fact that they all like to talk in riddles, perhaps on the assumption that enigmatic language will fool the unwary into mistaking it for profundity. [As we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, there were, and still are ideological reasons for this confused and confusing rhetorical flourish (which operates in a way analogous to the way the confused things said by Bishops and Imams function).]
Hence, in addition to the confusing passages above, we also find the following:
"We Chinese often say, 'Things that oppose each other also complement each other.' [The original gives the source of this remark -- RL] That is, things opposed to each other have identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. 'Oppose each other' refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. 'Complement each other' means that in given conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity.
"In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, '...there is an absolute in the relative.'" [Mao (1961b), p.343. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Mao is here quoting Lenin:
"The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Italic emphases in the original.]
And good luck to anyone trying to make sense of that!
Be this as it may, let us assume that the above criticism is valid, and that all such 'dialectical change' is relative and conditional -- the result will be no different. Consider, therefore the following modified argument:
Let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory,O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.
[Of course, the other complications considered earlier now only need to have the clause "which change only under conditions C" added to make them work, too -- but, I'll refrain from doing that, otherwise this Essay will become even more unwieldy. That unpleasant task is left to enthusiastic readers.]
The same sort of adjustment will also take care of this part of the above objection:
"The unity and identity of opposites apply to real, material processes, which have to be identified first (they can't just be invented, like the examples on show in this essay), and they have to be studied dialectically, so that the real contradictions they contain can be understood in all their complexity and in their inter-relationships with other processes."
In that case:
Let us suppose that real, concrete, material object/process A (proven to be such by a thorough dialectical, all-round analysis) is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory,O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.
Once more, the same dialectically-depressing denouement emerges at the end.
Of course, none of this denies change; it is just that DM cannot account for it.
Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Hence, howsoever we try to re-package this 'Law', we end up hitting the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Let it go comrades. Your defective theory of change cannot be made to work whatever repairs are attempted, or whatever modifications are hastily inflicted upon it!
Social Change
[On this, also see Note 1.]
The above 'problems' aren't solely confined to changes involving water molecules, tables or assorted furry mammals; they re-surface in different forms with respect to the structures and processes in 'Materialist Dialectics', too.
For example: if (1) All things change into their dialectically-paired opposites, if (2) Change is caused by the 'dialectical tension' between these opposites, and if (3) Capitalism is to change into Socialism, then Socialism must now exist somewhere for that to happen!
As far as revolutionaries are concerned, that observation alone means that not only is DM of no use to them, it is worse than useless.
But, is there any truth to this latest set of allegations?
In order to see that there is indeed more than enough it might be a good idea to examine the connection between the Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP], and Socialist Relations of Production [SORP] --, but, more pointedly, the link between the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively], where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other (their 'other', their 'opposite').
We have already had occasion to quote the DM-classics, and 'lesser' DM-texts to the effect that they hold to (1)-(3) above, but here is Marx himself extending this to the FP and the RP:
"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of productionwhich correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
"The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
"Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production." [Marx (1968), pp.181-82. Bold emphases added.]
[I return to the above quotation and this specific topic presently.]
For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP doesn't actually exist anywhere on earth right now. However, given the aboveDM-theses, if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, by struggling with it!
But, if SORP already exists, it can't have come from CRAP (its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change because of the action of its own opposite (namely -- SORP!) -- unless SORP actually exists before it exists!
The same comments apply to "potential SORP" (or even to some sort of "tendency to produce SORP", be this a 'sublated' tendency, or indeed a 'sublated' actuality -- it matters not).
In order to see this, let us call "potential SORP", "PSORP", and a 'sublated' "tendency to produce SORP", "TSORP".
According to the DM-classics, if PSORP is to change into SORP, it has to (1) struggle with its opposite, and (2) change into that opposite (or, certain tendencies within either or both of these must change them from 'within'; but we have already seen that this options leads to a dead-end). So, PSORP has to both struggle with and change into SORP. But, that means that SORP must already exist, otherwise PSORP will have nothing with which it can struggle. And, if that is so, PSORP can't change into it!
The same comments apply to any potential or tendency in CRAP to produce SORP. So, calling the tendency in CRAP to produce SORP, "TSORP", from earlier: if TSORP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist, otherwise no struggle can take place between them.
But, let us suppose there is a tendency in Capitalism to produce SORP (howsoever this is understood), and a tendency that opposes this. Let us call each of these "TCRAP" and "TCRAP*", respectively.
Once again, if these are 'dialectical opposites' (and always assuming they aren't the only changeless things/processes in the entire universe), they can only change by struggling with one another, thus changing into one another -- that is, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
However, they can't change into one another since they already exist!
Anyway, are we really supposed to believe that the tendencies in capitalism to produce socialism, and those tendencies that oppose it must change into one another -- for example, that, say, the working class (and/or the economic forces that drive workers into struggle) must change into the Capitalist Class/Police/Courts (and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles), and Capitalist Class/Police/Courts (and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles) must change into the working class (and/or the economic forces that drive workers into struggle)? But, that is what the Dialectical-Worthies assure us must always happen.
Once again, the same non-dialectical brick wall blocks our path.
Let us now assume that it is TCRAP that changes CRAP into SORP; that is, that there is a tendency in Capitalism that changes it into Socialism. But, if that is so, TCRAP must struggle with and change into CRAP, not SORP! That is because, and once more, the DM-Worthies tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into that with which it struggles. And, it is reasonably clear that TCRAP must exist somewhere in this universe if it to effect change.
In that case, the only alternative is that SORP must have popped into existence from nowhere --, or it must have always existed --, if DM were correct.
Once more, this isn't to deny change, nor is it to suggest that the present author doesn't want to see the back of CRAP and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, this will not only never happen, it can't happen.
To be sure, in the real world very material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists (and/or their lackeys), but neither of these turn into one another, and they can't help change CRAP into SORP, either, since neither of these is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, norvice versa.
Forces And Relations Of Production
Of course, the above problems afflict the social and material relations constitutive of each and every Mode of Production. We find Dialectical Marxists often asserting things like the following:
"Throughout the mature Marx's economic works the idea that a contradiction between forces and relations of production underlies the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production is present. More generally, such a contradiction accounts for history existing as a succession of modes of production, since it leads to the necessary collapse of one mode and its supersession by another....
"The power of the contradiction between relations and forces to act as the motor of history is also stated in the same place: 'at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production...within which they have been at work hitherto'; and 'from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters', thereby initiating social revolution." [Harris (1985), p.178, quoting Marx (1968), pp.181-82.]
There are, of course, many other DM-theorists who say the same sort of thing; I have quoted several of them in Note 1b.1b
If this is indeed a 'dialectical contradiction', then the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively] must be 'dialectical opposites', too, and if that is so, they must (1) Struggle with one another, and they must (2) Change into each other -- if the DM-classics are to be believed. Is it really the case that relations of ownership, exploitation and control will struggle with and then change into labour power, factories, motorways, airports..., and vice versa?
If so, no one seems to have noticed this remarkable transformation...
Can Cats Defy This Iron Law?
It is worth noting at the start that the relevancy of the comments in this section depend on what dialecticians mean by "internal opposite". As noted earlier, sometimes they seem to mean "spatially-internal", at other times they appear to mean "logically-internal". [This ambiguity is examined in more detail in Essay Eight Part One. However, much of this and subsequent sections depend on interpreting "internal opposites" in one way -- i.e., spatially. Even so, the other alternative (i.e., interpreting "internal opposites" logically) will also be considered. On the serious difficulties this equivocation creates for DM-theorists, see here. We have also seen an earlier objector who seemed to want to view these "opposites" spatially, when he spoke about considering the dialectical process externally -- i.e., "at the outside".]
Anyway, it is plain that this particular equivocation has arisen because of an inappropriate organicist metaphor dialecticians have inherited from Hegel. Of course, the parts of an organism are both spatially-, and logically-internal to that organism, but, when we move beyond Biology, this metaphor loses whatever plausibility it might once seem to have had, and the above equivocation (between the spatial and the logical meaning of "internal") is bound to create problems -- indeed, as we are about to find out.
So, as we have seen, if cats change, as surely they do, then they must both struggle with and change into their opposites. But, where are these 'opposite cats' with which they are supposed to be struggling? And, how do they feature in and cause the changes they allegedly bring about in the original animal? On the other hand, if they don't do this, does this mean that feline parts of nature aren't subject to dialectical law? Is this why cats have nine lives?
Figure One: Another Dialectical Catastrophe?
Now, Engels did at least try to address these fatal objections to his theory; he argued that we must learn from nature what the actualproperties of objects and processes are in each case, and hence, presumably, what each can legitimately change into. [To be sure, he made this point in relation to the First and Third of his 'Laws' (the change of 'Quantity into Quality' and the 'Negation of the Negation', respectively), but there is no reason to suppose he would have denied this of his Second 'Law' (the 'Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites').] In addition, he pointed out that 'dialectical negation' isn't annihilation. [Engels (1954), p.63 and (1976), p.181.]
However, nature and society are annoyingly ambiguous in this respect. For example, lumps of iron ore can turn, or be turned into many different things (with or without the input of human labour, etc.). These include: cars, car parts, rolling stock, aeroplane components, ships, submarines, magnets, surgical equipment, surgical appliances, cutlery, kitchen utensils, scaffolding, chains, bollards, barriers, cranes,plant machinery, pumps, tubes, engines, ornaments, jewellery, girders, weapons, sheet metal, tools, instruments, wire, springs, furniture, doors, locks, keys, gates, grates, manhole covers, lifts, escalators, anchors, railings, rail tracks, wheels, zips, bars, handcuffs, bullets, iron filings, rivets, nails, screws, steel wool, steel helmets, armour, iron (dietary) supplements -- alongside other assorted naturally occurring or artificial substances, such as, cytochrome nitrogenase, haemoglobin, hematite, magnetite, taconite, ferrofluids, countless ferrous and ferric compounds (including rust, Ferrous and Ferric Sulphides, Fools Gold, etc., etc.) -- to name but a few.
Are we really supposed to believe that all of these reside inside each lump of iron? Or, which are 'logically' connected with them, as one of Hegel's unique "others"? Or are we to suppose there are 'inner tendencies' quietly humming away in each block of iron ore, just waiting for the chance to turn into a pair of handcuffs or a manhole cover? On the other hand, if we adopt the 'logical view' of "internal opposites", how can all of the above be logically-related to iron ore as its unique "other"? If not, what exactly is the point of this 'Law' if iron can change, or be changed into any of the above items? If each one isn't the unique "other" of iron ore, and yet iron ore can be turned into all of them, then that fact alone seems to return a rather unfavourable verdict concerning the validity of this 'Law': iron ore has no 'other'.
Again, switching back to the 'spatial view' of "internal opposites": if these items don't in fact exist inside each lump of iron -- or, even if they don't confront each other as antagonistic external or 'logical' opposites --, how is it possible for human labour and/or natural forces to turn iron ore into the above things (and more) while remaining in conformity with 'dialectical Law'? Does human labour work with, or work against, the 'Laws' of dialectics? If a lump of iron doesn't (logically or spatially) 'contain', say, a carving knife, how is it possible for human beings to change iron into carving knives, and for this to be done dialectically? Are there changes in nature and society that aren't governed by 'dialectical law'?
Are these iron 'Laws' not in fact applicable to iron itself?
In that case, exactly which opposites are ('logically'/physically) united in, or with any particular lump of iron ore? Or, indeed, with all such lumps?
Of course, it could be objected that the above considerations are ridiculous and completely misconstrue the nature of this 'Law'. No one supposes that cats and nuggets of iron ore contain their opposites. Indeed, this is how Woods and Grant explained things:
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology, odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness in relation to the spin of subatomic particles.... There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.65.]2
But, if nature works in pairs (at least), what is the paired opposite of a cat that causes that animal to change? If they have no opposites, then these feline parts of nature (at least) don't exist, or interact, in 'dialectical pairs'. And, whatever applies to cats must surely apply to countless other things, too. What then are the external and/or internal opposites of things like the following: Giraffes, Snowy Owls, Mountain Gorillas, Daffodils, Oak trees, Chinese Puzzles, broom handles, craters on the Moon, copies of Anti-Dühring, the ten thousand-and-first moth to hatch in Cook County, Illinois, USA, in May 2012 -- or the question mark at the end of this sentence (on your screen, not mine)? All of these are subject to change, but not, it seems, as a result of any obvious oppositional pairing, tension or 'struggle' with anything unique to each.
Is a question mark, for example, really locked in a life-and-death struggle with other punctuation marks? Or, even with its Hegelian 'other'? But, what is the 'other' of a "?"? An "!"?
It could be objected to this that in the case of cats (and some of the other objects listed above), the opposites concerned are plainly "male" and "female". But, even if that were so, these are manifestly not "internal opposites", and neither are they "internally related" to each other -- they are causally, historically and biologically related. Sexual diversity isn't a logical feature of reality -- if it were, there would be nohermaphrodites or asexual organisms. So, change in this case can't be the result of any 'internal contradictions' that exist between male and female organisms.
Even if this weren't so, is it really the case that males and females must always conflict/'struggle'? [Anyone who has, for example, seenLeopard Slugs mating might be forgiven for thinking that these fortunate creatures have had a dialectical exemption certificate encoded into their DNA at some point. They do not 'conflict'!]
Moreover, the following research would have to be ruled out in advance by all half-way decent DM-fans, since it violates DL, as the latter supposedly features in sexual reproduction:
"'Three people, one baby' public consultation begins
"A public consultation has been launched to discuss the ethics of using three people to create one baby. The technique could be used to prevent debilitating and fatal 'mitochondrial' diseases, which are passed down only from mother to child. However, the resulting baby would contain genetic information from three people -- two parents and a donor woman. Ministers could change the law to make the technique legal after the results of the consultation are known.
"About one in 200 children are born with faulty mitochondria -- the tiny power stations which provide energy to every cell in the body. Most show little or no symptoms, but in the severest cases the cells of the body are starved of energy. It can lead to muscle weakness, blindness, heart failure and in some cases can be fatal. Mitochondria are passed on from the mother's egg to the child -- the father does not pass on mitochondria through his sperm. The idea to prevent this is to add a healthy woman's mitochondria into the mix. Two main techniques have been shown to work in the laboratory, by using a donor embryo or a donor egg.
"How do you make a baby from three people?
"1) Two embryos are fertilised with sperm creating an embryo from the intended parents and another from the donors. 2) The pronuclei, which contain genetic information, are removed from both embryos but only the parents' is kept 3) A healthy embryo is created by adding the parents' pronuclei to the donor embryo, which is finally implanted into the womb.
"However, mitochondria contain their own genes in their own set of DNA. It means any babies produced would contain genetic material from three people. The vast majority would come from the mother and father, but also mitochondrial DNA from the donor woman. This would be a permanent form of genetic modification, which would be passed down through the generations.
"It is one of the ethical considerations which will be discussed as part of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority's consultation. The chair of the organisation, Prof Lisa Jardine, said: 'It is genetic modification of the egg -- that is uncharted territory. Once we have genetic modification we have to be sure we are damn happy.' She said it was a question of 'balancing the desire to help families have healthy children with the possible impact on the children themselves and wider society'....
"However, treatments in IVF clinics will be years away even if the public and ministers decide the techniques should go ahead. There are still questions around safety which need to be addressed. One of the pioneers of the methods, Prof Mary Herbert from Newcastle University, said: 'We are now undertaking experiments to test the safety and efficacy of the new techniques. This work may take three to five years to complete.'" [Quoted from here. Some links added; several paragraphs merged to save space. Bold emphases in the original. Accessed 17/08/2012.]
What price the UO if it is so easily by-passed/abrogated by reactionary scientists like these?
To be sure, modern medicine is quite remarkable; a few snips of the surgeon's scissors and Bob's your aunty. And yet -- but this should hardly need pointing out -- males do not change into females (nor vice versa), unaided and of their own accord, which is what the DM-classics tell us must happen with all such opposites.
Moreover, while it is true that cats are able to reproduce because of well known goings-on between the male and the female of the species, cats themselves do not change because of the relationship between the opposite sexes of the cat family. If they did, then a lone cat on a desert island would be capable of living forever (or, at least, of not changing). In that case, as long as this eternal (and miserably celibate) moggie kept clear of members of the opposite sex, it would be able to look forward to becoming a sort of feline Super-Methuselah.
But, what are we to say of those organisms that don't reproduce sexually? And worse, what are we to make of, say, hermaphrodites? Are the latter an expression of some sort of cosmic, bourgeois plot against DM? Even worse, what about Pseudohermaphroditism?3
Some might think hermaphrodites are perfect examples of the "unity of opposites", but this can't be so, or male sex cells would turn into female sex cells (and vice versa), after "struggling" with them, if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.
In that case, the above passage from RIRE does little to help resolve this problem.
[RIRE = Reason In Revolt; i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]
On the other hand, if cats don't change as a result of the machinations of their external and/or 'logical' opposites, but because of their 'internal contradictions', or maybe their 'internal opposite tendencies', then factors topologically internal to cats must surely be responsible for their development (if, as noted above, we interpret "internal" spatially -- since we seem to have got nowhere interpreting this doctrine 'logically'). Should we now look inside cats for these illusive opposites? If so, do these opposites appear at the level of that animal's internal organs, or somewhere else? But what is the opposite of, say, a cat's liver? Does it have one? If not, is it an everlasting liver? On the other hand, if it does have an 'opposite', will a cat's liver one day turn into a cat's 'non-liver'? -- A fossil trilobite, say, or the Dog Star, maybe?
In order to discover what the 'internal contradictions'/'opposing tendencies' are in this case, perhaps we should delve even deeper into the inner recesses of these awkward, feline aspects of 'Being'?
[In order to reduce the amount of pedantic detail I will omit reference to 'opposing tendencies'; readers can assume they are included in what follows.]
If cats' livers have no opposites, then perhaps their liver cells do? But, once more, what is the opposite of a cat's liver cell? A kidney cell? A blood cell? (An onion cell?)
As we ferret deeper into the nether regions of feline inner space, perhaps these elusive opposites will appear at the molecular or atomic level? Some dialecticians seem to think so -- but they have only been able to argue this by ignoring their own claims that all of natureworks in pairs. [In that case, we have yet to be told what, say, the River Amazon is twinned with, let alone what the Oort Cloud's dialectical alter ego -- its "other" -- could possibly be.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that 'internal opposites' actually involve the relations that exist between sub-atomic or inter-atomic forces and processes at work inside cats, lumps of iron, and much else besides.
But, if each thing (and not just each part of a thing), and each system/process in the Totality, is a UO (as we have been assured they are by the above DM-luminaries), then cats and iron bars (and not just electrons, π-mesons (Pions) and positrons, etc.) must have their own internal and/or external opposites -- that is, if they are to change.
So, for a cat to become a 'non-cat' -- which is, presumably, the 'internal' or 'external' opposite it is supposed to turn into --, it must be in dialectical tension with that opposite in the here-and-now if that opposite is to help initiate that change. [We saw this in abstract formearlier.] If not, then we can only wonder what dialecticians imagine the forces are (and from whence they originate) that cause cats, or lumps of iron, to change into whatever their opposites are imagined to be.
Furthermore, even if molecular, inter-atomic or sub-atomic forces actually power the development of cats, they will in general still have to change because of their paired macro-level opposites (whose identities still remain a mystery). It isn't as if each cat is struggling against all the protons, electrons and quarks there are beneath its fur. Nor are we to suppose that cats are constantly conflicting with their internal organs, fur or whiskers. If they were, then according to DM-lore quoted earlier, cats would have to turn into their internal organs, fur or whiskers, and the latter would have to turn into cats!
Moreover, even if sub-atomic particles were locked in a sort of quantum wrestling match with one another, the changes they induced in the average 'dialectical moggie' must find expression in macro-phenomena at some point, or cats wouldn't alter at all. But what on earth could those macro-phenomena be?
Additionally, if change is to be located ultimately at the quantum level, then what are all those sub-atomic particles changing into? Many are highly stable. But, even supposing they aren't -- and if the DM-classics are to be believed -- whatever they change into must exist right now if it is to cause them to change into it. And yet, if these opposites already exist, the original particles can't change into them. The very best that could happen here is that these 'opposite particles' must replace the originals (which then magically disappear!).
In which case, given this view of nature, things don't actually change, they just vanish, while other (seemingly identical) objects and processes take their place -- and they do so undialectically, too, since their opposites will have simply vanished; they won't have changed into them.
But, with no more 'opposites' to motivate them, they plainly can't be subject to further change.
If we now ask what the 'inner tendencies' are that cause live cats to change into dead cats, it isn't easy to come up with a viable candidate. Some might point to catabolic and anabolic processes as precisely these 'inner tendencies', but these process aren't tendencies, they are manifestly causal (which tendencies aren't, as we have seen).
But, let us assume these processes (anabolism and catabolism) are (possible) viable candidates here -- even then this will fall flat. As was noted earlier:
Will anabolic processes become catabolic processes, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact, these processes don't even struggle with one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we were to believe everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[Since I have devoted several sections of Essay Seven Part One to this very point, the reader is re-directed there for more details.]
Since these processes don't change into one another (which we were told should happen to all such opposites), it isn't easy to see how DM can account even for change to cats!
Human Input
If it is further complained that in many of the above examples human intervention must be taken into account, for, plainly, it is human labour that changes many of the processes that already occur, or which might occur naturally, into the artificial products mentioned earlier. Because of this, different principles must apply since our activity will have interfered with the normal operation of the natural opposites of things like, say, iron ore.
Or, so it might be claimed.
But, aren't we part of nature?
Putting that awkward reminder to one side for now (anyway, I have already dealt with this 'objection', here), what about those substances that didn't exist (as far as we know) before human beings made them? Has humanity made things that are above and beyond dialectical 'Law'?
Is plastic, for instance, governed by dialectical 'Law'? What then is the natural/"unique" 'opposite' of polyethylene? Is that 'opposite', whatever it is, the same as the 'opposite' of Polypropylene, polybutylene terephthalate (PBT), polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride (PVC), andpolymethylpentene (TPX)?
Again, if each of these plastics does indeed have a "unique" opposite (which they must have, or they couldn't change -- if the DM-classics are to be believed), how is it that human labour is able to make/bring into existence each of these opposites at the same time as making each new plastic? Or, was this (extra creation of this 'unique opposite') done by default, a side-effect, as it were? Do these 'unique opposites' pop into existence in some sort of metaphysical antechamber the moment we invent/manufacture each of the above plastics? If not, how are such plastics ever going to change if there are no opposites with which they can then begin to struggle?
[Incidentally, it is no use appealing to the inter-atomic, or sub-atomic forces here as the cause of change in the above substances, since that would leave the unique "other" of, say, PVC out of the picture. And, as we have seen it must have a unique "other" if it is to change -- according to the DM-classics. Anyway, do these inter-atomic, or sub-atomic forces change into one another? Do protons, for example, struggle with and then change into electrons? (Or, is it positrons?) If so, a Nobel Prize awaits the first DM-fan to publish on this.]
Furthermore, if human labour is able to turn plastics into all manner of things (such as bottles, bags, food containers, guttering, drainpipes, insulation, toys, car parts, pens, keyboards, DVDs, cell phone casings, chess pieces, etc., etc.), do they not therefore have countless artificial (or is it natural?) 'opposites' themselves -- namely the things we turn them into? [Do they really have as many 'opposites' as the things we can change these plastics into?] And, were all these artificial 'opposites' created the moment the original substances/artefacts were first manufactured? All of them? But, they must have been, since, according to the dialectical classics, every object in the universe has a unique 'opposite' (its "other"), and sooner or later turns into that 'opposite' -- and they do this by struggling with that 'opposite'. Or, these changes happen because we struggle with these 'opposites'. So, has anyone in human history struggled with the plastic bag they hoped to manufacture, before they made it? If so, they must also have changed into it, and it into them! Has anyone noticed these shape-shifting human beings?
On the other hand, and once again, if these 'opposites' only popped into existence when the above plastics were changed into them (meaning that human labour can't have created these 'opposites' in the act of making the original plastic substance/artefact), how is it possible for those non-existent 'opposites' to 'contradict' the existent unchanged plastic so that that plastic could be changed into them?
Even worse: if the 'opposite' of, say, PVC causes it to change, how does human labour feature anywhere in this transformation? What is the point of building factories and studying polymer chemistry, for example, if (according to the DM-classics) the 'opposite' of PVC is what changes lumps of PVC into plastic buckets or storage containers, all by itself? When human beings work on PVC to change it into all of the many things that they can and do change it into (using complex techniques and expensive machinery), are they merely onlookers -- not part of the action, as it were --, just viewing things that would have happened anyway, naturally?
Or, have the capitalists discovered a way of by-passing dialectical 'Law'? Are all polymer scientists, therefore, reactionaries?
But, if human labour [HL] can change such things into their 'opposites', then that must mean that HL is the unique 'opposite' of, say, PVC, otherwise it couldn't change it into anything (according to the above DM-worthies). In that case, HL must change into PVC -- and vice versa!
Use Value And Exchange Value
We are also told that exchange value [EV] is "congealed labour time" [LT]. That is, of course, a serious problem since use value [UV] is supposed to 'contradict' EV -- but, UV and EV do not seem to "struggle" much either, either with one another or with anything else. But, according to the Dialectical Gospels, UV must both struggle with and change into EV. Has anyone ever witnessed this 'abstract wrestling match'?
Here is Scott Meikle (who might have):
"All the contradictions of capitalist commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....
"The simple form of value itself contains the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value.... [Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]
Despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?
"The poles of an opposition are not just united. They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]
Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted, it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this is just anotherbrute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe. [I have elaborated this argument in considerable detail in Essay Eight Part Two.]
Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has reified the products of social relations (UV and EV) and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or, perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the word "repel" here? Do they actuallyrepel each other (like magnets, or electrical charges)? Or, do we do this because of the way we manufacture use values and then exchange them?
And, do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another, as the DM-classicists assured us they must?
Furthermore, how can the forms that underpin UV and EV (i.e., the equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of the forces Meikle mentions? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial pre-conditions -- the most important of which is that they should at least have the decency to exist. But, these two forms can't co-exist. This is what Marx had to say:
"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at the same time? On the other hand, if they both do co-exist, so that they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other? [Again, I have said much more about this in Essay Eight Part Two.]
Other than conceptually, how then can they repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other objects and processes to repel -- anything?
This is, of course, the unyielding rock upon which we have seen all such Idealist speculations founder.
It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thoughts about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist, for if they could, they wouldn't 'mutually exclude' one another! On the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't eventhink of them acting on one another, for if we were to so think, we must, of necessity, misconceive them.
Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling match taking place in our heads, such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare equivalent form the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK rules)?
Figure Two: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks Relative Form In A Skull Near You
It could be objected that the fact that something is a relative form excludes it from being an equivalent form. This is where the opposition arises; the one is the opposite of the other.
But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as I have shown here.
Of course, in Marxist economics we have (1) Labour Power [LP] and (2) Capital [C] cycles, and the like, but does LP really "struggle" against C? Not obviously so, it would seem. As we have already noted, very material workers most certainly struggle against their equally material bosses, but how is it possible for LP to struggle against C?
Someone might object that this misrepresents DM; it is the inherent dialectical contradiction between capital and labour (or that between the relevant classes) that foments struggle.
Perhaps so, but until we are told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, that response itself is devoid of sense (since it contains a meaningless phrase: "dialectical contradiction"). [More on that in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three.]
The Real Source Of The Problem
Hegel's Hare-Brained 'Logic'
As we have seen, this 'theory' is just an elaboration of the following and classic example of a priori Superscience concocted by the Mystery Meister Himself:
"Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174. Bold emphases added.]
As this quotation indicates, and as Essay Eight Part Three will demonstrate, Hegel made a quasi-'logical' attempt to 'derive' such 'opposites' from his criticism of the LOI, but his reasoning was defective from beginning to end -- and demonstrably so. The bottom line is that, far from specifying that each object was paired with its unique dialectical "other", Hegel inadvertently conceded that objects and processes were confronted on all sides by countless "others", fatally compromising his 'theory of change'.
Putting such technicalities to one side, and ignoring for the moment the question of how Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov knew this 'Law' was true of everything in the entire universe, for all of time -- this topic was examined in more detail in Essay Two -- when it is based solely on a ham-fisted and Idealist 'thought experiment', it is worth pointing out that many things seem to have no internally-interconnected opposites. For example, electrons, which, while they appear to have several external opposites (even though, as noted above, it isn't too clear what the opposite of an electron is -- is it a positron or is it a proton? --, it is clear electrons do not seem to turn into either of them), they appear to have no internal opposites as far as can be ascertained. In that case, they must be changeless beings -- or, if they do change, it can't be as a result of their "internal contradictions".4
Admittedly, electrons had only just been discovered in Lenin's day, but that makes his dogmatism even more puzzling -- especially when it is recalled that it was Lenin who insisted that all knowledge is provisional and relative.
Conclusion
DM is supposed to be the philosophy of change. As we have seen that description is about as accurate as describing George W Bush as a "peace monger".
Notes
1. There are several possible escape routes that the beleaguered DM-fan might want to take:
(1) O* 'changes', not into not-O*, but into not-O1*, meaning that: (a) There are now two not-O*s where once there was only one -- not-O1*and not-O* -- unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air (but, see below), or: (b) O* will have changed, not into its opposite, but into something that isn't its opposite, and with which it hasn't struggled. According to the DM-classics, O* should struggle with not-O* -- its opposite -- not with not-O1*, which isn't its opposite.
Or:
(2) (a) O* doesn't actually change, and/or (b) O* simply disappears. Plainly, O* can't change into what already exists -- that is, O* can'tchange into its opposite, not-O*, without there now being two of the latter (see option (1), above) where there was only one before. But, even then, one of these won't be not-O*, just a copy of it. In that case, once more: (i) O* either disappears, (ii) O* doesn't change at all, or, (iii) it changes into something else (but, not by struggling with what it changes into, otherwise, the same problems will simply re-emerge).
Or:
(3) Not-O* itself disappears in order to allow a new (but which is now a copy of) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if it has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict this new not-O* that confronted the old. If this new not-O* exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were a few paragraphs back in the main body of this Essay.
Or:
(4) O* and not-O* change into one another. But, as we will soon see, this option presents DM-theorists with even more serious difficulties, since it implies, for example, that capitalism must change into socialism, and socialism must change into capitalism!
But, worse: it isn't easy to see how this could happen if both of these already exist.
Anyway, as should seem obvious -- and among the other things already mentioned --, alternative (2) plainly means that O* doesn't in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- i.e., into O* --, according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created out of thin air!
In addition, option (4) has O* and not-O* changing into one another, meaning that either (i) there would be no net change, or, that (ii) O*and not-O* have just replaced one another. So, if we label, for instance, Capitalism, "C" and socialism, "S", then these two must co-exist if they are to "struggle" with one another (as Mao pointed out earlier), the net result being that in the end S and C still co-exist, only they will have now swapped places! Of course, if S already exists, C won't need to change into it, and socialists needn't fight to bring it about!
Furthermore, in relation to option (4) above, as already noted: S must already exist, or there couldn't be a struggle; but where did S come from? From C? And yet, it can't have come from C, since for C to change and produce S, S must already exist (or, once more, there would be no struggle)! Furthermore, where did C itself come from? Of course, C came from F (Feudalism), but that in turn means that C and Fmust have co-existed, too, so C can't have come from F (since, as we have just seen, they must co-exist if one is to cause the other to change)! Hence, this 'theory' implies that either (iii) C, S and F must all co-exist, or (iv) All three sprang into existence from nowhere.
Of course, C, S and F are all abstractions, and so can't possibly struggle with one another, but the same problems emerge if we concentrate on things that can and do struggle. Let W1 be any randomly-selected worker, or section of workers in struggle, and let C1 be those capitalists, or sections of the capitalist class and their bully-boys with which W1 struggles -- making C1 the 'dialectical opposite' of W1. But, according to the DM-classics, W1 must change into C1 and vice versa. But, this can't happen since both of these already exist; so, at best, all they can do is replace one another. Do we see this anywhere on the planet in connection with the class struggle?
Recall: if this theory were true, this would happen countless thousands of times a year as the capitalist class (or sections of it) struggles with workers (or sections of them)! If this theory is correct, this must happen every time bosses struggle with workers: they must change into one another!
The same difficulties arise if we project this into the future and consider the final struggle to overthrow capitalism (if and when that takes place). In that case, let W2 be that section of the workers' movement in actual struggle at that point, and let C2 be those capitalists (and/or those elements of the capitalist class and their hangers on that fight their battles for them) with which they are struggling. According to the DM-classics, W2 must change into C2, and vice versa. Again: this can't happen since both of these already exist; so, at best, all they can do here is replace one another. What is worse: this must continue happening indefinitely -- because the capitalist class and the working class will still exist and will therefore struggle with one another, endlessly changing into each other, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
Are we really all struggling just to become capitalists?
It could be objected that the working class does indeed become its opposite, it becomes the ruling class. I have dealt with that objection,here.
1a. Of course, the theory that change is the result of some sort of relation, interplay or 'struggle' between 'opposites' encapsulates ideas that stretch back into the mists of time. For example, it forms the basis of Manichean dualistic ontology, just as it underlies the Daoist belief in yin and yang. [In Appendix One of Essay Two I have posted several more examples of ancient and modern mystical systems that also adopted this world-view.] This doctrine is also central to Aristotle's theory of change; he credits the Presocratic Philosophers, Empedocles,Anaxagoras, Parmenides and Democritus, with different versions of this dogma, although it is also present in Heraclitus's thought, albeit in a very obscure form:
"All thinkers then agree in making the contraries principles, both those who describe the All as one and unmoved (for even Parmenides treats hot and cold as principles under the names of fire and earth) and those too who use the rare and the dense. The same is true of Democritus also, with his plenum and void, both of which exist, be says, the one as being, the other as not-being. Again he speaks of differences in position, shape, and order, and these are genera of which the species are contraries, namely, of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape, angular and angle-less, straight and round.
"It is plain then that they all in one way or another identify the contraries with the principles. And with good reason. For first principles must not be derived from one another nor from anything else, while everything has to be derived from them. But these conditions are fulfilled by the primary contraries, which are not derived from anything else because they are primary, nor from each other because they are contraries.
"But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result, as well as in the way just indicated.
"It is plain then that they all in one way or another identify the contraries with the principles. And with good reason. For first principles must not be derived from one another nor from anything else, while everything has to be derived from them. But these conditions are fulfilled by the primary contraries, which are not derived from anything else because they are primary, nor from each other because they are contraries.
"But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result, as well as in the way just indicated.
"Our first presupposition must be that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random, nor may anything come from anything else, unless we mean that it does so in virtue of a concomitant attribute. For how could 'white' come from 'musical', unless 'musical' happened to be an attribute of the not-white or of the black? No, 'white' comes from 'not-white'-and not from any 'not-white', but from black or some intermediate colour. Similarly, 'musical' comes to be from 'not-musical', but not from any thing other than musical, but from 'unmusical' or any intermediate state there may be.
"Nor again do things pass into the first chance thing; 'white' does not pass into 'musical' (except, it may be, in virtue of a concomitant attribute), but into 'not-white'-and not into any chance thing which is not white, but into black or an intermediate colour; 'musical' passes into 'not-musical'-and not into any chance thing other than musical, but into 'unmusical' or any intermediate state there may be.
"The same holds of other things also: even things which are not simple but complex follow the same principle, but the opposite state has not received a name, so we fail to notice the fact. What is in tune must come from what is not in tune, and vice versa; the tuned passes into untunedness -- and not into any untunedness, but into the corresponding opposite. It does not matter whether we take attunement, order, or composition for our illustration; the principle is obviously the same in all, and in fact applies equally to the production of a house, a statue, or any other complex. A house comes from certain things in a certain state of separation instead of conjunction, a statue (or any other thing that has been shaped) from shapelessness-each of these objects being partly order and partly composition.
"If then this is true, everything that comes to be or passes away from, or passes into, its contrary or an intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived from the contraries-colours, for instance, from black and white. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries." [Aristotle (1984b), pp.321-22.]
"If then this is true, everything that comes to be or passes away from, or passes into, its contrary or an intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived from the contraries-colours, for instance, from black and white. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries." [Aristotle (1984b), pp.321-22.]
As we will see, this doctrine also forms the backbone of Hegel's answer to Hume's attack on rationalist theories of causation.
Of course, DM-fans fail to tell their readers that their own theory of change owes much to Aristotle, probably since that would undermine their ill-informed criticisms of his logic.
On Aristotle's theory of change, see Bostock (2006). The writings of the Presocratics mentioned above are to be found in Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1999). On the Presocratics in general, see Barnes (1982). I have also covered this in Note 4 to Essay Eight Part One.
1b. Here are several other DM-theorists (drawn from different wings of Marxism) who say more-or-less the same sort of thing:
"Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new....
"When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the socio-historical process, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, they discovered the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology, etc.), and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society.
"When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." [Mao (1961b), pp.314, 328-29.]
"A dialectical materialist outlook and method, and its application to human society and its development, historical materialism, reveals that the defining contradictions of any society, and the motive force of change in society, is the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, along with the contradiction between the economic base (or the mode of production) and the superstructure (of politics, ideology, and culture). Engaging with this, in its more sweeping dimension, will establish a stronger foundation for grasping more clearly and deeply the essential reality that, in this era, and in the world right now, it is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, and other decisive contradictions which this continually gives rise to -- it is this, and the motion and development this gives rise to, more than anything else -- that is setting the overall framework of things and is compelling and driving change in the world, even as we, the conscious and organized vanguard forces, are striving to transform this motion and development from what it is to a course leading to the realization of communism -- a possibility which itself lies within the fundamental and defining contradictions of capitalism and can be achieved through the revolutionary resolution of these contradictions, throughout the world." [Bob Avakian, quoted from here. Italic emphasis in the original.]
"At this point one important confusion must be cleared up. Historical materialism has frequently been subject to a mechanical materialist distortion in which the dialectic of forces and relations of production is interpreted simply as an antagonism between the technical instruments of production ('forces') and the system of property ownership ('relations') which operates independently of human activity, thus arriving at a theory of technological determinism. In this interpretation both Marx's key concepts undergo a reduction in their meaning. For Marx the forces of production signify not only the instruments in the sense of tools, machines etc., but the total productive capacity of society including the productive activity of the working class. 'Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself.'... Property ownership, on the other hand, is 'but a legal expression of relations of production.' Thus the contradiction between the forces and relations of production is not separate from the class struggle but is the very ground on which the latter arises." [Molyneux (1983), p.16. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"The general contradiction is that between the forces and relations of production, though Marx doesn't come right out and make this point specifically. Instead he says that capital must develop the productive forces to their maximum 'regardless of the value and surplus-value it contains, and regardless of the social conditions under which capitalist production takes place'. At the same time capital must preserve the value of the existing capital and expand that value. The development of the productivity of labor negates its ability to do this." [Kapitalism 101, quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
2. Woods and Grant list several examples of internal and external opposites -- not really distinguishing between the two --, perhaps basing this prize example of sloppy thought on principles they learnt from far too little exposure to FL, and rather too much to DL.
[FL = Formal Logic; DL= Dialectical Logic.]
Since RIRE is now being quoted all over the Internet as the book to read on DM, a few words seem appropriate. To that end, the reader should consult my comments on this book in Essay Four (the links can be found in Note 7, of Essay Seven Part One), and those written by a supporter of this site, "LevD", here. [To assist the reader, the latter has now been re-posted here.]
3. Spare a thought, though, for the Australian Jewel Beetle, or rather the male of the species, which seems to have developed an unhealthy fixation for beer bottles:
"Beetles Die During Sex With Beer Bottles
"Jennifer Viegas
"Besotted beetles are dying while trying to get it on with discarded brown beer bottles, according to research conducted by Darryl Gwynne, a University of Toronto Mississauga professor.
"It's a case of mistaken attraction, because the beer bottles happen to possess all of the features that drive male Australian jewel beetles wild. They're big and orangey brown in color, with a slightly dimpled surface near the bottom (designed to prevent the bottle from slipping out of one's grasp) that reflects light in much the same way as female wing covers. Gwynne made these observations with colleague David Rentz.
"As a result, the beer bottles are irresistible to the male insects, which will die trying to mate with them in the hot Australian sun....
"Gwynne and Rentz were conducting fieldwork in western Australia when they noticed something unusual along the side of the road.
"He explained, 'We were walking along a dirt road with the usual scattering of beer cans and bottles when we saw about six bottles with beetles on top or crawling up the side. It was clear the beetles were trying to mate with the bottles.'
"The bottles –- stubbies as they are known in Australia, Canada and a few other countries –- resemble a 'super female' jewel beetle. Male beetles are so captivated by the bottles that they will gird their loins and go through the expected motions, refusing to leave until they fry to death, are consumed by hungry ants, or are physically removed by researchers.
"The male beetles are very particular about the bottles. Beer cans or wine bottles do nothing for them. It's all about the shape, color and texture and has nothing to do with booze. As the researchers wrote in their findings, 'Not only do western Australians never dispose of a beer bottle with beer still in it, but many of the bottles had sand and detritus accumulated over many months.'...
"Gwynne points out that the research supports a theory of sexual selection: that males of certain species, in their eagerness to mate, are often the ones making mating mistakes." [Quoted from the Discovery Science News page; 03/10/2011. Quotations marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site; spelling changed to UK English. Some paragraphs have been merged to save space. Link in the original; some links removed.]
Has evolution provided a new 'dialectical opposite' for these randy insects? If so, why has this development (in the forward march of theNON) only emerged in Australia?
Indeed, spare another thought for Hermaphrodites -- for example, the African Bat bug. This is what the New Scientist had to say about this odd insect:
"If you thought human sexual relationships were tricky, be thankful you're not an African bat bug. They show what could be the most extreme case of transsexualism yet discovered. Male bat bugs sport female genitalia, and some females have genitalia that mimic the male's version of the female bits -- as well as their own redundant vagina.
"Bat bugs, and their relatives the bed bugs, are renowned among entomologists for their gruesome and bizarre method of reproduction. Males never use the vagina, instead piercing the female's abdomen and inseminating directly into the blood, where the sperm then swim to the ovaries. It is this 'traumatic insemination', as it is termed, which is at the root of the extreme levels of gender bending in the African bat bug, says Klaus Reinhardt of the University of Sheffield, UK.
"Female bat bugs have evolved a countermeasure to the stabbing of the male's penis -- structures on their abdomens known as paragenitals. These are a defence mechanism that limits the damage by guiding the male's sharp penis into a spongy structure full of immune cells.
"When Reinhardt's team studied bat bugs in a cave on Mount Elgon, Kenya -- already famous as a place that elephants visit to mine for salt -- they found that the males also had defence genitals. What's more, they had scarring on their abdomens similar to that of the females following copulation. In other words, males had been using their penises to stab other males.
"If that isn't strange enough, when the team looked at 43 preserved female bat bugs, they found that 84% had male versions of the defence genitals. Females with this male version of female genitals had less scarring due to penetration than the other females.
"'This is what we think might have happened,' says Reinhardt. 'Males started getting nobbled (sic) by other males, so they evolved the female defensive genitals. As this reduced the amount of penis damage they were getting, females evolved the male version of the female genitals.'
"While theoretical models have predicted that females should evolve different morphologies to escape male attention, this is the first time it has been seen in genitalia, Reinhardt says. 'It's a spectacular example of evolution through sexual conflict.'" [New Scientist, 195, 2622, 22/09/07, p.11. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
It is to be hoped that the NON visits these highly confused insects one day to give them more than merely friendly marriage-guidance counselling.
And, it appears that scientists can now by-pass Engels's 'Law' almost at will:
"With a surprisingly simple genetic tweak, scientists have transformed nematode worms into hermaphrodites. They report in the journal Sciencethat lowering the activity of just two genetic pathways produces the change.
"Evolution from a species consisting of males and females into one consisting of only males and hermaphrodites happens naturally in many nematodes. A team of US researchers says their experiment explains how this might take place.
"They say it also provides a simple model helping scientists to work out the mechanism of evolutionary change. The researchers chose to study the evolution of female worms into hermaphrodites because it was a 'striking change' that occurred relatively recently.
"Ronald Ellis, a biologist from the University of Medicine and Dentistry New Jersey in the US, who led the research, said that most big evolutionary changes within species happened too long ago to study at the genetic level.
"'But this dramatic change happened fairly recently and in a group of animals that we know a lot about... that's why we're studying it to find out how complex traits are created,' he told BBC News.
"Dr Ellis said it was exciting to discover that, by lowering the activity of just two genetic pathways he and his team were able to 'take what should have been a female animal and turn it into a cell fertile hermaphrodite'. The two genes the researchers 'tweaked' were one involved in making sperm and another involved in activating them.
"'These were small changes to the activity of genetic pathways that already existed,' said Dr Ellis. 'So the pieces were already in place, they just had to be altered so they worked in a slightly new way.' He said the finding was surprising because it was such a simple change that produced a trait that was so dramatic.
"Genes of change
"The scientists use nematode worms as simple models to show how evolution works at a genetic level. 'We understand how evolution tweaks simple traits, like a giraffe's neck [getting] longer and longer over time,' he said. 'But most of the most important changes -- the creation of the eye, the development of feathers in birds, wings in insects -- involved the creation of novel traits.
"'The better we understand this, the better we can understand the kinds of changes that created humans from our ancestors.' Dr David Lunt, an evolutionary biologist from the University of Hull, UK, who was not involved in this study told BBC News that said this was an 'excellent experiment'.
"'Scientists study the evolution of sexual systems because it allows us to see all the forces of evolution at once,' he explained. 'We have very few model systems anywhere near as powerful as this one.'" [BBC News, 15/11/09. Emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Some paragraphs merged. See also here.]
I have given details of several other rather confused organisms that do not appear to 'understand' dialectics, here.
4. We have already seen that there are countless changeless objects in nature. [On this, see the recent Internet discussion I have had on this topic.]
Appendix A -- Mao On Change
The following material has been taken from Mao (1961b):
The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.
Engels said, "Motion itself is a contradiction." Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)". Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist. (p.316)
But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed -- a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing. [P.333.]
Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection or mutual co-operation -- all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity....
The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another. That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.
This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity?
The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without "above", there would be no "below") without "below", there would be no "above". Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, these would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty) without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies "how oppositescan be...identical". How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.
But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?
The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity.
Our agrarian revolution has been a process in which the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land, and it will be such a process once again. In given conditions having and not having, acquiring and losing, are interconnected; there is identity of the two sides. Under socialism, private peasant ownership is transformed into the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place everywhere else. There is a bridge leading from private property to public property, which in philosophy is called identity, or transformation into each other, or interpenetration. [Pp.337-39.]
War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed "how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...".
Why is it that "the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another"? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.
In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another. There are innumerable transformations in mythology, for instance, Kua Fu's race with the sun in Shan Hai Ching, Yi's shooting down of nine suns in Huai Nan Tzu, the Monkey King's seventy-two metamorphoses in Hsi Yu Chi,the numerous episodes of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings in the Strange Tales of Liao Chai, etc. But these legendary transformations of opposites are not concrete changes reflecting concrete contradictions. They are naive, imaginary, subjectively conceived transformations conjured up in men's minds by innumerable real and complex transformations of opposites into one another. Marx said, "All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature." The myriads of changes in mythology (and also in nursery tales) delight people because they imaginatively picture man's conquest of the forces of nature, and the best myths possess "eternal charm", as Marx put it; but myths are not built out of the concrete contradictions existing in given conditions and therefore are not a scientific reflection of reality. That is to say, in myths or nursery tales the aspects constituting a contradiction have only an imaginary identity, not a concrete identity. The scientific reflection of the identity in real transformations is Marxist dialectics.
Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever.
Why is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible.
Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?...
All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.
There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things. [Pp.339-43.]
We may now say a few words to sum up. The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought. It stands opposed to the metaphysical world outlook. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. Each contradiction and each of its aspects have their respective characteristics; this is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. In given conditions, opposites possess identity, and consequently can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other; this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle of opposites is ceaseless, it goes on both when the opposites are coexisting and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and becomes especially conspicuous when they are transforming themselves into one another; this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions and to the distinction between the principal aspect and the non-principal aspect of a contradiction; in studying the universality of contradiction and the struggle of opposites in contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the different forms of struggle. Otherwise we shall make mistakes. If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction. [Pp.345-46. Throughout, bold emphases alone added.]
References
Afanasyev, V. (1968), Marxist Philosophy (Progress Publishers, 3rd ed.).
Aristotle, (1984a), The Complete Works Of Aristotle, Two Volumes, edited by J. Barnes (Princeton University Press).
--------, (1984b), Physics, in Aristotle (1984a), pp.315-446.
Barnes, J. (1982), The Presocratic Philosophers (Routledge).
Bostock, D. (2006), 'Aristotle On The Principles Of Change In Physics 1', in Schofield and Nussbaum, pp.179-96.
Bottomore, T. (1985) (ed.), A Dictionary Of Marxist Thought (Blackwell).
Conze, E. (1944), An Introduction To Dialectical Materialism (NCLC Publishing Society Ltd.).
Cornforth, F. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.). [A copy of the 1968 edition is available here.]
Engels, F. (1891a), 'Letter To Conrad Schmidt', 01/11/1891, in Marx and Engels (2001), p.286.
--------, (1891b), The Origin Of Family, Private Property And State, in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.449-583.
--------, (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).
--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).
Fisk, M. (1973), Nature And Necessity (Indiana University Press).
--------, (1979), 'Dialectics And Ontology', in Mepham and Ruben (1979), pp.117-43.
Gollobin, I. (1986), Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories And Practice (Petras Press).
Guest, D. (1963), Lectures On Marxist Philosophy (Lawrence & Wishart).
Hacker, P. (2007), Human Nature, The Categorial Framework (Blackwell).
Harris, L. (1985), 'Forces And Relations Of Production', in Bottomore (1985), pp.178-80.
--------, (1995a), Lectures On The History Of Philosophy Volume One: Greek Philosophy To Plato, translated by E. S. Haldane (University of Nebraska Press).
--------, (1995b), Lectures On The History Of Philosophy Volume Three: Medieval And Modern Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane (University of Nebraska Press).
--------, (1999), Science Of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller (Humanity Books).
Kirk, G., Raven, J., and Schofield, M. (1999) (eds.), The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.).
Lawler, J. (1982), 'Hegel On Logical And Dialectical Contradictions, And Misinterpretations From Bertrand Russell To Lucio Colletti', in Marquit et al (1982), pp.11-44. [Much of this article has been reproduced here and here.]
Lenin, V. (1916), The Junius Pamphlet -- Collected Works Volume 22 (Progress Publishers).
Mao Tse-Tung (1961a), Selected Works Of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume One (Foreign Languages Press).
--------, (1961b), 'On Contradiction', in Mao (1961a), pp.311-47.
Marquit, E. (1982), 'Contradictions In Dialectics And Formal Logic', in Marquit et al (1982), pp.67-83.
Marquit, E., Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982) (eds.), Dialectical Contradictions And Contemporary Marxist Discussions, Studies in Marxism, Volume 10 (Marxist Educational Press).
Marx, K. (1968) 'Preface To A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy', in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.180-84.
Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968), Selected Works In One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).
Meikle, S. (1979), 'Dialectical Contradiction And Necessity', in Mepham and Ruben (1979), pp.5-33.
Mepham, J., and Ruben, D-H. (1979) (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Volume One: Dialectics And Method (Harvester Press).
Molyneux, J. (1983), 'What Is The Real Marxist Tradition?' International Socialism 20, pp.3-53.
Novack, G. (1971), An Introduction To The Logic Of Marxism (Pathfinder Press, 5th ed.).
--------, (1978), Polemics In Marxist Philosophy (Monad Press).
Pannekoek, A. (1942), Materialism And Historical Materialism.
Plekhanov, G. (1956), The Development Of The Monist View Of History (Progress Publishers). This is reprinted in Plekhanov (1974), pp.480-737.
--------, (1974), Selected Philosophical Works, Volume One (Progress Publishers, 2nd ed.).
Ruben, D-H. (1979), 'Marxism And Dialectics', in Mepham and Ruben (1979), pp.37-85.
Rudas, L. (1933), 'Dialectical Materialism And Communism', Labour Monthly Pamphlets, Number 4. [This can be accessed as a PDF,here.]
Schofield, M., and Nussbaum, M. (2006) (eds.), Language And Logos. Studies In Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented To G. E. L. Owen(Cambridge University Press).
Shirokov, M., et al (1937), A Textbook Of Marxist Philosophy (Victor Gollancz). [This book in fact has no publication date, but internal evidence suggests that it was published in the mid-, to late-1930s, so I have arbitrarily assigned it the given date. (The second half of the book can now be accessed here (as a PDF), and the first half here.)]
Spirkin, A. (1983), Dialectical Materialism (Progress Publishers).
Stalin, J. (1976a), Problems Of Leninism (Foreign Languages Press).
--------, (1976b), 'Dialectical And Historical Materialism', in Stalin (1976a), pp.835-73.
Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism. The Marxist World-View (Covici, Friede Publishers).
Weston, T. (2008), 'The Concept Of Non-Antagonistic Contradiction In Soviet Philosophy', Science & Society 72, 4, pp.427-54.
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Latest Update: 30/12/14
Word count: 43,560
© Rosa Lichtenstein 2015
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Cash Till PayEssay Seven Part Three -- Why Dialectical Materialism Can't Explain Change
Preface
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March 2015: A recent computer meltdown has resulted in the codes I inserted into several Essays at this site altering randomly (I have no idea why!). This has made the formatting and fonts I have used vary erratically. I am currently trying to correct this error, but it might take several weeks to implement fully.
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The material presented below originally began life as part of Essay Seven Part One and several other Essays, but I thought it wise to re-write it and post it as an Essay in its own right.
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As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary nearly thirty years ago. [The difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained here.]
It is also worth pointing out that phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM) aren't meant to imply that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.
However, this will become the main topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directedhere, here, and here for more details. [Why I have included DM in this assessment of ruling-class thought is explained here and here.]
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As of December 2014, this Essay is just over 43,500 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas can be accessed here.
The material below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
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(1) Introduction
(1) Hegel
(2) Engels
(3) Plekhanov
(4) Lenin
(5) Stalin
(6) Mao
(ii) Other DM-Theorists
(4) Critics Answered
(a) General Response
(5) Social Change
(d) Human Input
(7) Conclusion
(8) Notes
(10) References
Introduction
Dialectical Marxists claim that DM is not only capable of explaining simple and complex (protracted or short) changes that take place in nature and society, it is able to do so far better than any other theory, especially one that relies on FL. Of course, this isn't just an academic question since dialecticians also maintain that their theory is uniquely suited in its ability to assist those engaged in the revolutionary transformation of society. In which case, DM isn't just the quintessential theory of change -- as a guide to practice, it is the only effective theory of revolutionary change.
[FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
But, what if it should turn out that DM can't actually cope with, or even account for change?
Worse still: what if it should turn out that if DM were true, change would in fact be impossible?
The implied assumptions behind each of the above questions might at first sight seem (to some) to be false, if not patently absurd. And yet, as we are about to find out, they aren't:
(1) DM can't cope with change. (2) If true, it would indeed make change impossible.
As it turns out, these highly controversial allegations (unique to this site) are nearly as easy to substantiate as they have been to load onto your screen.
Any who doubt this are encouraged to read on...
Why DM Can't Explain Change
Dialectical Confusion
Surprising as this might seem, DM-theorists are decidedly unclear whether or not objects and processes in nature and society changebecause of (1) A 'contradictory' relationship or 'struggle' between their 'internal opposites', or because (2) They change into their 'opposites', or even because (3) Change itself creates those 'opposites'.
Now, whenever I have debated this topic with dialecticians, the above allegations are often disputed, and that is so even after those who take exception are confronted with proof texts drawn from the DM-classics (and other, 'lesser', DM-texts).
What Do Dialecticians Themselves Say?
So, precisely what do the DM-classics tell us? And, what do other DM-sources have to say?
In order to answer these questions, I propose to list several dozen of the aforementioned 'proof texts'.
However, apologies must be given in advance for the length and extremely repetitive nature of most of the following excerpts, but DM-fans simply refuse to accept that the DM-classicists actually believed the things alleged of them above (and below) -- especially after they have been confronted with the absurd consequences that follow from them detailed in the rest of this Essay -- unless they are shown chapter and verse, and in extensive detail. Indeed, in the absence of these proof texts they tend to regard anything that a particular theorist had to say (regardless of whether or not this theorist is Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, or Mao) as either "far too crude", unrepresentative, unreliable. Alternatively, they complain that these passages have been "taken out of context".
I have dealt with these and other objections, here.
In what follows, unless otherwise stated, bold emphases alone have been added. Quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.
What Do The DM-Classicists Have To Say?
Beginning with Hegel himself (but, see also here):
"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.
"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]
"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
"Two philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the dialectical (Aristotle and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that these fixed opposites of basis and consequence, cause and effect, identity and difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that analysis shows one pole already present in the other in nuce, that at a definite point the one pole becomes transformed into the other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing contradictions." [Ibid., pp.202-03.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]
"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation." [Ibid., p.179.]
"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891a), p.414.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in theidentity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]
"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]
"Of course, the fundamental proposition of Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted from here.]
"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin (1976b), pp.836, 840.]
Mao:
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end...." [Ibid.,pp.311-18.]
I have now added (to Appendix A ) all of Mao's highly repetitive comments on this aspect of change, so that readers can see that (1) What he had to say hasn't been taken out of context, and (2) This theory of change wasn't a minor or peripheral aspect of his thought.
Other DM-Theorists
Here are the comments of several 'lesser' DM-theorists:
"[The sides of] dialectical contradictions do not dissolve one another, do not neutralise one another, while oppositely directed forces do not prevail over one another but turn into one another, and this transition of every phenomenon, every process into its opposite also constitutes the essence of all forms of movement of matter, a general law of its existence." [Boris Gessen and Ivan Podvolotskii, quoted in Weston (2008), p.435. These two characters were Deborinites writing in the 1920s.]
"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable ofinfinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinitedifferentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because thisunlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]
"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]
"This first conception [i.e., the first conception Lenin had mentioned -- RL] remains on the surface of phenomena. It can describe merely the outer appearance of movement but cannot divulge its essence; it is able merely to describe the growth or diminution of different elements or factors in a process, but cannot explain the internal cause of its evolutionary movement, cannot show how and why a given process develops. The supporters of this conception, when they would attempt such an explanation, are compelled to seek for some external factor to account for the qualitatively new, since this could never be given by merely quantitative changes. It is hardly surprising that they are frequently driven to the theory of divine intervention. The supporters of this view cannot explain how a thing comes to be turned into its own opposite, cannot explain 'leaps,' the disappearance of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new.' Thus from this standpoint it is impossible to show why capitalism must inevitably grow into socialism, or why classes in the U.S.S.R. disappear as the result of sharp class struggle. The exponents of this point of view are supporters of the mechanistic conception of development.
"The exponents of the second conception proceed from the standpoint that everything develops by means of a struggle of opposites, by a division, a dichotomy, of every unity into mutually exclusive opposites. Thus capitalism develops in virtue of the contradiction between the social character of production and the private means of appropriation; transitional economy develops on the basis of the struggle between developing and growing socialism and developed, but not yet annihilated, capitalism, and also on the basis of the sharpened conflict of classes in this period in the course of which classes ultimately disappear.
"The second conception, not remaining on the surface of phenomena, expresses the essence of movement as the unity of opposites.... This conception seeks the causes of development not outside the process but in its very midst; it seeks mainly to disclose the source of 'self-movement' of the process. To understand a process means to disclose its contradictory aspects, to establish their mutual relationship, to follow up the movement of its contradictions through all its stages. This view gives the key to the 'leaps' which characterises the evolutionary series; it explains the changing of a process into its opposite, the annihilation of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new'...." [Shirokov (1937), pp.134-36.]
"This conception of all existence as movement, process, is the fundamental condition for the understanding of the dialectic. Only from this standpoint do the contradictions and opposites, their struggle, their transformation and conversion into one another, their inter-penetration, their dialectical interaction become comprehensible. Those who see rigid entities before them and have rigid concepts of them in their heads will find it impossible to understand how the same thing can possess contradictory determinations or change into its opposite. But to those who regard both things and their reflection in our minds as processes, it will not seem strange that a process should have contradictory tendencies, sides, elements which conflict with one another, penetrate one another and change into the other....
"So the 'other' which arise from the dialectical process of becoming is not an other, i.e.., not only 'otherness,' but its other, as Hegel emphasised:
'This harmony', he says, 'is just absolute becoming, change -- not becoming something other, now this and now an other. The essential point is that each different, particular thing is different from an other, not abstractly different from any other, but different from its other.' [Rudas is here quoting Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular passage coming from p.285 --RL.]
"Upon which Lenin comments:
'Very true and important: the "other" as its other, development into its opposite.' [Rudas is here quoting Lenin (1961), p.260. This is a key idea in Hegel's response to David Hume; on this, see here -- RL.]
"Are life and death, matter and thought, bourgeois and proletarian, capitalism...and communism only 'otherness,' and not also opposites which arise from a contradictory process of development and represent its opposite poles or the transformation of one into another?" [Rudas (1933), pp.19-21. This can now be read here, although in the on-line version the above passage comes from the reader's pp.10-12.]
"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -–at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….
"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]
"The negative electrical pole…can't exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]
"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), pp.94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used at this site.]
"Formal logic, which is based on abstract, or simple, identity (A equals A), is too one-sided to explain this negation of one state of matter and its transformation into its opposite, in this case the lifeless into the living, because it excludes from its premises real difference and contradiction, which is the extreme development of difference. But the unity of opposites (A equals non-A), which makes contradiction explicit and intelligible, can explain this transition, which actually occurred on earth. The emergence of life from the nonliving in turn substantiates the objective basis in nature of this law of concrete contradiction, a cornerstone of dialectical logic." [Novack (1978), p.239.]
"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….
"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....
"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature….Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]
"Dialectics teaches one to look beyond the immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of stability and calm, and to see the seething contradictions and ceaseless movement that lies beneath the surface. We are imbued with the idea of constant change, and that sooner or later everything changes into its opposite. The capitalist system, together with its values, morality, politics and what sometimes passes for philosophy, is not something eternal, which has no beginning and no end. In fact, it is a very recent phenomenon with a turbulent past, a shaky present, and no future at all. This, of course, is something the system's defenders find impossible to contemplate. So much the worse for them!" [Authors' Preface to the second Spanish Edition of Reason in Revolt (i.e., Woods and Grant (1995); quoted from here.]
"Ted Grant was an incorrigible optimist all his life. Marxists are optimistic by their very nature because of two things: the philosophy of dialectical materialism, and our faith in the working class and the socialist future of humanity. Most people look only at the surface of the events that shape their lives and determine their destiny. Dialectics teaches one to look beyond the immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of stability and calm, and to see the seething contradictions and ceaseless movement that lies beneath the surface. The idea of constant change, in which sooner or later everything changes into its opposite enables a Marxist to rise above the immediate situation and to see the broader picture." [Authors' Preface to the second English Edition of Reason in Revolt; quoted from here.]
"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….
"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….
"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….
"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414.]
"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.
"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one can't find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....
"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]
"The statement that the struggle of opposites is decisive in development in no way belittles the importance of their unity. The unity of opposites is a requisite of struggle, because there is struggle only where opposite sides exist in one object or phenomenon....
"And so, objects and phenomena have opposite aspects -- they represent the unity of opposites. Opposites not merely exist side by side, but are in a state of constant contradiction, a struggle is going on between them. The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the source of development of reality." [Afanasyev (1968), pp.95-97.]
"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'
"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.
"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.
"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)
"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.
"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]
"But, change itself also constitutes a unity of opposites. In the most general way, a system undergoing change is becoming something that it was not and is cessing to be what it was. In one form or another a change represents the transformation of an object into its dialectical opposite, a process referred to as dialectical negation...." [Marquit (1982), pp.69-70.]
"Qualitative change is one of the basic concepts of dialectics. And so-called qualitative change refers precisely to the transformation of the character of a thing into the opposite and its change into another thing. To deny this is to deny the whole of dialectics." [Wang Jo-Shui, p.3, quoted from here. (This links to a PDF.)]
"Apart from the more or less broad division of contradictions into antagonistic and non-antagonistic, it is possible to emphasize specifically contradictions which are the basic source of development of an object (this is contradiction in its essence), contradictions connected with the transition of an object from a given state into its opposite state...." [I. Narski, Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia (1963), p.1; quoted fromhere. (This links to a PDF.)]
Even Left Communists, it seems, have been seduced by this Hermetic Creed:
"It is assumed that the dialectical character of historical materialism is best described when it is referred to as the theory of development. However, the process of evolution was also known to the natural science of the 19th century. Scientists were well acquainted with the growth of the cell into a complex organism, the evolution of animal species as expressed in the origin of species, and the theory of the evolution of the physical world known as the law of entropy. But their method of reasoning was undialectical. They believed their concepts were concrete objects and considered their identities and opposites as absolutes. Consequently, the evolution of the universe as well as the continued progress of knowledge brought out contradictions in the theory of knowledge of which many examples have been quoted by Engels in his 'Anti-Dühring.' Understanding in general and science in particular segregate and systematise into definite concepts and laws what in the real world of phenomena occurs in continuous flux and transition. By means of names, through which language separates and defines the sequel of events, all occurrences falling into a particular group are considered similar and unchangeable. As abstract concepts they differ sharply, but in reality they converge and fuse. The colours blue and green are distinct from each other but in the intermediary nuances no one can say definitely where one colour ends and the other begins. It cannot be stated at which point during its life cycle a flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That in practical life good and evil are not absolute opposites and that the greatest justice may become the greatest injustice is acknowledged everyday, just as juridical freedom may be transformed into its opposite. Dialectical thinking corresponds to reality inasmuch as it takes into consideration that the finite cannot explain the infinite, nor the static the dynamic world; that every concept has to develop into new concepts, or even into its opposite. Metaphysical thinking, on the other hand, leads to dogmatic assertions and contradictions because it views conceptions as fixed entities. Metaphysical, that is undialectical, thinking considers concepts formulated by thought as independent concepts that make up the reality of the world. Natural science proper does not suffer much from this shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice insofar as the very process of development compels it to continually revise its formulations and concepts, to amplify them by breaking them up in greater detail, to further modify its formulations to account for the new changes and to find new formulas for additions and corrections, thereby bringing the picture ever closer to the original model, the phenomenal world. The lack in dialectic reasoning becomes disturbing only when the naturalist passes from his special field of knowledge towards general philosophy and theory, as is the case with bourgeois materialism." [Anton Pannekoek,Materialism And Historical Materialism, 1942. Quoted from here. Spelling altered to conform to UK English.]
And, this idea crops up all over the place on the Internet:
"Logic since Aristotle (384-322 BCE) had been based on the so-called formal logic of A = A, a thing is always equal to itself. With the advances in science just after the French Revolution Hegel was able to propound a new logic, which based itself on movement. This can be summed up with the idea that A = -A, everything will eventually change into its opposite. Light and dark, life and death, up and down, all phenomena are in movement and eventually change into their opposite. Even the most durable elements break down into nothing over time." [Quoted fromhere.]
"The two mutually contradictory aspects of an objective thing are not dead and rigid, but living, conditional and mobile and they transform themselves into each other." [Yen Feng, quoted from here.]
"It is hardly surprising that they are frequently driven to the theory of divine intervention. The supporters of this view cannot explain how a thing comes to be turned into its own opposite, cannot explain 'leaps,' the disappearance of the 'old' and the emergence of the 'new.' Thus from this standpoint it is impossible to show why capitalism must inevitably grow into socialism, or why classes in the U.S.S.R. disappear as the result of sharp class struggle. The exponents of this point of view are supporters of the mechanistic conception of development....
"The mutual penetration of opposites, the transition of one opposite into another, belongs to all processes....
"Such indeed must be the method of studying any process, i.e. our task must be to find its simplest, basic relations, to disclose in it the basic contradictions, to investigate their development and their conflict; to investigate how the development of a contradiction prepares its resolution and determines the form of its resolution; to investigate the qualitative changes in the successive phases of development of a process, the relative independence of movement of contradictory aspects, their mutual connection, their transitions one into the other; to disclose in the development of the conflict of opposites in any process the necessity and also all the conditions and possibilities of its conversion into its own opposite. Such must be the course of study of any process in its emergence, development and decay." [Quoted from here.]
"This does not end with merely acknowledging that their contradictory aspects are necessary for each other's existence. What we also need to include is their transformation into each other. In given conditions each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite.
"This transforming into its opposite is what revolution is about....
"This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. All contradictory things are interconnected. They coexist in a single entity in given conditions,under other conditions they transform themselves into each other. This is what Lenin meant when he said, 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another." [Quoted from here.]
"The universe has not been created, but has always existed, in a process of continuous flux and change, whereby things change into their opposites, cause becomes effect, and effect cause. Thus contradiction lies at the root of everything. In order to get at the truth, it is necessary to go beyond the appearances, and lay bear the inner conflicting tendencies of a given phenomenon, in order to understand its inner motive forces." [Allan Woods, quoted from here.]
"Everything, which exists, does so out of necessity. But everything perishes, only to be transformed into something else. Thus what is ‘necessary’ in one time and place becomes 'unnecessary' in another. Everything creates its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it." [Quoted from here.]
Of course, this is archaic doctrine even appears in Chinese Philosophy:
"The Yin Yang principle is 'the' preeminent ancient Chinese secret offering explanation to everything that exists, changes or moves. Its origin comes from observing the very essence of the Universe -- from darkness there is light. Yin Yang embodies duality or an opposite nature with Yin tending toward passive, dark, feminine, downward seeking and Yang tending toward active, light, masculine, upward seeking.
"Because we can see dark and we can see light they appear separate yet they are connected. Everything in life has this same connective quality. However, notice your tendency to identify Yin and Yang as separate and to judge which one you relate to or prefer over the other. This same human tendency prevents us from accessing the power of the principle. So to access the power of Yin Yang we must embrace both Yin and Yang and observe without judgment.
"There is also a cyclical nature to Yin Yang. Everything changes into its opposite in an ongoing cycle of reversal. Health changes to sickness and sickness changes into health. The more you embrace Yin Yang and see your life as one continuous flow; your experiences in life will naturally reverse or begin to flow more easily." [China Daily, 25/02/2011.]
"Because we can see dark and we can see light they appear separate yet they are connected. Everything in life has this same connective quality. However, notice your tendency to identify Yin and Yang as separate and to judge which one you relate to or prefer over the other. This same human tendency prevents us from accessing the power of the principle. So to access the power of Yin Yang we must embrace both Yin and Yang and observe without judgment.
"There is also a cyclical nature to Yin Yang. Everything changes into its opposite in an ongoing cycle of reversal. Health changes to sickness and sickness changes into health. The more you embrace Yin Yang and see your life as one continuous flow; your experiences in life will naturally reverse or begin to flow more easily." [China Daily, 25/02/2011.]
Other, perhaps more open and honest mystics, hold the same belief:
"The messages that we receive every day from Babuji Maharaj emphasise that we have no choice. We have to go through it, suffering whatever happens to us, even to the extent of understanding that happiness is a suffering. Because today's happiness brings us sorrow tomorrow. Today's sorrow brings us happiness tomorrow. Everything changes into its [opposite] as we move through this incarnation. Nothing is fixed. What is fixed is the real experience of life that we treasure in our heart -- love." [Quoted from here.]
"'This is why no one could ever defeat me. There was no way to defeat me because I was never victorious. There was not a single person on this earth who could defeat me. Nobody could defeat me because I had already accepted the defeat on my own. I never tried to win. But you are saying that you want to win, and you don't want to be defeated by anyone. Then you are bound to be defeated because victory and defeat are two sides of the same coin.'
"What Krishna is saying is that one who sees this…. And remember one thing about this seeing: it is an existential experience. It is our everyday experience, but it is a wonder how we go on missing it, how we protect ourselves from seeing it. It seems we are playing a big trick on ourselves, otherwise it would be astonishing for such a living truth of life to escape our notice.
"We experience it every day. Everything changes into its opposite. If you go more deeply into a friendship, it starts turning into enmity. But what is the trick, that we go on avoiding seeing it? The trick is that when the friendship starts turning into enmity, we don't see it like that. We say that the friend is turning into an enemy." [Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, quoted from here. Link added. Many more examples of this ancient doctrine, which seem to have been accepted by every mystic that has ever walked the earth, have been posted here.]
It wouldn't be difficult to double or treble the number of quotations (taken both from Dialectical Marxists and from the above more open and honest mystics, like the good Bhagwan) that say more-or-less the same thing, as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have -- or, who knows how to use Google -- can easily confirm.
From the above, it is quite clear that the vast majority of classical (and even more recent) dialecticians do indeed believe that objects and processes not only change (1) Because of a struggle between their 'internal opposites', but also that (2) They change into these opposites (indeed, according to Lenin, they change into all of them!) as a result of that "struggle", and that they (3) Produce these opposites while they change --, or, they do so as a result of that change.
As we will also see, some might be tempted to drop one or other of the above three conditions to save the theory, but there were very good philosophical reasons why the DM-classicists argued the way they did. which most DM-apologists seem oblivious of. I will return to this theme in a later section; so anyone tempted to abandon one of more of (1)-(3) above would be well advised to postpone these moves until they have considered these reasons.
The Absurd Consequences Of This 'Theory'
In what follows, I will be ignoring the equivocation (outlined here and here), where dialecticians sometimes appear to mean by "internal opposite", "spatially-internal opposite", and sometimes they seem to mean "conceptually-", or "logically-internal opposite" -- the latter of which was certainly what Hegel appeared to mean by his use of such odd language.
As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change because they "struggle" with one another, and then change into one another -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics, and in the writings of countless other DM-theorists.
In order to see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of, or possesses, two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and thus changes as a result.
[Henceforth, in order to save on complexity, I will omit the phrase "or possesses".]
Unfortunately, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with which it could "struggle" in order to bring that about!
[Several obvious objections to the above argument will be neutralised below. Incidentally, the same problems arise if these 'contradictions' and 'opposites' are viewed as 'external'. (However, as we will see in Essay Eight Part One, 'external contradictions/opposites' attract serious difficulties all of their own.) Here, I have also avoided using "A" and "non-A"/"not-A" as 'opposites' in order to prevent certain options from being closed off too soon. Not much hangs on this, anyway, which readers can confirm for themselves if they replace O* andO** with "A" and/or "non-A"/"not-A" respectively throughout. (This will be done anyway, below, too.) Concentrating on A alone won't help, anyway. If A changes into non-A/not-A, A will have to exist at the same time as non-A/not-A, or A and non-A/not-A couldn't 'struggle' with one another in order for A to change into one or other of non-A/not-A. Once more: if non-A/not-A already exist, A can't change into either of them, since, plainly, it/they already exist!]
As we have just seen, 'dialectical opposites' have to co-exist of they are to engage in 'struggle' -- indeed, as Gollobin confirms:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414. Bold emphases added.]
Mao made the same point:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below').... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'howopposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Mao (1961a), pp.338-39. Bold emphases alone added.]
As, indeed, did Engels:
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold emphasis added.]
The online version renders this passage slightly differently:
"And one cannot have one side of this contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his hand after eating half." [Quoted from here.]
In that case, as noted above, these 'opposites' must co-exist.
Anyway, it is hard to see how O* could "struggle" with O** if O** didn't exist at the same time as O*!
Moreover, it is no use propelling O** into the future so that it is what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** isalready there, in the present, to make that happen!
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (if we now interpret O** as not-O*, which is how the DM-classicists tend to view these opposites), O* can't change into not-O* since not-O* already exists.
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (if we now interpret O** as not-O*, which is how the DM-classicists tend to view these opposites), O* can't change into not-O* since not-O* already exists.
[Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this dialectical ditch. I have considered all of them below, and in Note 1.]
Of course, the same problems will re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into (always assuming it isn't a changeless object/process). But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. Recall not-O* can only change into not-not-O* if it struggles with not-not-O*, which doesn't yet exist! In which case, the 'dialectical process' will simply grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence (out of thin air, it seems) to start things up again, or to keep things going. But, what could possibly engineer, or have engineered, that?
Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising the serious problems it creates for his theory.]
Returning to the last point: the puzzle where not-O* itself came from. It seems it will have to have come from O* since O* can only change because of its struggle with not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will only reduplicate the above problems -- as we will see in Note 1, but in relation to C, S, and F -- Capitalism, Socialism and Feudalism.1
[However, on the NON, see below.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]
Maybe this is all too quick? Perhaps we are missing something obvious? So, in order to ascertain if the above is indeed too hasty, it might be wise to push this process into the past to see if we can circumvent these 'difficulties'. To that end, let us suppose that O* itself came from object/process X, and that not-O* came from object/process Y.
However, according to the DM-classics, X itself can only change because it "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-X". As a result of that "struggle", X will change into not-X. But, and once again, not-X already exists, so X can't change into it! If not-X didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which X could "struggle", and hence change.
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Of course, this leaves the origin of not-X itself unexplained! And yet, it can only have come into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y! However, as we have seen, Y can't change into not-X, since not-X already exists! If it didn't, X couldn't in fact change since there would be nothing there with which it could "struggle". In which case, both X and not-X must have popped into existence from nowhere.
The same problems afflict Y. Once more, according to the DM-classics, Y itself can only change because of a "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-Y". As a result, it changes into that opposite, not-Y. But, and once again, not-Y already exists, so Y can't change into it! If not-Y didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which Y could "struggle", and hence change.
Once again, this leaves the origin of not-Y unexplained. Not-Y can only have come into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y! But, Y can't change into not-Y, since not-Y already exists! If it didn't, Y couldn't change. In which case, both Y and not-Ymust have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
It could be objected that the above seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the argument advanced in this Essay is completely misguided.
Fortunately, repairs are relatively easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O** -- the latter once again interpreted as not-O* --, and thus develops as a result.
The rest follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O*, and O* develops into not-O* as a result, then. plainly, this can't happen. As we have already seen, it isn't possible for O* to change into not-O* if not-O* already exists, and this will be the case whether or not, O* and not-O* are changeless or constantly changing objects and/or processes.
Of course, it could be objected that not-O* develops into O* while not-O* develops into O*. They develop into each other.
[This objection might even incorporate that obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]
If that were so, while this was happening, O* and not-O* would no longer be opposites of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more. It would also threaten to undermine this 'Law' in other ways, since, as we will see, each object/process has to have a unique "opposite" (something Hegel and Lenin called its "other").
Ignoring this 'minor' difficulty for now -- and even if we suppose it were the case that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' intoO*, and that and such change was governed by the obscure term "sublation" -- this theory still wouldn't work (as we are about to find out).
In order to see this, it might be a good idea to motivate the above objection to the argument presented here a little further. Indeed, it could be argued that Engels had anticipated the above 'difficulties' in the following comments:
"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976), pp.172-73. Bold emphases added.]
"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....
"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81. Bold emphases and link added.]
Engels's argument appears to be that "dialectical negation" isn't the same as ordinary (or even logical) negation in that it isn't simpledestruction, nor is it a mere cancellation. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect in itself, just as we will also see, this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as, indeed, did Engels and subsequent DM-fans).
Despite all this, it is worth asking: Does the above passage neutralise the argument presented earlier? Is the argument here guilty of the following?
"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought."? [Ibid.]
To answer this question, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites"/"tendencies"O* and not-O*, and it thus develops as a result. Given this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary --, but not intonot-O* --, incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. If we are to believe what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.
Putting this minor quibble to one side, too: Given this 'revised' view, we may now suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "Oi*" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').
If so, Oi* must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-Oi* in existence to make it develop any further!
[Recall that according to this 'theory', everything in existence (and that must include Oi*) changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]
So, there must be a not-Oi* already in existence to make Oi* change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt Oi* from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that Oi* changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events expressed in the DM-classics, which tell us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the "struggle" of opposites (and Oi* is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.
[That would also mean that the Second 'Law' isn't a law, either -- which is what we found was the case with the First 'Law', too.]
This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to Oi*) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.
Ignoring this 'difficulty', too: Even if Oi* were to change into not-Oi* (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down in the DM-classics), then all the problems we met earlier simply reappear, for Oi* would only be able to change if not-Oi* already exists to make that happen! But, not-Oi* can't already exist, for Oi* hasn't changed into it yet!
On the other hand, even if we were to suppose not-Oi* already exists, Oi* couldn't change into it since, as we have just seen, not-Oi*already exists!
Again, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O*, which produces not-O*, isn't ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.
In that case, let us now suppose that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite, not-Os*. But, if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Classics, not-Os* must already exist if O* is to struggle with it and then change into it! Once again, if that is so, O* can't turn into not-Os*, for it already exists! Alternatively, if not-Os* didn't already exist, O* couldn't change since O* can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-Os*!
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, once more.
It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For instance, to use Mao's example, peace changes into war; love can change into hate, and so on.
No one doubts this, but DM can't explain why this happens. Indeed, if DM were true, they couldn't happen!
So, for peace to change into war, it would have to struggle with it. Has anyone witnessed this odd event? Can abstractions like these actually struggle with one another? And yet, both Mao and Lenin told us the following:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphases added.]
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)'. Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another.
"That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion....
"War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.
"There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b), pp.316, 337-38, 339-40, 342-43. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
If the above DM-classicists are right, how can peace change into war unless it "struggled" with it?
It could be argued that the contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) of a given society, or societies -- which might give the appearance of peace -- are what turn peace in to war; it is the mutual struggle of these contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) that change the one into the other.
In that case, let us call these underlying contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) UA and UA*, respectively. If the above is correct, it is the struggle between UA and UA* that changes Peace (P) into War (W). And yet, if this is so, the DM-classics were wrong;P and its opposite, W, do not actually struggle with one another, even though they are opposites, and even though they should do this (if the DM-classics are to be believed). What changes P into W is a struggle between their non-opposites, UA and UA*. Furthermore, if eitherUA or UA* changes P into W, then one or both of them must be the opposite(s) of P, and if they are the opposite(s) of P they should change into P! Either that, or the DM-classics are wrong.
On the other hand, if UA and UA* are indeed opposites of one another, they should change into each other. But, they can't do that since they both already exist!
Once again, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Concrete Examples
It could be argued that if we consider concrete examples, we might be able to understand what the DM-classics meant when they claimed that things struggle, with and then change, into their opposites.
In what follows, I propose to examine several 'concrete' examples, some of which have been put to me by those who doubt that the general criticisms advanced above apply in such cases. Apologies are owed in advance for the somewhat repetitive nature of this material, but those who appealed to these examples thought they could thereby neutralise the above criticisms. In every case, they were only able to imagine they could do this by ignoring one or more of the core DM-theses advanced in the classics -- namely: (1) Everything changes because of a 'struggle' between 'dialectical opposites', (2) Everything changes into that 'opposite', and (3) Change produces that opposite.
Hence, the next four sub-sections are aimed at showing that if we accept what the DM-classics have to say, the aforementioned general criticisms do indeed apply in each case. Hence the unfortunate need for repetition.
'Dialectical John' Can't In Fact Age
Consider "John" again: it has been pointed out to me that while it might be the case that John is a boy, in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man (all things being equal). Now, the fact that other individuals are already men doesn't stop John changing into a man (his opposite). So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists. In that case, the above objections fail.
Or, so it could be maintained.
And yet, as we have seen, this theory tells us that all things/processes change because they "struggle" with their 'opposites', and that they "struggle" with what they become (i.e., that 'opposite'). The above response ignores these salient details. If we don't ignore them, what effect will that have on this example?
Are we to assume with the DM-classics that John has to struggle with his opposite? But, according to this response, his opposite is all men (or perhaps manhood). If so, John must struggle with all the individuals that are already men (i.e., all men) if he is to become a man himself. But, do we find boys, and particularly John, struggling with every grown man on the planet? I must admit, if this does happen, I have missed it; I suspect I'm not the only one.
Perhaps, John struggles with manhood? I'll return to this possibility presently.
On the other hand, are we to suppose that John must struggle with what he himself is to become, his individual opposite -- i.e., himself as a man --, even before it/he exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point; John can only change if he struggles with his opposite, but that opposite doesn't yet exist. Plainly, if his opposite doesn't yet exist, he can't struggle with it, and hence can't change.
We hit the same problem.
Moreover, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite (and his opposite is all men), does this mean he has to turn into these other men, too? Or, does he turn into just one of them? But, it seems he must do one or the other if the Dialectical Classics are to be believed.
Anyway, according to the DM-worthies, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. If so, are we really supposed to believe that "John-as-a-man" is struggling with "John-as-a-boy" in the here-and-now? Or, that the abstraction, manhood, is struggling with that other abstraction, boyhood?
Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, if that were the case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the here-and-now. Of course, adolescence can't struggle with anything, since it, too, is an abstraction. And, a struggle in John's 'mind' over what he is to become can't make him develop into a man, either! Maybe for Idealists what happens in 'the mind' can effect a change in John, but one assumes materialists will want to reject such an option; it should hardly need pointing out that a struggle in the mind can't change a boy into a man. This isn't to deny that such struggles take place, it is merely to point out that mere thinking doesn't make something so, or happen -- if it did, beggars would ride.
Nevertheless, John-as-a-man doesn't yet exist, so John-as-a-man can't struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-mandoes exist alongside John-as-boy, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy can't change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!
To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that 'opposite' cannot now exist otherwise John wouldn't need to become him! But, and once again, if this opposite doesn't exist, John can't change, for there would be nothing with which he could struggle.
Looking at this a little more concretely: In ten or fifteen years time, John won't become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "ManJ". But, and once again, ManJ must exist now or John couldn't change into him (if the DM-classics quoted earlier are to be believed) -- for John can only become a man if he is now locked in struggle with what he is to become, his own opposite, ManJ.
Once more: if this is so, John cannot become ManJ since ManJ already exists!
It could be objected that the DM-classics argue that an object in change takes on an opposite property or quality, expressed by the negation of the predicate term that once applied to it. So, in abstract terms, if A is F (where "A" is perhaps the name of a person, such as John, or that of some object or process, and "F" is some property or quality he/it possesses at some point) -- then the A that is F becomes the A that is not-F. Or, perhaps better: it used to be the case that A is F, now it is the case that A is not-F. This is surely possible -- indeed, actual. Moreover, A being F doesn't prevent A becoming not-F simply because F already exists, or even because not-F already exists (since, plainly, not-F doesn't yet exist in A). So, dialectical change is not only possible, it is actual.
However, this is just a generalisation of the point made above about John becoming a man, and is susceptible to the same sort of rebuttal: if not-F doesn't yet exist, then A can't struggle with it, and hence can't change. In which case, this latest response ignores what the DM-classics tell us: change is produced by a struggle of co-existent opposites.
It could be argued, that not-F does exist, so this struggle can take place. Hence, A can both struggle with not-F and become not-F. More concretely, tendencies in John that maintain him as a boy (F) are locked in a struggle with those that are changing him into a man/not-a-boy (not-F).
Again, this is just a particular example of a point that has already been considered. But, are we really supposed to believe that John changes into a tendency -- for that is what not-F is, according to this objection?
[Anyway, I examine the 'opposite tendencies defence' in more detail, below.]
Independently of that, it is difficult to believe that anyone who has read the DM-classics could imagine that this new interpretation finds any support in what they have to say. For example, if it is indeed the case that the A that is F turns into the A is not-F -- or if A's being Fdevelops into A's being not-F -- then, according to those classics, they must struggle with one another. But, how can this happen if it isadmitted that the A is not-F doesn't yet exist?
It could be countered that what is important here is that F applied to A turns into its opposite, not-F. Now, many not-Fs will typically alreadyexist. For example, John might be alive one day (i.e., A is F), but the next he could be dead/not alive (i.e., A is not-F). But, many other individuals were dead or weren't alive the day before, when John was alive. But, that doesn't stop him from becoming not alive (not-F), contrary to the repeated assertions above. The fact that some things are not-F doesn't prevent other things from becoming not-F, too.
Again, this is just a re-packaged version of the point made above about John becoming a man. In this case, when he dies, John doesn't just become any old corpse, he becomes John's corpse. If that is so, and the DM-classics are to be believed (that objects and processes struggle with what they become), then that can only happen if John struggles with his opposite, i.e., with his own corpse! Do we all really have to fight our own future cadavers in order to die?
It could be objected that this could happen if F struggles with not-F. Life and death/not-life are dialectically opposed to one another, as Engels pointed out. So, the forces that keep John, for example, alive are opposed to those that are killing him, and which will kill him one day.
But, if that is so, and the DM-classics are correct, then these dialectical opposites must turn into one another. Is it really the case then that the forces that keep John alive will turn into those that are killing him, and vice versa? Will anabolic processes become catabolicprocesses, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact, these processes don't even struggle with one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we were to believe everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[Since I have devoted several sections of Essay Seven Part One to this very point, the reader is re-directed there for more details.]
Furthermore, and returning to whatever it is that A refers to, mentioned above: A doesn't just change into any old not-F, it changes into aparticular not-F. Let us call the particular not-F that A changes into "FA". Once more, according to the dialectical classics, every object/process changes because (1) It struggles with its opposite and (2) It changes into that opposite. If so, A can only change by struggling with FA; but FA already exists, so A can't change into it. If FA didn't already exist, A couldn't struggle with it in order to change.
No matter how many bends we try to negotiate with this rusty old banger of a theory, it still ends up wrapped around the same non-dialectical tree trunk.
Turning The Tables On DM
Consider another concrete example with which I have been confronted: wood being fashioned into a table. Once more, according to the dialectical classics all objects and processes change because of a 'struggle' of opposites, and they also change into those opposites.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to 'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it. [Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?]
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood couldn't 'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it couldn't 'struggle' with the table it has yet to become!
Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to 'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it. [Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?]
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood couldn't 'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it couldn't 'struggle' with the table it has yet to become!
Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
And, it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a carpenter is required to turn wood into a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with that wood to make it into that table -- since we are told that every object and process in nature and society is governed by this 'Law'. But, once again, according to the Dialectical Classics, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical 'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, the wood in question must turn into the carpenter, not the table! And the carpenter must change into wood!
With a crazy 'theory' like this at its core, is it any wonder Dialectical Marxism is a by-word for failure?
Are 'Dialectical Cats' Immortal?
If we examine another example I have come across on several Internet Discussion Boards we will soon see that this 'law' has several other rather absurd consequences: The DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a 'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites' (since we are told everything in the entire universe changes this way).
Consider a live cat, C, and its 'dialectical opposite', C*. According to the DM-classicists, C must at some point 'struggle' with and then change into C*. But, at some point, C also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead cat must be the 'opposite' of that live cat; that is, C* must be that dead cat. In that case, if the dialectical classics are to be believed, a dialectical cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become. In which case, C can only die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
On the other hand, live cat C can't change into dead cat C* since dead cat C* already exists! If C* didn't already exist, C couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', C can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
Alternatively, this 'theory' also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
On the other hand, live cat C can't change into dead cat C* since dead cat C* already exists! If C* didn't already exist, C couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', C can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
Alternatively, this 'theory' also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in the life and death of cat C, whether or not these are 'sublated' intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that cat C goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.
However, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a 'struggle of opposites', and C(1) must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, C(1) must inevitably change into C(2).
So, C(1) must 'struggle' with and change into, C(2).
If so, the same problems arise, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since C(2) already exists. If C(2) didn't already exist, C(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it!
Let us assume, therefore, that cat C goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.
However, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a 'struggle of opposites', and C(1) must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, C(1) must inevitably change into C(2).
So, C(1) must 'struggle' with and change into, C(2).
If so, the same problems arise, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since C(2) already exists. If C(2) didn't already exist, C(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it!
Furthermore, if C(2) is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with and change into,C(3). But, C(2) can't change into C(3) since C(3) already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make C(2) change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat could change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat could change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
It is a mystery, therefore, how there is any room left in the dialectical universe for anything to move, let alone change!
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism?
Stop Press: Dialectical Kettles Use Zero Energy!
Consider another hackneyed DM-example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe what the DM-classics tell us, that the 'opposite' that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? But, this must be the case if the DM-classics are correct.
Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!
In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!
It might be useful to make this example a little more concrete: To that end, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it when the liquid (of which it is a part) is heated. In order to identify this molecule let us call it, "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into, "S1". But, if the DM-classics above are correct W1 can only turn into S1 by 'struggling' with it. In that case, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1couldn't struggle with it and thus change! But, how can W1 turn into S1 if S1 already exists?
[The same result emerges if we consider a set of water molecules, W, and the set of steam molecules, S, that they turn into. I have left the details for the reader to complete.]
In fact, according to the DM-classics, opposites turn into each other; if so, S1 must change into W1 at the same time that W1 is turning intoS1! So, while you are boiling a kettle -- according to this Super-scientific 'theory' -- steam must be condensing back into the water you are boiling, and it must be doing so at the same rate the water is turning into steam!
One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.
Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and, as we have seen, to any and all alleged examples of 'dialectical'-change).
It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas (i.e., into steam/water vapour); so the dialectical classicists are correct.
However, if we take the DM-classics at their word, this gas (steam) must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if that water is to change into it. But, plainly, this gas doesn't yet exist, or the water would already have changed into it! In which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true, since the gas it is supposed to change into isn't there yet for it to struggle with.
It could be argued that what happens is that the heat energy put into the system makes water boil. Indeed, but then, if heat makes water boil, that water must struggle with this heat, and then change into it (if we are to believe the |DM-classicists), just as heat must change into water! If not, the DM-classics are wrong, and dialecticians are left with no theory of change.
[Follow the above link for an explanation why Hegel and Lenin adopted this rather odd 'theory of change'.]
Critics Answered
General Response
The above argument completely destroys the undeserved reputation DM has enjoyed for over a century (at least in the minds of its supporters) that it is the theory of change. In which case, one would have expected some sort of coherent defence from DM-fans. But, what do we find?
When confronted with these startling revelations -- and to most DM-fans these passages are indeed revelations, since few of them seem to have read the DM-classics with due care, or given them much thought --, dialecticians with whom I have 'debated' this topic have tended to respond in one or more of the following ways:
(1) They deny the DM classicists meant what they said -- or they assert that the DM-classicists did not in fact say what these passages clearly say they said! [Yes, they are that desperate!]
(2) They argue that these quotations aren't representative, or they have been "taken out of context".
(3) They claim that the author in question mis-spoke, or made an error.
(4) They argue that my demolition of this core DM-principle is merely "semantic", or that it is a classic example of "pedantry". That response is neutralised here. But, independently of that, it is worth pointing out that the argument that Hegel used to motivate and establish this 'theory' of change was itself based on 'semantic' principles -- on that, see here and here. So, if this doctrine was originally based on 'semantics', DM-fans can hardly complain if 'semantics' is used in its demolition.
(5) They suggest we should use our "commonsense" when applying this 'Law', and we should therefore reject the absurd conclusions I have highlighted.
(6) They point out that it is inappropriate to use FL-symbols when attempting to understand/interpret this theory, since FL puts objects and processes in 'fixed categories'. [An example of this sort of response can be found here, on page 2.]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
(7) They endeavour to repair this theory on-the-hoof, as it were, substituting their own preferred, but hastily concocted, 'substitute theory' -- all of which 'repairs' suffer from other fatal defects which they have also failed to spot, problems that Hegel and the DM-classicists were well aware of. Indeed, Hegel's theory was specifically designed to avoid these 'problems'.
(8) They argue that (a) This 'Law' deals solely with, or pertains exclusively to, opposing "tendencies", or that (b) It only applies inspecific circumstances.
(9) But, mostly, they simply ignore this 'problem', or they deflect it onto me, and ask: "Who does Ms Lichtenstein think she is questioning this great Philosopher (Hegel), or these great revolutionaries?" [An excellent example of the latter approach can be found here -- check out the emotive responses of 'Loz'. But there are many more like this.]
I will now deal with each of these in turn -- beginning, however, with (2):
Unrepresentative And/Or 'Taken Out Of Context'
I have already listed dozens of quotations taken from the dialectical classics and 'lesser' DM-clones which show that these passages are indeed representative, and that DM-theorists (i.e., those who accept the classics) do in fact, or should in fact, believe that (a) Everything changes into its 'opposite', that (b) Everything does this by 'struggling' with its 'opposite', and that (c) This 'struggle' results in the production of that 'opposite'.
based on these passages, it is quite clear that the vast majority of classical (and even more recent) dialecticians do indeed accept (a), (b), and (c).
Now, when asked in what way these passages have been "taken out of context", the 'reply' I invariably receive from my 'dialectical critics' is..., er..., total silence. To that end, if any of my current readers think I have taken any of these passages "out of context", they should e-mail me, and if it turns out that i have sinned in this regard, I will apologise profusely and withdraw my criticism.
[This material has now been on the Internet, in one form or another, for nigh on eight years; in that time not one single DM-fan has e-mailed me to point out where or how I have taken this material "out of context".]
The DM-Classicists Didn't Mean What They Said
As far as (1) above is concerned, if the DM-worthies didn't mean what they said then latter-day DM-fans (who advance this excuse) will, it seems, have to ignore their own classics!
Less irrational readers will note that many of the above dialecticians quote one another word-for-word, so they at least thought their sources meant what they said.
The DM-Classicists Misspoke, Or Committed A Series Of Errors
More-or-less the same can be said about excuse (3); if the above worthies miss-spoke, or were wrong, then contemporary DM-fans would be well advised to ignore these error-strewn classics, since they all say the same thing!
Of course, anyone foolish enough to adopt this (otherwise!) sound piece of advice will have to endure the same amount and volume of abuse that has been aimed in my direction by those misguided enough to ignore it.
If We Use Our Commonsense, We Will Soon See These 'Absurd Consequences' For What They Are
Excuse (5) is a little different. Clearly we should use our common sense when interpreting anything, but this line-of-defence is a little rich coming from those who tell us, or who endorse, the following comment about 'commonsense':
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Engels (1892), p.406. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Especially those who now turn round and expect 'commonsense' to bale them out. In fact, Engels tells us that 'commonsense' is all but useless in such contexts (i.e., in relation to change, etc.). How 'commonsense' can help the beleaguered dialectician here is therefore something of a mystery.
Indeed, and on the contrary, the application of ordinary common sense shows this 'Law' would make change impossible.
[I explain the difference between "common sense" and "commonsense", here.]
Even so, Lenin and Mao were quite clear, this 'Law' is both universal and absolute:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. .]
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid.,p.318. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Not much wiggle room here, one feels!
It Is Inappropriate To Use FL, Or FL-Symbols, In Such Contexts
In fact, I have used very little, if any, FL in this Essay. And, as far as symbols are concerned, we need look no further than Mao's own use of them:
"But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed -- a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing." [Mao (1961b), p.333. Bold emphases added.]
Any who still complain about the use of symbols should turn an equally critical eye toward their use by DM-theorists themselves -- and, indeed, by Hegel, himself.
So, the use of abbreviative letters in this Essay (and they are no more than this -- they are certainly not variables drawn from FL!) is decidedly uncontroversial and plainly doesn't imply the use of 'fixed categories', as Mao himself notes.
In order to see this, it might be helpful to re-write an earlier argument (but now edited accordingly) that uses these abbreviative symbols to see what happens when they are dropped:
The DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a 'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites' (since we are told everything in the entire universe changes this way).
Consider a live cat and its 'dialectical opposite'. According to the DM-classicists that live cat must at some point 'struggle' with and then change into that 'opposite'. Again, at some point, that live cat also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead cat must be the 'opposite' of the live cat. In that case, if the dialectical classics are to be believed, a dialectical cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become; hence,it can only die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
Alternatively, that live cat can't change into the aforementioned dead cat since that dead cat already exists! If it didn't already exist, the live cat couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', the above live cat can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, it also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Alternatively, that live cat can't change into the aforementioned dead cat since that dead cat already exists! If it didn't already exist, the live cat couldn't 'struggle' with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', the above live cat can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM -- the 'world view of the proletariat' -- implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, it also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in the life and death of a cat, whether or not these are 'sublated' intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that this live cat goes through an indefinite number of successive stages: cat stage one, cat stage two, cat stage three..., cat stage any large number you care to name, cat stage one bigger than that, until at cat stage one bigger still it finally pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, cat stage one can only change into cat stage two because of a 'struggle of opposites', and cat stage one must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, cat stage one must inevitably change into cat stage two.
So, cat stage one must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage two.
If so, the same problems arise, for cat stage one can't change into cat stage two since cat stage two already exists. If it didn't, cat stage one couldn't 'struggle' with it! Moreover, if cat stage two is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage three. But, cat stage two can't change into cat stage three since cat stage three already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make cat stage two change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By an indefinite number of applications of the above argument -- and according to this 'theory' -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
Let us assume, therefore, that this live cat goes through an indefinite number of successive stages: cat stage one, cat stage two, cat stage three..., cat stage any large number you care to name, cat stage one bigger than that, until at cat stage one bigger still it finally pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, cat stage one can only change into cat stage two because of a 'struggle of opposites', and cat stage one must also change into that with which it has struggled; hence, cat stage one must inevitably change into cat stage two.
So, cat stage one must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage two.
If so, the same problems arise, for cat stage one can't change into cat stage two since cat stage two already exists. If it didn't, cat stage one couldn't 'struggle' with it! Moreover, if cat stage two is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage three. But, cat stage two can't change into cat stage three since cat stage three already exists! If it didn't, there would be nothing to make cat stage two change, nothing with which it could struggle.
By an indefinite number of applications of the above argument -- and according to this 'theory' -- all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist. In which case, no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages must co-exist, too.
It is a mystery, therefore, how there is any room left in the dialectical universe for anything to move, let alone change!
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism?
The reader will no doubt appreciate that very little has changed (no pun intended), except perhaps the argument isn't quite as clear or as concise as it used to be. Hence, very little hangs on the use of abbreviative symbols.
Impromptu Repairs Attempted 'On-The-Hoof'
It seems that very few DM-fans have given much thought to their own 'theory' of change, so when its absurd consequences are pointed out to them they first of all react with horror, and then some of them attempt to apply their own hastily constructed and impromptu repairs. [An excellent example of this tactic can be found here, on page 2.] But, these repairs, carried out 'on-the-hoof', fail to address the core problems that Hegel's theory was itself supposed to have addressed and then solved -- which is why DM-theorists like Lenin were keen to import it into Marxism. Before I examine how Lenin thought Hegel had done this, it might be a good idea to fill in some of the background details.
Hegel's Response To Hume
In reply to (7) above, it is worth recalling that Hegel invented this way of characterising change by appropriating and then adapting Kant's response to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation. Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume and the Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution pushed necessitating causation off into the Noumenon, about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect; he found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that every determination is also a negation (which, by the way, neither Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to justify -- more about that in Essay Twelve), and in (2) His argument that the LOI "stated negatively" implies the LOC (which, unfortunately, it doesn't).1a
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A, "determinate negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A. [I am, of course, simplifying greatly here! I have reproduced Hegel's argument below for those who think I might have misrepresented him.]
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".
From this, the "unity of opposites" was born. So, the link between cause and effect was now given by this 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction between these logically-linked "opposites".
Plainly, this paired, unique opposite, not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide his readers with no explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed to just any old not-A -- say, B, or, indeed, something else, C, for example -- all of which would also be not-A, too.
So, since B and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he would have had no effective answer to Hume.
[Hume, of course, wouldn't have denied that A changes into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have pointed out that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A to change into what we have always, or what we have in general, experienced before. There is no logical link, however, between A and what it develops into since there is no contradiction in supposing Ato change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply is successful!)]
Hence, Hegel introduced this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique "other" that was 'internally' connected to A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate negation' from A. [How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and criticism of it -- can be found in Essay Eight Part Three.]
This special not-A was now the unique "other" of A. Without it Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.
Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the above 'rationale'; as far as I can see, of the DM-classicists, only Lenin seems to be aware of it!), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And, that is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet") is integral to classical DM; it supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.
[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms, and those of more recent Humeans, and which do not thereby make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the reader is directed to Hacker (2007), and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
Lenin Endorses Hegel's Theory
Here is Lenin's acknowledgement and endorsement of this principle:
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Lenin (1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation is found on p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentiallycontained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961), p.225, quoting Hegel (1999),pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in the original.]
Lenin wrote in the margin:
"This is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.225.]
To which he added:
"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel." [Ibid., p.179.]
This shows that Lenin understood this to be a reply to Hume, and that it was central to comprehending dialectics.
It is worth quoting the entire passage from Hegel's Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied into the above Notebooks -- pp.225-28):
"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself.Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of theimmediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.
"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simpledetermination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negativejudgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.
"The second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation." [Hegel (1999), pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting several minor typos.]
The most relevant and important part of which is this:
"It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequentlyas contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid. Bold emphases alone added.]
This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not the logical reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel notes. Hence, Lenin was absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding" DM -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and unworkable as a result!
Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the 'Shorter Logic':
"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]
[The problems these rather odd ideas in fact create for Hegel are outlined here.]
Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or even (3) Reject the idea that these 'opposites' are internally-related as one "other" to another specific "other", will leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.
[For Hegel's other comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b), pp.369-75.]
In which case, Hegel's theory (coupled with the part-whole dialectic) was at least a theory of causation, change and of the supposed logical development of history; so the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental -- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has a logic to it. Hence, Hegel's 'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent incarnations of them (which, combined with contemporary versions of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith was of course a friend collaborator of Hume's) in essence feature in much of modern economic theory and philosophy, and thus in contemporary criticisms of Marx's economics and politics) -- are a direct threat to this idea. If these bourgeois critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner logic' to capitalism.
[This dependency on Hegel's theory of causation and change also supplies us with an explanation for the implicit teleology anddeterminism in DM, providing its acolytes with hope in a hopeless world. More on this in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two. The mystical and rationalist foundations of this approach to change are outlined here, here, here and here.]
As far as I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even noticed!) this aspect of their own theory. The only authors that I am aware of who take this aspect of DM into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which are the most sophisticated I have so far seen (on this topic), in other Essays published at this site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight Part Three. [However, since writing this I have also come across some of Charles Bettelheim's comments that suggest he, too, understood this point.]
Incidentally, this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any of these, they couldn't be 'logically' connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been logico-conceptual or necessary development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless enough to introduce 'external contradictions' into their system would in effect be 're-Hume-ing' Hegel, not putting him 'back on his feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that 'external contradictions' were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]
[I have analysed several other fatal defects implicit in the idea that there can be 'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature or society) in Essay Eleven Part Two, here and here.]
The problem is that even though Hegel's theory sort of works -- if one is both an Idealist and p*ss-poor logician (more on this in Essay Twelve Part Five) --, it can't work in HM, for the reasons outlined in this Essay -- since, if this theory were true, change would be impossible!
So, if, for instance, the relations of production and the forces of production, the proletariat and the capitalist class, are linked as 'contradictory opposites' in the way that Hegel supposed (upside down or 'the right way up') -- which they will have to be, or Hume's criticisms (or more modern versions of them) will have their place --, then the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class -- and vice versa!
So, if, for instance, the relations of production and the forces of production, the proletariat and the capitalist class, are linked as 'contradictory opposites' in the way that Hegel supposed (upside down or 'the right way up') -- which they will have to be, or Hume's criticisms (or more modern versions of them) will have their place --, then the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class -- and vice versa!
It could be argued that the proletariat will in fact change into the ruling-class, its opposite. So, this theory is at least correct here.
But, the opposite of the proletariat isn't just any old ruling-class, it is the capitalist class. This class is the unique "other" of the proletariat with whom they are 'internally' linked. Hence, the former must change into the latter, and vice versa, if this theory were correct. Workers struggle with capitalists, and so, according to this theory, they must change into them, thus making socialism impossible.
Anyway, did the peasant class in the Middle Ages change in to the ruling-class of their day? Or, vice versa? Did the slaves in Ancient Rome change into the Aristocracy? Or, vice versa? But, they should have done this if DM were correct.
[On this, also see Note 1.]
These Criticisms Are Completely Misguided Since They Ignore 'Opposite Tendencies'
Considering now the first half of (8) above, it could be pointed out that Lenin actually argued as follows:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
As one critic of my argument put things (this is in fact one of the few detailed and carefully argued responses to my objections I have encountered in the last eight years on the Internet):
"This is a complete misreading of the law of unity and interpenetration of opposites. To borrow Rosa's symobology (sic), a contradiction means in essence that an entity A contains internally contradictory tendencies O* and O** which cause A to turn into not-A. The struggle within A is between O* and O**, the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*) and the internal forces acting on it to change (O**). The whole essence of dialectics is that O* and O** can not exist within a stable equilibrium. Rosa quotes Lenin saying quite clearly that we are not dealing with O*turning into O**, but with the working-out of 'internally contradictory tendencies' within A.
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity; it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**).
"Now, Rosa's going to object that dialectics pictures entities that 'struggle with' what they are going to become, which presupposes that these entities already exist. But this is because she fails to distinguish between the realized entities A and not-A, and the internal tendencies O* andO**. When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism....
"Again, Lenin talks about these tendencies in phenomena and processes that elude your grasp. The above is precisely what I have been illustrating with the difference between A (the entity) and O*/O** (its contradictory tendencies) that you have not understood.
"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*." [Bold added.]
"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*." [Bold added.]
Readers will look long and hard and to no avail to find where I say that things "change into their contradictions", but into theircontradictories, in this case into not-A (which is what the DM-classics tell us). Just as they will look long and hard for a single quotation from the DM-classics (certainly this critic offered none) that supports this revisionist reading of the theory. The above critic will also need to tell us why not-A isn't the 'contradictory' of A.
It could be objected that the above critic did refer us to this quotation from Lenin:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)." [Lenin (1961), p.357. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
However, when asked (several times), the above critic refused to comment on this quotation from Lenin:
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin (1961), p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
According to the above, the opposite tendencies within A -- that is, "the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*)" and "the internal forces acting on it to change (O**)" must change into one another. But, how can they do that if each of them already exists? No wonder this critic ignored Lenin's words. [However, see below.]
But, what about this part of the argument?
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity; it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**)."
Unfortunately, this ignores the philosophical background to Hegel's theory (which Lenin accepted, even if he had to put it "back on its feet"). That background was outlined above.
It could be argued that this critic has answered the point made by Lenin (that opposites are transformed into one another):
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites. This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the internal tendencies O* and O**."
And yet this fails to explain why O* and O** do not change into one another. Despite being pressed on this many times, this critic refused to respond. Moreover, this isn't to look "at the outside". [Whatever that means! More on this below.] The DM-classics are quite clear, this applies to "everything existing", and it is an "absolute":
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Ibid., p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]
"Of course, the fundamental proposition of Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted from here.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. In all of the above, bold emphases alone added; quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
[And these are only from the classics; we have seen that 'lesser' DM-works also say the same thing. However, this critic was a fellow Trotskyist, and so might not be prepared to accept what Mao had to say. But, as we can see, Mao was merely echoing Lenin.]
It could be argued that some of the above passages merely say that everything changes into its opposite; they don't say that they change into one another. But, if everything changes into its opposite, and that opposite is also part of everything, then it too must change into its opposite; that is, O* must change into O**, and O** must change into O*.
But, what of the argument itself? Are "tendencies" causal agents? Aren't they (i.e., both the tendencies and the changes) rather the result of other causes? For example, do we say that the "tendency" for glass to break is what makes it break, or do we appeal to inter-molecular forces within glass, and an external shock? But, can't we call these inner forces "tendencies", too? Are there such inner "tendencies" in glass? If there are, what are their causes? Or, are they uncaused? In fact, if we just appeal to "tendencies" to explain things, noting is explained. "Why did that glass break?" "It just has a tendency to do so." "Why is it raining?" "It simply has a tendency to do so in this area." "Why did those cops attack the strikers?" "They have a tendency to defend the bosses." So, an appeal to a "tendency" is no explanation at all.
Or, rather, if we insist on regarding and appeal to "tendencies" as an explanation, that must be because we also view the word as a shorthand for other causes (known or unknown) at work in the system. Consider the "tendency" of the rate of profit to fall. Is thatuncaused? But, no Marxist will argue it is. Indeed, Marxists point to several contributory causal factors that combine to make the rate of profit tend to fall over time. Would any of us have been satisfied if Marx had simply said there a "tendency" for the rate of profit to fall, and made no attempt to explain its cause/causes?
Hence, "tendencies" aren't causes; they are the result of one or more causes themselves. So, this critic is mistaken, an internal "tendency" can't "preserve A", nor can the opposite "tendency", O**, cause a "transformation into not-A", since these "tendencies" are derivative not causative. Indeed, as the DM-classics inform us, the cause of these "tendencies" is the "unity and interpenetration of opposites", the "contradiction" and the "struggle" that results from this.
As Gollobin points out (quoting Engels):
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a), p.414. Bold emphases added.]
So, as Lenin also noted, these 'internal opposites' not only struggle, they turn into one another:
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin (1961), p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
But, this can't happen, and for reasons explored above.
Well, perhaps it is the struggle between these "opposite tendencies" that causes A to change? Here is my critic again:
"When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism...."
But, the DM-classics are quite clear: when these opposites struggle, they change into one another, as noted above several times. [And it is no use this critic blithely asserting that this is to be found only in "some presentations" of the theory. It is found throughout the DM-classics and other DM-texts, as we have seen.] So, O* must change into O**, and vice versa. Otherwise, O* and O** will be changeless beings. If they themselves have causal powers, or are causal powers, then they, too, must also be objects (structures?), relations, or processes of some sort. In which case, they, too, must change. On the other hand, if they don't have causal powers, or they aren't causal powers, then, of course, they can't cause change themselves. And, we can see this critic also assumes this to be so, since he has stopped calling O* andO** "tendencies"; they have become the "capitalist class" and the "working class", respectively. And, these surely change one another, and thereby change themselves. They are the most important cause, or one of the most important causes, of change in Capitalism.
Indeed, this critic admits they do change:
"That is, A does not change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*."
And yet, if we ignore the impromptu 'theory' this critic has pulled out of thin air and accept the account given in the DM-classics, this can only happen if O* struggles with not-O*, and then turns into it, which puts us exactly where we were several paragraphs back. Of course, even though he adopted my "symbology", this critic failed to note that I had defined O**, for example, as not-O*. In which case, he has no explanation why O* changes into not-O*. Are there further tendencies within what are already tendencies? That must be so if this critic's theory is to work. There must be a tendency in O* that preserves it as O* -- let us call it, "T*" -- just as there must be a tendency to turn it into not-O* -- let us call this, "T**".
Does this go on forever, with a series of tendencies within tendencies within tendencies? It seems it must if all change (including each change of a tendency into whatever it changes into) is a result of these internal tendencies -- otherwise these tendencies must be changeless.
This seems to imply that every change involves a potentially infinite number of tendencies within tendencies within tendencies. Let us suppose it does imply this, and that each interaction between these inner tendencies takes, say, 10-10 seconds (i.e., each takes one ten-billionth of a second). Let us further suppose that there is a series of, say, 10100 of these tendencies within tendencies within tendencies. Now, even though this number is huge (i.e., it is one followed by a hundred zeros, and is called a Googol), it is way short of infinity. But, let us suppose there is this number of such inner, inner tendencies involved in each 'dialectical' change of an object/process into its opposite. If these changes (to those inner, inner tendencies) each take 10-10 seconds to complete, then any single change of an object/process into its opposite (i.e., A into not-A) will take 10-10 x 10100 = 1090 seconds to complete. If a year is 60 x 60 x 24 x 365 = 31,536,000 seconds, then each such change will take 1090/31,536,000 = 3.171 x 1083 years to complete -- that is, approximately 3 followed by 83 zeros years! If we take the latest estimate of the age of the universe as approximately 14 billion years (that is, 14 followed by nine zeros), then each 'dialectical change' -- even assuming there isn't an infinite series of these inner, inner tendencies -- would take approximately 2 x 1073 (i.e., 2 followed by 73 zeros) times longer to happen than the entire time that has elapsed since the 'Big Bang'!
On the other hand, an infinite series of these inner, inner tendencies will take an infinite number of years to complete. The universe would grind to a halt just as soon as it 'began'.
Of course, if there isn't an infinite number of these inner, inner tendencies, then at some point there will be a T* that changes into a T** (or even into a not-T*) that won't have been caused/initiated by an inner struggle of further tendencies. At this point, the theory will collapse, since it will then be clear that any change (all of which must begin with this very last uncaused tendency change) will be uncaused, and will just happen. So, since all change must begin with this first uncaused change, then 'dialectical change' will not ultimately be the result of a struggle between opposites, but will just happen and have no 'dialectical cause', and the DM-classics will stand refuted.
So, if this objector's theory were correct, then either (1) Change wouldn't have happened (but would have ground to a halt a billionth of a second or so after the Big Bang, or (2) Change isn't ultimately dialectical.
Anyway, this revisionist theory ignores the fact that the DM-classics tell us that such changes can only happen if O* and its opposite, not-O*, struggle with one another, and then change into one another. But, this cannot happen since they both already exist.
Once more, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall!
In which case, my refutation still stands.
[Readers are encouraged to read my lengthier reply to this critic, here. Several more objections are fielded here, and here.]
I return again below to the tendencies within capitalism that this objector thinks either tend to cause it to change or tend to make it remain the same (or which tend to make it resist change).
The idea behind the second half of objection (8) above seems to be the following point, made by Mao:
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another." [Mao (1961b), p.340. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Lenin seems to have agreed:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
[There are passages in Engels's work which appear to say the same sort of thing.]
Hence, it could be argued that the criticisms aired here seem to trade on the idea that dialectical contradictions are abstractions of some sort, or that they operate unconditionally, everywhere and at all times. As the above quotations show, the unity and identity of opposites applies to real, material processes, which have to be identified first (they can't just be invented, like the examples on show in this Essay), and they have to be studied dialectically so that the real contradictions they contain can be understood in all their complexity and as part of their inter-relationships with other objects and processes. Moreover, these contradictions operate conditionally and relatively. In which case, the criticisms in this Essay are completely misguided.
However, Lenin and Mao went on to point out the following:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
"Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever....
"Why is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible.
"Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?
"Lenin said:
'The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.'
"What does this passage mean?
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.341-42. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks also added to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, the struggle and the transformation into opposites is absolute, but the identity of opposites is conditional and relative. According to Mao it seems that the identity of opposites supplies some sort of constancy, while the struggle of opposites initiates change. [But, Mao isn't at all clear, so this might be to misrepresent him.]
However, my interpretation is partially supported by the very next thing Mao said:
"There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b), pp.342-43. Bold emphases added.]
Much of the difficulty interpreting Mao (and other dialecticians) lies in the fact that they all like to talk in riddles, perhaps on the assumption that enigmatic language will fool the unwary into mistaking it for profundity. [As we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, there were, and still are ideological reasons for this confused and confusing rhetorical flourish (which operates in a way analogous to the way the confused things said by Bishops and Imams function).]
Hence, in addition to the confusing passages above, we also find the following:
"We Chinese often say, 'Things that oppose each other also complement each other.' [The original gives the source of this remark -- RL] That is, things opposed to each other have identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. 'Oppose each other' refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. 'Complement each other' means that in given conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity.
"In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, '...there is an absolute in the relative.'" [Mao (1961b), p.343. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Mao is here quoting Lenin:
"The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Italic emphases in the original.]
And good luck to anyone trying to make sense of that!
Be this as it may, let us assume that the above criticism is valid, and that all such 'dialectical change' is relative and conditional -- the result will be no different. Consider, therefore the following modified argument:
Let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory,O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.
[Of course, the other complications considered earlier now only need to have the clause "which change only under conditions C" added to make them work, too -- but, I'll refrain from doing that, otherwise this Essay will become even more unwieldy. That unpleasant task is left to enthusiastic readers.]
The same sort of adjustment will also take care of this part of the above objection:
"The unity and identity of opposites apply to real, material processes, which have to be identified first (they can't just be invented, like the examples on show in this essay), and they have to be studied dialectically, so that the real contradictions they contain can be understood in all their complexity and in their inter-relationships with other processes."
In that case:
Let us suppose that real, concrete, material object/process A (proven to be such by a thorough dialectical, all-round analysis) is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O* and O**, and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O* can't itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory,O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.
Once more, the same dialectically-depressing denouement emerges at the end.
Of course, none of this denies change; it is just that DM cannot account for it.
Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Hence, howsoever we try to re-package this 'Law', we end up hitting the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Let it go comrades. Your defective theory of change cannot be made to work whatever repairs are attempted, or whatever modifications are hastily inflicted upon it!
Social Change
[On this, also see Note 1.]
The above 'problems' aren't solely confined to changes involving water molecules, tables or assorted furry mammals; they re-surface in different forms with respect to the structures and processes in 'Materialist Dialectics', too.
For example: if (1) All things change into their dialectically-paired opposites, if (2) Change is caused by the 'dialectical tension' between these opposites, and if (3) Capitalism is to change into Socialism, then Socialism must now exist somewhere for that to happen!
As far as revolutionaries are concerned, that observation alone means that not only is DM of no use to them, it is worse than useless.
But, is there any truth to this latest set of allegations?
In order to see that there is indeed more than enough it might be a good idea to examine the connection between the Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP], and Socialist Relations of Production [SORP] --, but, more pointedly, the link between the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively], where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other (their 'other', their 'opposite').
We have already had occasion to quote the DM-classics, and 'lesser' DM-texts to the effect that they hold to (1)-(3) above, but here is Marx himself extending this to the FP and the RP:
"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of productionwhich correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
"The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
"Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production." [Marx (1968), pp.181-82. Bold emphases added.]
[I return to the above quotation and this specific topic presently.]
For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP doesn't actually exist anywhere on earth right now. However, given the aboveDM-theses, if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, by struggling with it!
But, if SORP already exists, it can't have come from CRAP (its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change because of the action of its own opposite (namely -- SORP!) -- unless SORP actually exists before it exists!
The same comments apply to "potential SORP" (or even to some sort of "tendency to produce SORP", be this a 'sublated' tendency, or indeed a 'sublated' actuality -- it matters not).
In order to see this, let us call "potential SORP", "PSORP", and a 'sublated' "tendency to produce SORP", "TSORP".
According to the DM-classics, if PSORP is to change into SORP, it has to (1) struggle with its opposite, and (2) change into that opposite (or, certain tendencies within either or both of these must change them from 'within'; but we have already seen that this options leads to a dead-end). So, PSORP has to both struggle with and change into SORP. But, that means that SORP must already exist, otherwise PSORP will have nothing with which it can struggle. And, if that is so, PSORP can't change into it!
The same comments apply to any potential or tendency in CRAP to produce SORP. So, calling the tendency in CRAP to produce SORP, "TSORP", from earlier: if TSORP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist, otherwise no struggle can take place between them.
But, let us suppose there is a tendency in Capitalism to produce SORP (howsoever this is understood), and a tendency that opposes this. Let us call each of these "TCRAP" and "TCRAP*", respectively.
Once again, if these are 'dialectical opposites' (and always assuming they aren't the only changeless things/processes in the entire universe), they can only change by struggling with one another, thus changing into one another -- that is, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
However, they can't change into one another since they already exist!
Anyway, are we really supposed to believe that the tendencies in capitalism to produce socialism, and those tendencies that oppose it must change into one another -- for example, that, say, the working class (and/or the economic forces that drive workers into struggle) must change into the Capitalist Class/Police/Courts (and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles), and Capitalist Class/Police/Courts (and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles) must change into the working class (and/or the economic forces that drive workers into struggle)? But, that is what the Dialectical-Worthies assure us must always happen.
Once again, the same non-dialectical brick wall blocks our path.
Let us now assume that it is TCRAP that changes CRAP into SORP; that is, that there is a tendency in Capitalism that changes it into Socialism. But, if that is so, TCRAP must struggle with and change into CRAP, not SORP! That is because, and once more, the DM-Worthies tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into that with which it struggles. And, it is reasonably clear that TCRAP must exist somewhere in this universe if it to effect change.
In that case, the only alternative is that SORP must have popped into existence from nowhere --, or it must have always existed --, if DM were correct.
Once more, this isn't to deny change, nor is it to suggest that the present author doesn't want to see the back of CRAP and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, this will not only never happen, it can't happen.
To be sure, in the real world very material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists (and/or their lackeys), but neither of these turn into one another, and they can't help change CRAP into SORP, either, since neither of these is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, norvice versa.
Forces And Relations Of Production
Of course, the above problems afflict the social and material relations constitutive of each and every Mode of Production. We find Dialectical Marxists often asserting things like the following:
"Throughout the mature Marx's economic works the idea that a contradiction between forces and relations of production underlies the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production is present. More generally, such a contradiction accounts for history existing as a succession of modes of production, since it leads to the necessary collapse of one mode and its supersession by another....
"The power of the contradiction between relations and forces to act as the motor of history is also stated in the same place: 'at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production...within which they have been at work hitherto'; and 'from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters', thereby initiating social revolution." [Harris (1985), p.178, quoting Marx (1968), pp.181-82.]
There are, of course, many other DM-theorists who say the same sort of thing; I have quoted several of them in Note 1b.1b
If this is indeed a 'dialectical contradiction', then the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively] must be 'dialectical opposites', too, and if that is so, they must (1) Struggle with one another, and they must (2) Change into each other -- if the DM-classics are to be believed. Is it really the case that relations of ownership, exploitation and control will struggle with and then change into labour power, factories, motorways, airports..., and vice versa?
If so, no one seems to have noticed this remarkable transformation...
Can Cats Defy This Iron Law?
It is worth noting at the start that the relevancy of the comments in this section depend on what dialecticians mean by "internal opposite". As noted earlier, sometimes they seem to mean "spatially-internal", at other times they appear to mean "logically-internal". [This ambiguity is examined in more detail in Essay Eight Part One. However, much of this and subsequent sections depend on interpreting "internal opposites" in one way -- i.e., spatially. Even so, the other alternative (i.e., interpreting "internal opposites" logically) will also be considered. On the serious difficulties this equivocation creates for DM-theorists, see here. We have also seen an earlier objector who seemed to want to view these "opposites" spatially, when he spoke about considering the dialectical process externally -- i.e., "at the outside".]
Anyway, it is plain that this particular equivocation has arisen because of an inappropriate organicist metaphor dialecticians have inherited from Hegel. Of course, the parts of an organism are both spatially-, and logically-internal to that organism, but, when we move beyond Biology, this metaphor loses whatever plausibility it might once seem to have had, and the above equivocation (between the spatial and the logical meaning of "internal") is bound to create problems -- indeed, as we are about to find out.
So, as we have seen, if cats change, as surely they do, then they must both struggle with and change into their opposites. But, where are these 'opposite cats' with which they are supposed to be struggling? And, how do they feature in and cause the changes they allegedly bring about in the original animal? On the other hand, if they don't do this, does this mean that feline parts of nature aren't subject to dialectical law? Is this why cats have nine lives?
Figure One: Another Dialectical Catastrophe?
Now, Engels did at least try to address these fatal objections to his theory; he argued that we must learn from nature what the actualproperties of objects and processes are in each case, and hence, presumably, what each can legitimately change into. [To be sure, he made this point in relation to the First and Third of his 'Laws' (the change of 'Quantity into Quality' and the 'Negation of the Negation', respectively), but there is no reason to suppose he would have denied this of his Second 'Law' (the 'Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites').] In addition, he pointed out that 'dialectical negation' isn't annihilation. [Engels (1954), p.63 and (1976), p.181.]
However, nature and society are annoyingly ambiguous in this respect. For example, lumps of iron ore can turn, or be turned into many different things (with or without the input of human labour, etc.). These include: cars, car parts, rolling stock, aeroplane components, ships, submarines, magnets, surgical equipment, surgical appliances, cutlery, kitchen utensils, scaffolding, chains, bollards, barriers, cranes,plant machinery, pumps, tubes, engines, ornaments, jewellery, girders, weapons, sheet metal, tools, instruments, wire, springs, furniture, doors, locks, keys, gates, grates, manhole covers, lifts, escalators, anchors, railings, rail tracks, wheels, zips, bars, handcuffs, bullets, iron filings, rivets, nails, screws, steel wool, steel helmets, armour, iron (dietary) supplements -- alongside other assorted naturally occurring or artificial substances, such as, cytochrome nitrogenase, haemoglobin, hematite, magnetite, taconite, ferrofluids, countless ferrous and ferric compounds (including rust, Ferrous and Ferric Sulphides, Fools Gold, etc., etc.) -- to name but a few.
Are we really supposed to believe that all of these reside inside each lump of iron? Or, which are 'logically' connected with them, as one of Hegel's unique "others"? Or are we to suppose there are 'inner tendencies' quietly humming away in each block of iron ore, just waiting for the chance to turn into a pair of handcuffs or a manhole cover? On the other hand, if we adopt the 'logical view' of "internal opposites", how can all of the above be logically-related to iron ore as its unique "other"? If not, what exactly is the point of this 'Law' if iron can change, or be changed into any of the above items? If each one isn't the unique "other" of iron ore, and yet iron ore can be turned into all of them, then that fact alone seems to return a rather unfavourable verdict concerning the validity of this 'Law': iron ore has no 'other'.
Again, switching back to the 'spatial view' of "internal opposites": if these items don't in fact exist inside each lump of iron -- or, even if they don't confront each other as antagonistic external or 'logical' opposites --, how is it possible for human labour and/or natural forces to turn iron ore into the above things (and more) while remaining in conformity with 'dialectical Law'? Does human labour work with, or work against, the 'Laws' of dialectics? If a lump of iron doesn't (logically or spatially) 'contain', say, a carving knife, how is it possible for human beings to change iron into carving knives, and for this to be done dialectically? Are there changes in nature and society that aren't governed by 'dialectical law'?
Are these iron 'Laws' not in fact applicable to iron itself?
In that case, exactly which opposites are ('logically'/physically) united in, or with any particular lump of iron ore? Or, indeed, with all such lumps?
Of course, it could be objected that the above considerations are ridiculous and completely misconstrue the nature of this 'Law'. No one supposes that cats and nuggets of iron ore contain their opposites. Indeed, this is how Woods and Grant explained things:
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology, odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness in relation to the spin of subatomic particles.... There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.65.]2
But, if nature works in pairs (at least), what is the paired opposite of a cat that causes that animal to change? If they have no opposites, then these feline parts of nature (at least) don't exist, or interact, in 'dialectical pairs'. And, whatever applies to cats must surely apply to countless other things, too. What then are the external and/or internal opposites of things like the following: Giraffes, Snowy Owls, Mountain Gorillas, Daffodils, Oak trees, Chinese Puzzles, broom handles, craters on the Moon, copies of Anti-Dühring, the ten thousand-and-first moth to hatch in Cook County, Illinois, USA, in May 2012 -- or the question mark at the end of this sentence (on your screen, not mine)? All of these are subject to change, but not, it seems, as a result of any obvious oppositional pairing, tension or 'struggle' with anything unique to each.
Is a question mark, for example, really locked in a life-and-death struggle with other punctuation marks? Or, even with its Hegelian 'other'? But, what is the 'other' of a "?"? An "!"?
It could be objected to this that in the case of cats (and some of the other objects listed above), the opposites concerned are plainly "male" and "female". But, even if that were so, these are manifestly not "internal opposites", and neither are they "internally related" to each other -- they are causally, historically and biologically related. Sexual diversity isn't a logical feature of reality -- if it were, there would be nohermaphrodites or asexual organisms. So, change in this case can't be the result of any 'internal contradictions' that exist between male and female organisms.
Even if this weren't so, is it really the case that males and females must always conflict/'struggle'? [Anyone who has, for example, seenLeopard Slugs mating might be forgiven for thinking that these fortunate creatures have had a dialectical exemption certificate encoded into their DNA at some point. They do not 'conflict'!]
Moreover, the following research would have to be ruled out in advance by all half-way decent DM-fans, since it violates DL, as the latter supposedly features in sexual reproduction:
"'Three people, one baby' public consultation begins
"A public consultation has been launched to discuss the ethics of using three people to create one baby. The technique could be used to prevent debilitating and fatal 'mitochondrial' diseases, which are passed down only from mother to child. However, the resulting baby would contain genetic information from three people -- two parents and a donor woman. Ministers could change the law to make the technique legal after the results of the consultation are known.
"About one in 200 children are born with faulty mitochondria -- the tiny power stations which provide energy to every cell in the body. Most show little or no symptoms, but in the severest cases the cells of the body are starved of energy. It can lead to muscle weakness, blindness, heart failure and in some cases can be fatal. Mitochondria are passed on from the mother's egg to the child -- the father does not pass on mitochondria through his sperm. The idea to prevent this is to add a healthy woman's mitochondria into the mix. Two main techniques have been shown to work in the laboratory, by using a donor embryo or a donor egg.
"How do you make a baby from three people?
"1) Two embryos are fertilised with sperm creating an embryo from the intended parents and another from the donors. 2) The pronuclei, which contain genetic information, are removed from both embryos but only the parents' is kept 3) A healthy embryo is created by adding the parents' pronuclei to the donor embryo, which is finally implanted into the womb.
"However, mitochondria contain their own genes in their own set of DNA. It means any babies produced would contain genetic material from three people. The vast majority would come from the mother and father, but also mitochondrial DNA from the donor woman. This would be a permanent form of genetic modification, which would be passed down through the generations.
"It is one of the ethical considerations which will be discussed as part of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority's consultation. The chair of the organisation, Prof Lisa Jardine, said: 'It is genetic modification of the egg -- that is uncharted territory. Once we have genetic modification we have to be sure we are damn happy.' She said it was a question of 'balancing the desire to help families have healthy children with the possible impact on the children themselves and wider society'....
"However, treatments in IVF clinics will be years away even if the public and ministers decide the techniques should go ahead. There are still questions around safety which need to be addressed. One of the pioneers of the methods, Prof Mary Herbert from Newcastle University, said: 'We are now undertaking experiments to test the safety and efficacy of the new techniques. This work may take three to five years to complete.'" [Quoted from here. Some links added; several paragraphs merged to save space. Bold emphases in the original. Accessed 17/08/2012.]
What price the UO if it is so easily by-passed/abrogated by reactionary scientists like these?
To be sure, modern medicine is quite remarkable; a few snips of the surgeon's scissors and Bob's your aunty. And yet -- but this should hardly need pointing out -- males do not change into females (nor vice versa), unaided and of their own accord, which is what the DM-classics tell us must happen with all such opposites.
Moreover, while it is true that cats are able to reproduce because of well known goings-on between the male and the female of the species, cats themselves do not change because of the relationship between the opposite sexes of the cat family. If they did, then a lone cat on a desert island would be capable of living forever (or, at least, of not changing). In that case, as long as this eternal (and miserably celibate) moggie kept clear of members of the opposite sex, it would be able to look forward to becoming a sort of feline Super-Methuselah.
But, what are we to say of those organisms that don't reproduce sexually? And worse, what are we to make of, say, hermaphrodites? Are the latter an expression of some sort of cosmic, bourgeois plot against DM? Even worse, what about Pseudohermaphroditism?3
Some might think hermaphrodites are perfect examples of the "unity of opposites", but this can't be so, or male sex cells would turn into female sex cells (and vice versa), after "struggling" with them, if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.
In that case, the above passage from RIRE does little to help resolve this problem.
[RIRE = Reason In Revolt; i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]
On the other hand, if cats don't change as a result of the machinations of their external and/or 'logical' opposites, but because of their 'internal contradictions', or maybe their 'internal opposite tendencies', then factors topologically internal to cats must surely be responsible for their development (if, as noted above, we interpret "internal" spatially -- since we seem to have got nowhere interpreting this doctrine 'logically'). Should we now look inside cats for these illusive opposites? If so, do these opposites appear at the level of that animal's internal organs, or somewhere else? But what is the opposite of, say, a cat's liver? Does it have one? If not, is it an everlasting liver? On the other hand, if it does have an 'opposite', will a cat's liver one day turn into a cat's 'non-liver'? -- A fossil trilobite, say, or the Dog Star, maybe?
In order to discover what the 'internal contradictions'/'opposing tendencies' are in this case, perhaps we should delve even deeper into the inner recesses of these awkward, feline aspects of 'Being'?
[In order to reduce the amount of pedantic detail I will omit reference to 'opposing tendencies'; readers can assume they are included in what follows.]
If cats' livers have no opposites, then perhaps their liver cells do? But, once more, what is the opposite of a cat's liver cell? A kidney cell? A blood cell? (An onion cell?)
As we ferret deeper into the nether regions of feline inner space, perhaps these elusive opposites will appear at the molecular or atomic level? Some dialecticians seem to think so -- but they have only been able to argue this by ignoring their own claims that all of natureworks in pairs. [In that case, we have yet to be told what, say, the River Amazon is twinned with, let alone what the Oort Cloud's dialectical alter ego -- its "other" -- could possibly be.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that 'internal opposites' actually involve the relations that exist between sub-atomic or inter-atomic forces and processes at work inside cats, lumps of iron, and much else besides.
But, if each thing (and not just each part of a thing), and each system/process in the Totality, is a UO (as we have been assured they are by the above DM-luminaries), then cats and iron bars (and not just electrons, π-mesons (Pions) and positrons, etc.) must have their own internal and/or external opposites -- that is, if they are to change.
So, for a cat to become a 'non-cat' -- which is, presumably, the 'internal' or 'external' opposite it is supposed to turn into --, it must be in dialectical tension with that opposite in the here-and-now if that opposite is to help initiate that change. [We saw this in abstract formearlier.] If not, then we can only wonder what dialecticians imagine the forces are (and from whence they originate) that cause cats, or lumps of iron, to change into whatever their opposites are imagined to be.
Furthermore, even if molecular, inter-atomic or sub-atomic forces actually power the development of cats, they will in general still have to change because of their paired macro-level opposites (whose identities still remain a mystery). It isn't as if each cat is struggling against all the protons, electrons and quarks there are beneath its fur. Nor are we to suppose that cats are constantly conflicting with their internal organs, fur or whiskers. If they were, then according to DM-lore quoted earlier, cats would have to turn into their internal organs, fur or whiskers, and the latter would have to turn into cats!
Moreover, even if sub-atomic particles were locked in a sort of quantum wrestling match with one another, the changes they induced in the average 'dialectical moggie' must find expression in macro-phenomena at some point, or cats wouldn't alter at all. But what on earth could those macro-phenomena be?
Additionally, if change is to be located ultimately at the quantum level, then what are all those sub-atomic particles changing into? Many are highly stable. But, even supposing they aren't -- and if the DM-classics are to be believed -- whatever they change into must exist right now if it is to cause them to change into it. And yet, if these opposites already exist, the original particles can't change into them. The very best that could happen here is that these 'opposite particles' must replace the originals (which then magically disappear!).
In which case, given this view of nature, things don't actually change, they just vanish, while other (seemingly identical) objects and processes take their place -- and they do so undialectically, too, since their opposites will have simply vanished; they won't have changed into them.
But, with no more 'opposites' to motivate them, they plainly can't be subject to further change.
If we now ask what the 'inner tendencies' are that cause live cats to change into dead cats, it isn't easy to come up with a viable candidate. Some might point to catabolic and anabolic processes as precisely these 'inner tendencies', but these process aren't tendencies, they are manifestly causal (which tendencies aren't, as we have seen).
But, let us assume these processes (anabolism and catabolism) are (possible) viable candidates here -- even then this will fall flat. As was noted earlier:
Will anabolic processes become catabolic processes, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact, these processes don't even struggle with one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we were to believe everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[Since I have devoted several sections of Essay Seven Part One to this very point, the reader is re-directed there for more details.]
Since these processes don't change into one another (which we were told should happen to all such opposites), it isn't easy to see how DM can account even for change to cats!
Human Input
If it is further complained that in many of the above examples human intervention must be taken into account, for, plainly, it is human labour that changes many of the processes that already occur, or which might occur naturally, into the artificial products mentioned earlier. Because of this, different principles must apply since our activity will have interfered with the normal operation of the natural opposites of things like, say, iron ore.
Or, so it might be claimed.
But, aren't we part of nature?
Putting that awkward reminder to one side for now (anyway, I have already dealt with this 'objection', here), what about those substances that didn't exist (as far as we know) before human beings made them? Has humanity made things that are above and beyond dialectical 'Law'?
Is plastic, for instance, governed by dialectical 'Law'? What then is the natural/"unique" 'opposite' of polyethylene? Is that 'opposite', whatever it is, the same as the 'opposite' of Polypropylene, polybutylene terephthalate (PBT), polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride (PVC), andpolymethylpentene (TPX)?
Again, if each of these plastics does indeed have a "unique" opposite (which they must have, or they couldn't change -- if the DM-classics are to be believed), how is it that human labour is able to make/bring into existence each of these opposites at the same time as making each new plastic? Or, was this (extra creation of this 'unique opposite') done by default, a side-effect, as it were? Do these 'unique opposites' pop into existence in some sort of metaphysical antechamber the moment we invent/manufacture each of the above plastics? If not, how are such plastics ever going to change if there are no opposites with which they can then begin to struggle?
[Incidentally, it is no use appealing to the inter-atomic, or sub-atomic forces here as the cause of change in the above substances, since that would leave the unique "other" of, say, PVC out of the picture. And, as we have seen it must have a unique "other" if it is to change -- according to the DM-classics. Anyway, do these inter-atomic, or sub-atomic forces change into one another? Do protons, for example, struggle with and then change into electrons? (Or, is it positrons?) If so, a Nobel Prize awaits the first DM-fan to publish on this.]
Furthermore, if human labour is able to turn plastics into all manner of things (such as bottles, bags, food containers, guttering, drainpipes, insulation, toys, car parts, pens, keyboards, DVDs, cell phone casings, chess pieces, etc., etc.), do they not therefore have countless artificial (or is it natural?) 'opposites' themselves -- namely the things we turn them into? [Do they really have as many 'opposites' as the things we can change these plastics into?] And, were all these artificial 'opposites' created the moment the original substances/artefacts were first manufactured? All of them? But, they must have been, since, according to the dialectical classics, every object in the universe has a unique 'opposite' (its "other"), and sooner or later turns into that 'opposite' -- and they do this by struggling with that 'opposite'. Or, these changes happen because we struggle with these 'opposites'. So, has anyone in human history struggled with the plastic bag they hoped to manufacture, before they made it? If so, they must also have changed into it, and it into them! Has anyone noticed these shape-shifting human beings?
On the other hand, and once again, if these 'opposites' only popped into existence when the above plastics were changed into them (meaning that human labour can't have created these 'opposites' in the act of making the original plastic substance/artefact), how is it possible for those non-existent 'opposites' to 'contradict' the existent unchanged plastic so that that plastic could be changed into them?
Even worse: if the 'opposite' of, say, PVC causes it to change, how does human labour feature anywhere in this transformation? What is the point of building factories and studying polymer chemistry, for example, if (according to the DM-classics) the 'opposite' of PVC is what changes lumps of PVC into plastic buckets or storage containers, all by itself? When human beings work on PVC to change it into all of the many things that they can and do change it into (using complex techniques and expensive machinery), are they merely onlookers -- not part of the action, as it were --, just viewing things that would have happened anyway, naturally?
Or, have the capitalists discovered a way of by-passing dialectical 'Law'? Are all polymer scientists, therefore, reactionaries?
But, if human labour [HL] can change such things into their 'opposites', then that must mean that HL is the unique 'opposite' of, say, PVC, otherwise it couldn't change it into anything (according to the above DM-worthies). In that case, HL must change into PVC -- and vice versa!
Use Value And Exchange Value
We are also told that exchange value [EV] is "congealed labour time" [LT]. That is, of course, a serious problem since use value [UV] is supposed to 'contradict' EV -- but, UV and EV do not seem to "struggle" much either, either with one another or with anything else. But, according to the Dialectical Gospels, UV must both struggle with and change into EV. Has anyone ever witnessed this 'abstract wrestling match'?
Here is Scott Meikle (who might have):
"All the contradictions of capitalist commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....
"The simple form of value itself contains the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value.... [Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]
Despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?
"The poles of an opposition are not just united. They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]
Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted, it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this is just anotherbrute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe. [I have elaborated this argument in considerable detail in Essay Eight Part Two.]
Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has reified the products of social relations (UV and EV) and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or, perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the word "repel" here? Do they actuallyrepel each other (like magnets, or electrical charges)? Or, do we do this because of the way we manufacture use values and then exchange them?
And, do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another, as the DM-classicists assured us they must?
Furthermore, how can the forms that underpin UV and EV (i.e., the equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of the forces Meikle mentions? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial pre-conditions -- the most important of which is that they should at least have the decency to exist. But, these two forms can't co-exist. This is what Marx had to say:
"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at the same time? On the other hand, if they both do co-exist, so that they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other? [Again, I have said much more about this in Essay Eight Part Two.]
Other than conceptually, how then can they repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other objects and processes to repel -- anything?
This is, of course, the unyielding rock upon which we have seen all such Idealist speculations founder.
It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thoughts about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist, for if they could, they wouldn't 'mutually exclude' one another! On the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't eventhink of them acting on one another, for if we were to so think, we must, of necessity, misconceive them.
Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling match taking place in our heads, such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare equivalent form the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK rules)?
Figure Two: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks Relative Form In A Skull Near You
It could be objected that the fact that something is a relative form excludes it from being an equivalent form. This is where the opposition arises; the one is the opposite of the other.
But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as I have shown here.
Of course, in Marxist economics we have (1) Labour Power [LP] and (2) Capital [C] cycles, and the like, but does LP really "struggle" against C? Not obviously so, it would seem. As we have already noted, very material workers most certainly struggle against their equally material bosses, but how is it possible for LP to struggle against C?
Someone might object that this misrepresents DM; it is the inherent dialectical contradiction between capital and labour (or that between the relevant classes) that foments struggle.
Perhaps so, but until we are told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, that response itself is devoid of sense (since it contains a meaningless phrase: "dialectical contradiction"). [More on that in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three.]
The Real Source Of The Problem
Hegel's Hare-Brained 'Logic'
As we have seen, this 'theory' is just an elaboration of the following and classic example of a priori Superscience concocted by the Mystery Meister Himself:
"Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174. Bold emphases added.]
As this quotation indicates, and as Essay Eight Part Three will demonstrate, Hegel made a quasi-'logical' attempt to 'derive' such 'opposites' from his criticism of the LOI, but his reasoning was defective from beginning to end -- and demonstrably so. The bottom line is that, far from specifying that each object was paired with its unique dialectical "other", Hegel inadvertently conceded that objects and processes were confronted on all sides by countless "others", fatally compromising his 'theory of change'.
Putting such technicalities to one side, and ignoring for the moment the question of how Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov knew this 'Law' was true of everything in the entire universe, for all of time -- this topic was examined in more detail in Essay Two -- when it is based solely on a ham-fisted and Idealist 'thought experiment', it is worth pointing out that many things seem to have no internally-interconnected opposites. For example, electrons, which, while they appear to have several external opposites (even though, as noted above, it isn't too clear what the opposite of an electron is -- is it a positron or is it a proton? --, it is clear electrons do not seem to turn into either of them), they appear to have no internal opposites as far as can be ascertained. In that case, they must be changeless beings -- or, if they do change, it can't be as a result of their "internal contradictions".4
Admittedly, electrons had only just been discovered in Lenin's day, but that makes his dogmatism even more puzzling -- especially when it is recalled that it was Lenin who insisted that all knowledge is provisional and relative.
Conclusion
DM is supposed to be the philosophy of change. As we have seen that description is about as accurate as describing George W Bush as a "peace monger".
Notes
1. There are several possible escape routes that the beleaguered DM-fan might want to take:
(1) O* 'changes', not into not-O*, but into not-O1*, meaning that: (a) There are now two not-O*s where once there was only one -- not-O1*and not-O* -- unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air (but, see below), or: (b) O* will have changed, not into its opposite, but into something that isn't its opposite, and with which it hasn't struggled. According to the DM-classics, O* should struggle with not-O* -- its opposite -- not with not-O1*, which isn't its opposite.
Or:
(2) (a) O* doesn't actually change, and/or (b) O* simply disappears. Plainly, O* can't change into what already exists -- that is, O* can'tchange into its opposite, not-O*, without there now being two of the latter (see option (1), above) where there was only one before. But, even then, one of these won't be not-O*, just a copy of it. In that case, once more: (i) O* either disappears, (ii) O* doesn't change at all, or, (iii) it changes into something else (but, not by struggling with what it changes into, otherwise, the same problems will simply re-emerge).
Or:
(3) Not-O* itself disappears in order to allow a new (but which is now a copy of) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if it has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict this new not-O* that confronted the old. If this new not-O* exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were a few paragraphs back in the main body of this Essay.
Or:
(4) O* and not-O* change into one another. But, as we will soon see, this option presents DM-theorists with even more serious difficulties, since it implies, for example, that capitalism must change into socialism, and socialism must change into capitalism!
But, worse: it isn't easy to see how this could happen if both of these already exist.
Anyway, as should seem obvious -- and among the other things already mentioned --, alternative (2) plainly means that O* doesn't in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- i.e., into O* --, according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created out of thin air!
In addition, option (4) has O* and not-O* changing into one another, meaning that either (i) there would be no net change, or, that (ii) O*and not-O* have just replaced one another. So, if we label, for instance, Capitalism, "C" and socialism, "S", then these two must co-exist if they are to "struggle" with one another (as Mao pointed out earlier), the net result being that in the end S and C still co-exist, only they will have now swapped places! Of course, if S already exists, C won't need to change into it, and socialists needn't fight to bring it about!
Furthermore, in relation to option (4) above, as already noted: S must already exist, or there couldn't be a struggle; but where did S come from? From C? And yet, it can't have come from C, since for C to change and produce S, S must already exist (or, once more, there would be no struggle)! Furthermore, where did C itself come from? Of course, C came from F (Feudalism), but that in turn means that C and Fmust have co-existed, too, so C can't have come from F (since, as we have just seen, they must co-exist if one is to cause the other to change)! Hence, this 'theory' implies that either (iii) C, S and F must all co-exist, or (iv) All three sprang into existence from nowhere.
Of course, C, S and F are all abstractions, and so can't possibly struggle with one another, but the same problems emerge if we concentrate on things that can and do struggle. Let W1 be any randomly-selected worker, or section of workers in struggle, and let C1 be those capitalists, or sections of the capitalist class and their bully-boys with which W1 struggles -- making C1 the 'dialectical opposite' of W1. But, according to the DM-classics, W1 must change into C1 and vice versa. But, this can't happen since both of these already exist; so, at best, all they can do is replace one another. Do we see this anywhere on the planet in connection with the class struggle?
Recall: if this theory were true, this would happen countless thousands of times a year as the capitalist class (or sections of it) struggles with workers (or sections of them)! If this theory is correct, this must happen every time bosses struggle with workers: they must change into one another!
The same difficulties arise if we project this into the future and consider the final struggle to overthrow capitalism (if and when that takes place). In that case, let W2 be that section of the workers' movement in actual struggle at that point, and let C2 be those capitalists (and/or those elements of the capitalist class and their hangers on that fight their battles for them) with which they are struggling. According to the DM-classics, W2 must change into C2, and vice versa. Again: this can't happen since both of these already exist; so, at best, all they can do here is replace one another. What is worse: this must continue happening indefinitely -- because the capitalist class and the working class will still exist and will therefore struggle with one another, endlessly changing into each other, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
Are we really all struggling just to become capitalists?
It could be objected that the working class does indeed become its opposite, it becomes the ruling class. I have dealt with that objection,here.
1a. Of course, the theory that change is the result of some sort of relation, interplay or 'struggle' between 'opposites' encapsulates ideas that stretch back into the mists of time. For example, it forms the basis of Manichean dualistic ontology, just as it underlies the Daoist belief in yin and yang. [In Appendix One of Essay Two I have posted several more examples of ancient and modern mystical systems that also adopted this world-view.] This doctrine is also central to Aristotle's theory of change; he credits the Presocratic Philosophers, Empedocles,Anaxagoras, Parmenides and Democritus, with different versions of this dogma, although it is also present in Heraclitus's thought, albeit in a very obscure form:
"All thinkers then agree in making the contraries principles, both those who describe the All as one and unmoved (for even Parmenides treats hot and cold as principles under the names of fire and earth) and those too who use the rare and the dense. The same is true of Democritus also, with his plenum and void, both of which exist, be says, the one as being, the other as not-being. Again he speaks of differences in position, shape, and order, and these are genera of which the species are contraries, namely, of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape, angular and angle-less, straight and round.
"It is plain then that they all in one way or another identify the contraries with the principles. And with good reason. For first principles must not be derived from one another nor from anything else, while everything has to be derived from them. But these conditions are fulfilled by the primary contraries, which are not derived from anything else because they are primary, nor from each other because they are contraries.
"But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result, as well as in the way just indicated.
"It is plain then that they all in one way or another identify the contraries with the principles. And with good reason. For first principles must not be derived from one another nor from anything else, while everything has to be derived from them. But these conditions are fulfilled by the primary contraries, which are not derived from anything else because they are primary, nor from each other because they are contraries.
"But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result, as well as in the way just indicated.
"Our first presupposition must be that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random, nor may anything come from anything else, unless we mean that it does so in virtue of a concomitant attribute. For how could 'white' come from 'musical', unless 'musical' happened to be an attribute of the not-white or of the black? No, 'white' comes from 'not-white'-and not from any 'not-white', but from black or some intermediate colour. Similarly, 'musical' comes to be from 'not-musical', but not from any thing other than musical, but from 'unmusical' or any intermediate state there may be.
"Nor again do things pass into the first chance thing; 'white' does not pass into 'musical' (except, it may be, in virtue of a concomitant attribute), but into 'not-white'-and not into any chance thing which is not white, but into black or an intermediate colour; 'musical' passes into 'not-musical'-and not into any chance thing other than musical, but into 'unmusical' or any intermediate state there may be.
"The same holds of other things also: even things which are not simple but complex follow the same principle, but the opposite state has not received a name, so we fail to notice the fact. What is in tune must come from what is not in tune, and vice versa; the tuned passes into untunedness -- and not into any untunedness, but into the corresponding opposite. It does not matter whether we take attunement, order, or composition for our illustration; the principle is obviously the same in all, and in fact applies equally to the production of a house, a statue, or any other complex. A house comes from certain things in a certain state of separation instead of conjunction, a statue (or any other thing that has been shaped) from shapelessness-each of these objects being partly order and partly composition.
"If then this is true, everything that comes to be or passes away from, or passes into, its contrary or an intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived from the contraries-colours, for instance, from black and white. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries." [Aristotle (1984b), pp.321-22.]
"If then this is true, everything that comes to be or passes away from, or passes into, its contrary or an intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived from the contraries-colours, for instance, from black and white. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries." [Aristotle (1984b), pp.321-22.]
As we will see, this doctrine also forms the backbone of Hegel's answer to Hume's attack on rationalist theories of causation.
Of course, DM-fans fail to tell their readers that their own theory of change owes much to Aristotle, probably since that would undermine their ill-informed criticisms of his logic.
On Aristotle's theory of change, see Bostock (2006). The writings of the Presocratics mentioned above are to be found in Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1999). On the Presocratics in general, see Barnes (1982). I have also covered this in Note 4 to Essay Eight Part One.
1b. Here are several other DM-theorists (drawn from different wings of Marxism) who say more-or-less the same sort of thing:
"Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new....
"When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the socio-historical process, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, they discovered the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology, etc.), and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society.
"When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." [Mao (1961b), pp.314, 328-29.]
"A dialectical materialist outlook and method, and its application to human society and its development, historical materialism, reveals that the defining contradictions of any society, and the motive force of change in society, is the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, along with the contradiction between the economic base (or the mode of production) and the superstructure (of politics, ideology, and culture). Engaging with this, in its more sweeping dimension, will establish a stronger foundation for grasping more clearly and deeply the essential reality that, in this era, and in the world right now, it is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, and other decisive contradictions which this continually gives rise to -- it is this, and the motion and development this gives rise to, more than anything else -- that is setting the overall framework of things and is compelling and driving change in the world, even as we, the conscious and organized vanguard forces, are striving to transform this motion and development from what it is to a course leading to the realization of communism -- a possibility which itself lies within the fundamental and defining contradictions of capitalism and can be achieved through the revolutionary resolution of these contradictions, throughout the world." [Bob Avakian, quoted from here. Italic emphasis in the original.]
"At this point one important confusion must be cleared up. Historical materialism has frequently been subject to a mechanical materialist distortion in which the dialectic of forces and relations of production is interpreted simply as an antagonism between the technical instruments of production ('forces') and the system of property ownership ('relations') which operates independently of human activity, thus arriving at a theory of technological determinism. In this interpretation both Marx's key concepts undergo a reduction in their meaning. For Marx the forces of production signify not only the instruments in the sense of tools, machines etc., but the total productive capacity of society including the productive activity of the working class. 'Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself.'... Property ownership, on the other hand, is 'but a legal expression of relations of production.' Thus the contradiction between the forces and relations of production is not separate from the class struggle but is the very ground on which the latter arises." [Molyneux (1983), p.16. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"The general contradiction is that between the forces and relations of production, though Marx doesn't come right out and make this point specifically. Instead he says that capital must develop the productive forces to their maximum 'regardless of the value and surplus-value it contains, and regardless of the social conditions under which capitalist production takes place'. At the same time capital must preserve the value of the existing capital and expand that value. The development of the productivity of labor negates its ability to do this." [Kapitalism 101, quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
2. Woods and Grant list several examples of internal and external opposites -- not really distinguishing between the two --, perhaps basing this prize example of sloppy thought on principles they learnt from far too little exposure to FL, and rather too much to DL.
[FL = Formal Logic; DL= Dialectical Logic.]
Since RIRE is now being quoted all over the Internet as the book to read on DM, a few words seem appropriate. To that end, the reader should consult my comments on this book in Essay Four (the links can be found in Note 7, of Essay Seven Part One), and those written by a supporter of this site, "LevD", here. [To assist the reader, the latter has now been re-posted here.]
3. Spare a thought, though, for the Australian Jewel Beetle, or rather the male of the species, which seems to have developed an unhealthy fixation for beer bottles:
"Beetles Die During Sex With Beer Bottles
"Jennifer Viegas
"Besotted beetles are dying while trying to get it on with discarded brown beer bottles, according to research conducted by Darryl Gwynne, a University of Toronto Mississauga professor.
"It's a case of mistaken attraction, because the beer bottles happen to possess all of the features that drive male Australian jewel beetles wild. They're big and orangey brown in color, with a slightly dimpled surface near the bottom (designed to prevent the bottle from slipping out of one's grasp) that reflects light in much the same way as female wing covers. Gwynne made these observations with colleague David Rentz.
"As a result, the beer bottles are irresistible to the male insects, which will die trying to mate with them in the hot Australian sun....
"Gwynne and Rentz were conducting fieldwork in western Australia when they noticed something unusual along the side of the road.
"He explained, 'We were walking along a dirt road with the usual scattering of beer cans and bottles when we saw about six bottles with beetles on top or crawling up the side. It was clear the beetles were trying to mate with the bottles.'
"The bottles –- stubbies as they are known in Australia, Canada and a few other countries –- resemble a 'super female' jewel beetle. Male beetles are so captivated by the bottles that they will gird their loins and go through the expected motions, refusing to leave until they fry to death, are consumed by hungry ants, or are physically removed by researchers.
"The male beetles are very particular about the bottles. Beer cans or wine bottles do nothing for them. It's all about the shape, color and texture and has nothing to do with booze. As the researchers wrote in their findings, 'Not only do western Australians never dispose of a beer bottle with beer still in it, but many of the bottles had sand and detritus accumulated over many months.'...
"Gwynne points out that the research supports a theory of sexual selection: that males of certain species, in their eagerness to mate, are often the ones making mating mistakes." [Quoted from the Discovery Science News page; 03/10/2011. Quotations marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site; spelling changed to UK English. Some paragraphs have been merged to save space. Link in the original; some links removed.]
Has evolution provided a new 'dialectical opposite' for these randy insects? If so, why has this development (in the forward march of theNON) only emerged in Australia?
Indeed, spare another thought for Hermaphrodites -- for example, the African Bat bug. This is what the New Scientist had to say about this odd insect:
"If you thought human sexual relationships were tricky, be thankful you're not an African bat bug. They show what could be the most extreme case of transsexualism yet discovered. Male bat bugs sport female genitalia, and some females have genitalia that mimic the male's version of the female bits -- as well as their own redundant vagina.
"Bat bugs, and their relatives the bed bugs, are renowned among entomologists for their gruesome and bizarre method of reproduction. Males never use the vagina, instead piercing the female's abdomen and inseminating directly into the blood, where the sperm then swim to the ovaries. It is this 'traumatic insemination', as it is termed, which is at the root of the extreme levels of gender bending in the African bat bug, says Klaus Reinhardt of the University of Sheffield, UK.
"Female bat bugs have evolved a countermeasure to the stabbing of the male's penis -- structures on their abdomens known as paragenitals. These are a defence mechanism that limits the damage by guiding the male's sharp penis into a spongy structure full of immune cells.
"When Reinhardt's team studied bat bugs in a cave on Mount Elgon, Kenya -- already famous as a place that elephants visit to mine for salt -- they found that the males also had defence genitals. What's more, they had scarring on their abdomens similar to that of the females following copulation. In other words, males had been using their penises to stab other males.
"If that isn't strange enough, when the team looked at 43 preserved female bat bugs, they found that 84% had male versions of the defence genitals. Females with this male version of female genitals had less scarring due to penetration than the other females.
"'This is what we think might have happened,' says Reinhardt. 'Males started getting nobbled (sic) by other males, so they evolved the female defensive genitals. As this reduced the amount of penis damage they were getting, females evolved the male version of the female genitals.'
"While theoretical models have predicted that females should evolve different morphologies to escape male attention, this is the first time it has been seen in genitalia, Reinhardt says. 'It's a spectacular example of evolution through sexual conflict.'" [New Scientist, 195, 2622, 22/09/07, p.11. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
It is to be hoped that the NON visits these highly confused insects one day to give them more than merely friendly marriage-guidance counselling.
And, it appears that scientists can now by-pass Engels's 'Law' almost at will:
"With a surprisingly simple genetic tweak, scientists have transformed nematode worms into hermaphrodites. They report in the journal Sciencethat lowering the activity of just two genetic pathways produces the change.
"Evolution from a species consisting of males and females into one consisting of only males and hermaphrodites happens naturally in many nematodes. A team of US researchers says their experiment explains how this might take place.
"They say it also provides a simple model helping scientists to work out the mechanism of evolutionary change. The researchers chose to study the evolution of female worms into hermaphrodites because it was a 'striking change' that occurred relatively recently.
"Ronald Ellis, a biologist from the University of Medicine and Dentistry New Jersey in the US, who led the research, said that most big evolutionary changes within species happened too long ago to study at the genetic level.
"'But this dramatic change happened fairly recently and in a group of animals that we know a lot about... that's why we're studying it to find out how complex traits are created,' he told BBC News.
"Dr Ellis said it was exciting to discover that, by lowering the activity of just two genetic pathways he and his team were able to 'take what should have been a female animal and turn it into a cell fertile hermaphrodite'. The two genes the researchers 'tweaked' were one involved in making sperm and another involved in activating them.
"'These were small changes to the activity of genetic pathways that already existed,' said Dr Ellis. 'So the pieces were already in place, they just had to be altered so they worked in a slightly new way.' He said the finding was surprising because it was such a simple change that produced a trait that was so dramatic.
"Genes of change
"The scientists use nematode worms as simple models to show how evolution works at a genetic level. 'We understand how evolution tweaks simple traits, like a giraffe's neck [getting] longer and longer over time,' he said. 'But most of the most important changes -- the creation of the eye, the development of feathers in birds, wings in insects -- involved the creation of novel traits.
"'The better we understand this, the better we can understand the kinds of changes that created humans from our ancestors.' Dr David Lunt, an evolutionary biologist from the University of Hull, UK, who was not involved in this study told BBC News that said this was an 'excellent experiment'.
"'Scientists study the evolution of sexual systems because it allows us to see all the forces of evolution at once,' he explained. 'We have very few model systems anywhere near as powerful as this one.'" [BBC News, 15/11/09. Emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Some paragraphs merged. See also here.]
I have given details of several other rather confused organisms that do not appear to 'understand' dialectics, here.
4. We have already seen that there are countless changeless objects in nature. [On this, see the recent Internet discussion I have had on this topic.]
Appendix A -- Mao On Change
The following material has been taken from Mao (1961b):
The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.
Engels said, "Motion itself is a contradiction." Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)". Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist. (p.316)
But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed -- a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing. [P.333.]
Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection or mutual co-operation -- all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity....
The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another. That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.
This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity?
The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without "above", there would be no "below") without "below", there would be no "above". Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, these would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty) without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies "how oppositescan be...identical". How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.
But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?
The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity.
Our agrarian revolution has been a process in which the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land, and it will be such a process once again. In given conditions having and not having, acquiring and losing, are interconnected; there is identity of the two sides. Under socialism, private peasant ownership is transformed into the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place everywhere else. There is a bridge leading from private property to public property, which in philosophy is called identity, or transformation into each other, or interpenetration. [Pp.337-39.]
War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed "how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...".
Why is it that "the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another"? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.
In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another. There are innumerable transformations in mythology, for instance, Kua Fu's race with the sun in Shan Hai Ching, Yi's shooting down of nine suns in Huai Nan Tzu, the Monkey King's seventy-two metamorphoses in Hsi Yu Chi,the numerous episodes of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings in the Strange Tales of Liao Chai, etc. But these legendary transformations of opposites are not concrete changes reflecting concrete contradictions. They are naive, imaginary, subjectively conceived transformations conjured up in men's minds by innumerable real and complex transformations of opposites into one another. Marx said, "All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature." The myriads of changes in mythology (and also in nursery tales) delight people because they imaginatively picture man's conquest of the forces of nature, and the best myths possess "eternal charm", as Marx put it; but myths are not built out of the concrete contradictions existing in given conditions and therefore are not a scientific reflection of reality. That is to say, in myths or nursery tales the aspects constituting a contradiction have only an imaginary identity, not a concrete identity. The scientific reflection of the identity in real transformations is Marxist dialectics.
Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever.
Why is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible.
Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?...
All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.
There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things. [Pp.339-43.]
We may now say a few words to sum up. The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought. It stands opposed to the metaphysical world outlook. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. Each contradiction and each of its aspects have their respective characteristics; this is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. In given conditions, opposites possess identity, and consequently can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other; this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle of opposites is ceaseless, it goes on both when the opposites are coexisting and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and becomes especially conspicuous when they are transforming themselves into one another; this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions and to the distinction between the principal aspect and the non-principal aspect of a contradiction; in studying the universality of contradiction and the struggle of opposites in contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the different forms of struggle. Otherwise we shall make mistakes. If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction. [Pp.345-46. Throughout, bold emphases alone added.]
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